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V l l l  
1.0 INTRODUCTION C S m  
This volm sumarizes work conducted in the second extension of the Phase A 
O r b i t  T r a n s f e r  V e h i c l e  Cmcept Definition and Systems Analysis Study. 
study was initiated in 1984 t o  consider the broad irplications and technologies 
involved w i t h  a new advanced upper stage which would represent NASA's workhorse 
vehicle for  orbital  transfers in the 1990's and beyond. 
the study concentrated on a Shuttlebased vehicle delivering primarily 
geosynchronous payloads. 
space-based. These vehicles were a l l  cryogaic, reusable, and aerobraked. The 
first study extension concentrated on the use of a large cargo vehicle (W) for 
delivering 0 " s  t o  l o w  Earth orbit. Here again a ground and space based family 
was needed with the s a w  general characteristics as before, although scmahat 
more ccenpact designs vere required for IfiJ packaging. 
This 
The init ial  phase of 
Two vehicle families w e r e  derived: ground-based and 
In this second study extension four mjo r  tasks w e  ichtified,  as follows: 
1) 
Leadership Initiative (CSLI) missions. 
Define an initial OTV program consistent with near-tern c i v i l  Space 
2) Develop program evolution t o  long tem advanced missions. 
3) 
Cargo Carrier (E) based OTV. 
Investigate the hplications of current STS safety policy on an A f t  
4) Expand tk analysis of high entry velocity aeroassist. 
In general, less -is was placed on mission -1s and life cycle cost 
analyses than for  the previous two phases. A n  increased eprpjlasis on the breadth 
of OTV applications was undertaken t o  show the need for the program on tk basis 
of the expansion of the nation's capabilities in space. 
driver missim set which specifies various growth options based on the Civil 
Needs Data Base (CNDB) . 
Use w a s  made of a 
Because of uncertainties i n  the availability of a new large cargo vehicle a 
program path w a s  derived w h i c h  utilized the STS for initial flights and then 
transition& t o  the heavy lift booster when available. 
expendable OTV t o  reduce front end costs and g r e w  in capabilities as required. 
A Shuttle based system w o u l d  also give an alternative near-tem GEO boost 
capability for heavy payloads (greater than 5000 lb); thus giving assured access 
t o  high energy orbits by matching and exceeding the capability of today's Titan 
N. A vehicle coanpatible w i t h  the proposed Shut t le  C w a s  also derived, although 
its subseqyent growth path is less clear. 
ambitious application, that of lunar base logistics, =re investigated. 
Although a number of subsystems require modification it appears tha t  a mdular 
OTV can be designed which performs transfers throughout the Earth-Moon space 
(including lunar landings) . 
bui1d.q and launch of a m ~ e d  Mars spacecraft w a s  also demnstrated. The use 
of aeroassist t o  increase the basic performance of larye inclination transfer 
missions would open polar orbits t o  visits from l o w  inclination orbital  bases. 
This path with an 
Issues involved w i t h  the most 
A method of uti l izing the OTV as the workhorse for 
1 
Safety assessnwt of the ACC OTV revealed a few m w  issues but in general 
confinred its desirability over the shuttle caryo bay as the boost location for 
a new STS crycgmic stage. 
encounters with the Earth and Mars was &elaped w h i c h  should be hvaluable in 
the future to a variety of programs. 
Finally, a large data base of aeroassisted 
The need for such an advanced 
leadership initiatives that NASA has proposed. 
beyond low Earth orbit is essential to expanding man's capabilities in t k  space 
environrrrent . 
stage is based in the bold new space 
Routine round-trip capability 
2 
2.0 MISSION h PROGRAM OPTIONS 
b 
In t h i s  second extension of the OTV pbase A study, use was made of a discrete 
driver mission set to define required levels of OTV capability. 
are derived frm the Civil Needs Data Base (CIDB) version 2.0, option 1, with 
deltas for the Earth, Lunar, and Unmanned Planetary Initiatives. 
mission set establishes tinepoints where qgrades in vehicle capabilities are 
recpiredto acccenplish spcific mission abjectives. 
conducted to establish vehicle capability breakpoints where no driving 
requirements exist. These cost analyses (docurrerrted in the Design Analyses 
section of this report) use a fixed Crrv payload size to derive flight rates 
required to support specific vehicle upgrades. 
These missions 
The driver 
Cost analyses were 
- 
LCV OTV ONLY 
INITIALLY EXPENDABLE 
RECOVERY A PROBLEM 
One of the m a i n  drivers for the OTV's future program path is its m3thod of 
delivery to low Earth orbit (Figure 2.0-1). 
cargo vehicle (W) by the mid 1990's would mst certainly drive the OTV to be 
m-based exdusively because of the larger lift capability and anticipated 
lower costs to orbit. 'RE very existence of an ICV, howevex, would tend to make 
STS downleg cargo bay space har&r to find since many deployed payloads not 
requiring manned support would be mDved off the shuttle. 
W-based OTV being either -le or space based because the W gives only 
a "one-way" ride to orbit. 
The availability of a new large 
This would result in 
OTV ON STS 
b INITIALLY EXPENDABLE 
RECOVERY OK 
O N  ON LCV 
+ SPACE BASED 
OR 
EXPENDABLE 
Figure 2.0-1 OTV Boost Cgions 
Two different options currently exist for the W ' s  payload bay size. 
traditional Shuttle derived vehicle (SDV) approach has a cargo bay diameter of 
25 ft. 
allowing rmchlar tankage distributed around a structural core (see results of 
the first study extension contained in V o l e  u(). 
concept has been proposed with a 15 ft diameter by 60 ft long cargo bay. This 
LCV would have good lift capability (1OOklb to low park orbit) but its sdler 
cargo bay would probably require a mre compact stage for volume efficiency. 
TIE 
This large size gives an OTV that has good gz-owth characteristics by 
Mre recently, the Shuttle C 
3 
Growth t o  higher capability missions would not be as favorable since M a r  
tankage would be more difficult  t o  integrate. 
Shuttle C OTV is discussed further i n  the &sign Analyses portion of this report 
(section 4.0) . 
A preliminary design for such a 
Another option is presented i f  the ICV is not operational by the mid 1990's. 
Rather than &lay the startup of a new upper stage, the Shuttle could be used as 
the delivery vehicle u n t i l  the LCV is available. =use the Shuttle's cargo 
bay would be freed up by the deployment of the oTv/payload ca&ined stack, it 
would be available for t k  return of a reusable OTV t o  the ground. The use of 
the aft cargo carrier (E) would a l l o w  a w i d e  diameter (up t o  27') OTV having 
good growth capabilities. 
cuuld transition over t o  it. 
deliver 12.5klb of payload t o  geosynchronous orbit with a 55klb ( to  110 m) 
payload capacity Shuttle. 
the OTV: the Shuttle and the LCV as w e l l  as f i l l ing  the gap in the Shuttle's 
performance brought on by the cancellatian of the STS/Centaur. 
i-hen the large cargo vehicle becarre available the OTV 
In an aqendable mode, such a vehicle could 
This approach would also give two paths t o  orbit for 
Thus two OTV options viere concentrated an: an D - o n l y  vehicle and one that 
begins on the Shuttle and then transitions t o  the LCV. The initial start ing 
point for the program was chosen t o  be a near t e n n  low-technology expendable 
vehicle t o  reduce the program's front-end costs. Such an approach a l l o w s  the 
incremental incorporation of vehicle hprovements over t i r e  in block 
d f i c a t i o n s  +red by mre advanced missons. It was f e l t  that the earliest 
date that such a vehicle could be made available wouldbe 1993 and so a vehicle 
with this I= date was used as a starting point. Later startup dates a l l o w  
cost-effective incorporation of new technologies into the in i t ia l  vehicle. 
issue is discussed further in the Desiqn Andlyses section ( 4 . 0 ) .  
This 
2.1 DRIVER MISSIONS 
Figure 2.1-1 sumnarizes the driver mission s e t  used in this study. 
represent discrete driver missions and not a t o t a l  mission m&l. 
scenario is derived f r m  NASA's Civil Needs Data Base ( W B )  version 2, cption 
#l. 
class missions spread over a 15 year t i r e  frame. 
by itself and as  a core with additions f r m  the three new C i v i l  Space 
Init iatives.  
Unmanned Planetary Initiative, and 3) Lunar Init iative.  
four driver mission sets. 
These 
The baseline 
This represents a conservative growth plan with a to ta l  of about 16 OTV- 
These more aggresive growth options are: 1) Earth Initiative, 2) 
This gives a total  of 
This baseline scenario is used 
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1996 1997 1998 1939 2010 
PLANETARY 
5.8 K, C3 = 28-32 
1996 
27 KLBM 
45.3 K STS LIFT 
41.9 K LCV LIFT 
45 KLBM 
65.7 K STS LIFT 
BASELINE 
SCENARIO 1 
EARTH 
INln ATlVE 
UNMANNED 
PLANETARY 
I N I n A n v E 
LUNAR 
INITIATIVE 
MULT. PR DELIV. GEO DELIVER) 
1998 2006 
12 K UP12 K DN 13.2 K PR 
31.4 KLBM 33.5 KLBM 
RACK EXPENDED 
52.9 K STS LIFT 
49.6 K LCV LIFT 
56.3 K STS LIFT 
53 K LCV LIFT 
42 KLBM 41 KLBM 
65.9 K STS LIFT 66.1 K STS LIFT 
OPTION X 1: BASELINE SCENARIO 1 
o p n m  x 2: BASELINE SCENARIO 1 + EARTH INITIATIVE 
OPTloN # 3: BASELINE SCENARIO 1 + UNMANNED PLANETARY 
opnm x 4: BASELINE SCENARIO 1 + LUNAR INITIATIVE 
VEHICLE 
STS LAUNCH, 
EXPENDABLE, 
RLlOA-3 ENG. 
STS LAUNCH, 
AEROBRAKE, 
REUSABLE. 
Figure 2.1-1 D r i v e r  Missions 
GEO DELIVER) 
10 K PIL 
1996 
28 KLBM 
47.3 K STS LIFT 
43.9 K LCV LIFT 
36 KLBM 
2.1.1 MISSION CAPTURE - BASELINE MISSION SET 
Table 2.1.1-1 lists driver missions for the baseline mission set along w i t h  
their required propellant quantities for ACC -le and reuseable vehicles. 
Also shown are resulting STS and LCV lift requirenents for performing the 
Table 2.1.1-1 Mission Capture - Baseline Scenario 
PROPELLANT REQUIREMENTS FOR DRIVER MISSIONS I 
~- 
GEO PLATFORM 
22KPiL 
2010 
49.6 KLBM 
59.1 K STS LOAD 
( FOR OTV ONLY) 
78.1 K LCV LIFT 
56 KLBM ' 
67.9 STS LIFT 
FOR OTV ONLY 
* DEGRADED Isp FOR LOW THRUST OPERATION 
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missions either in  a single or dual launch mcde as noted. The expmdable 
vehicle prapellant quantities are with respect t o  use of a U O A - 3  engine 
(existing Centaur motor a t  440 sec IS!?); the aeroassisted reusable vehicle 
concept uses the actvanced crycgenic engine (475 sec) which was described in 
Phase 1 of this study. 
PROGRAM 
lMPRoVEMENT 
OCENGlNE 
(STS LAUNCH) 
EXPENDABLE 
AEROBRAKU 
REUSABILITY 
(STS LAUNCH) 
LARGE OTVI 
MANRATED 
(SPACE 
BASED) 
The net lift reqxirements for the STS are identified in the figure and incluck 
the weight of the A E  as w e l l  as ASE. 
OTV ASE is included. 
possible. 
the lift requi-ts for the OTV only are noted. 
For the ICV l i f t  requkemnts only the 
m e  a dual launch w a s  required (the 22klb GEO platform delivery) 
Iu1 the missions were  perfonred w i t h  a single launch where 
PROPELLANT REQUIREMENTS FOR DRIVER MISSIONS 
EARTH INITIATIVE PLANETARY LUNAR INITIATIVE 
25K TO GEO GEO UNMANNED LUNAR ORBIT LUNAR SURFACE 
LOW G (0.1) SERVICING PLANETARY 
10 K P/L, C3 = 80 
50.4KLBM 4 ! 5 w  
62 K STS LIFT 
FOR OTV ONLY 
56 K STS LIFT 
FOR OTV ONLY 
21 K, C3 = 10 8.7K UP, 7.9 K DN 
59 K STS LIFT 
FOR OTV ONLY 
16.5 K UPB.5 K Dh 
8.8 K UNMANNED 
45 KLBM 40 KLBM 33 KLBM 
55 K STS OK 55 K STS OK 
40 K UNMANNED 
68 KLBM 94 KLBM 
All the missions can be prfonred by a 5Oklb prapellant capacity -le OTV 
with an &lo engine. 
capacity of 59klb ( to  110 m) is -red for the 22klb GEO platform delivery 
mission. This mission must be performed in sp l i t  fashion with one STS launch 
carrying the payload and the other carrying the fu l ly  fueled OTV. 
OTV is enployed, the maxinun Shuttle lift reqirement is 68klb. 
cargo vehicle is used as the launch vehicle all missions can be flown intact 
with a maximun l i f t  capacity of 78.1 klb. 
If the Shuttle is used as the launch vehicle a lift 
If a reusable 
If a large 
LUNAR 
LANDING 
(4 ENGINES, 
LANDING 
LEGS, RADAR) 
2.1.2 PROGRAM IMPRavEmwrS AND MISSION CAPTURE 
15KMA"ED 
2 @85KLBM 
40 K UNMANNED 
2 @98KLBM 
Propellant quantities are given in Tab le  2.1.2-1 for each of the three advanced 
space init iatives.  Program improvert.13nts are required i n  order t o  accmmdate 
the various c iv i l  space init iatives (such as inczased propellant capacity, 
m a t i n g ,  lunar landing legs,etc.) . 
t o  ICC engine (475 sec) usage unless otherwise noted. Where indicated, the 
currently planned 55klb STS lift capability ( to  110 m park orbit) is adequate 
t o  support a given mission. 
All prapellant quantities are with respect 
Table 2.1.2-1 Mission capture - Growth fissions 
NOTE: USING AN RL-10 ENGINE WITH THIS OPTION RESULTS IN 50 KLBM PROPELLANT USAGE 
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2.2 OTV PHASED GRowllfI 
Beginning w i t h  a relatively mxlest -le vehicle the OTV can grow its 
capabilities as required by the missions planned. 
considered in this study giving dramaticly differing results. 
Four different scenarios were 
2.2.1 GRCkJTH PATH DEVELOPMENT PROGR?MS 
OTV evolution w i l l  consist of vehicle improvements over a period of time as the 
missions demand and as certain technologies &cane available. 
lists the possible vehicle hprovanents i n  the logical order of evolution and 
mission need t o  assess the group- of subsystem updates. Grouping of these is 
essential in order t o  minimize program evolution costs and schedule impacts. 
This type of tlgroupingtt is intenckd t o  minimize test hardware/aperations, 
cpalification paprwork, test article and prodxtion retooling, damst ra t ion  
missions, design duplicity, etc.  As the vehicle improvenvsnts progress, the 
T a b l e  2.2.1-1 
T a b l e  2.2.1-1 Phased Growth - Subsystem Group-s 
ENGINE CTRL. 
MANRATING REDUNDANCY, SAFETY METEOROID REDUNDANCY LARGER 
FUEL CELLS FACTORS AEROBRAKE 
SPACE BASING MODULAR MODULAR MODULAR MODULAR DETACHABLE 
ORU'S AlTACHMENTS ORU'S ORUS AEROBRAKE 
METEOROID CONTIN. THROT., LANDING LEG 
CTRL.. RADAR LEGS ADD ENGINES COMPATIBLE 
overlap i n  subsystem develcpmt groups help tie the program together into a 
smuth evolution of continuing enhancmmts in OTV capabilities. 
these groupings is that definite !blockt1 changes apply t o  the evolution of the 
OTV program and that each subsystem does not have t o  evolve i n  small independant 
steps on its own. Therefore, a vehicle program that provides a range of vehicle 
hprovements can be achieved w i t h  a minimum of time and energy s p n t  on 
incorporating these block changes. 
"k result of 
For example, when evolving t o  a large s i ze  
7 
OTV the develqmmts required t o  make the vehicle man-rated and space based 
should just as w e l l  be done a l l  at the same t ime. 
2.2.2 OTV PHASED - BASE SCENARIO 
Figure 2.2.2-1 s m i z e s  the OTV growth plan for the baseline scenario (Civil 
Needs Data Base, Version 2, Scenario 1). This scenario is a low growth option 
with mual 0" flight rates of only one t o  two per year. 
begins as early as 1993 (earliest init ial  capbi l i ty )  w i t h  a low-technology, 
low-cost expadable vehicle. 
section, flight rates of 5 t o  6 per year are required t o  justify major system 
upgrades such as ICC engine and aeroassist. 
requirements for only one t o  two OTV-class missions per year. These low flight 
rates do not justify major OTV program inprovenwts and the OTV would remain an 
V d a b l e  vehicle. 
The OTV program 
As w i l l  be discussed in the &sign Analyses 
This baseline scenario has 
.EXPENDABLE 
0 RL.10 (ISP-440) 
I CONSTRAINED CNDB SCENARIO-1 DOES NOT JUSTIFY GROWTH b 
Figure 2.2.2-1 OTV Phased Growth - Baseline Scenario 
2.2.3 O W  PHASED GROWTH - EARTH INITIATIVE 
Figure 2.2.3-1 sumrarizes the OTV growth plan for the CSLI Earth Initiative. 
This initiative contains low-g large platform deployment as w e l l  as round-trip 
-servicing missions. 
OTV which drive hardware ckvelopmt. The first large GM) platform deployment 
occurs i n  1996. 
These missions present specific requirements for  the 
Because it is a low-g delivery requiring low thrust capability, 
8 
the OTV ICC engine mclst be used, rather than the -10. 
be required by 2001 for the GM) servicing mission, and since it is mre cost- 
effective t o  group ICC and aeroassist block changes together, these 
d f i c a t i o n s  are both bplemnted in 1996. 
must use an expendable OW m u s e  of the denandm ' g propellant requirements. 
Since aeroassist w i l l  
The actual platform deploy mission 
As defined, the baseline GM> servicing mission in 2001 can only be accaplished 
by a large space-based OW since it requires in excess of 68klb of propellant on 
an aerobraked vehicle. This would OTV space basing capability in 2001, 
w h i c h  is prabably about the earliest date that it could be available. 
alternate options for  this servicing mission w e r e  looked at t o  reduce OTV 
raremnts:  splitting the mission and expending the servicer. 
Two 
In the split mission option, the servicer is delivered by one OTV mission and 
retrieved by a second one. This reduces prapellant capacity requirements of the 
OTV t o  34.2klb (34.2klb t o  deliver the 16.5klb servicer w i t h  an expendable OTV, 
33.7klb t o  retrieve w i t h  an aerobraked reusable vehicle). 
mission option, the need for  space basing is eliminated since the smaller OTV 
can be delivered t o  orbit  fully fueled w i t h  a single launch. 
W i t h  t h i s  split 
In the expenckd servicer option, the peak propellant requirenwt of 34.2 k l b  
does not chaqe but the elimination of servicer return means that aeroassist is 
not needed for recovery. The Earth Initiative redd does not contain enough 
missions t o  atherwise justify reusability on an e c o n d c  basis so i f  this 
mission requirement drops out so w i l l  reuse. This would eliminate efficient 
round tr ip missions, however, w h i c h  my be inconsistent w i t h  mre general 
requirements of an expanckd near-- capability (for -le, the retrieval of 
finished prducts  frm manufacturing facilities in solar-synchronous orbi ts) .  
PROGRAM ENGINE 
EXPENDABLE MPROMD RE-USE ON-ORBIT 
RL-10 (ISP-440) PERFORMANCE RETURN PllS REPAIR 
(ISP.475) RESUPPLY 
~~~ 
Figure 2.2.3-1 OTV Phased Growth - Earth Initiative 
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119961 19961 I 
 EARTH INITIATIVE JUSTIFIES 10c ENGINE. AEROASSIST. AND SPACE BASING L 
Thus three different develqmmt paths are possible for  the Earth Initiative. 
The reference case shown in Figure 2.2.3-1 assums that the servicer mission is 
flown as defined in the driver mission set .  
the servicer in a single flight w h i c h  requires the IoC engine, aerobraking 
capability, and space basing of a 68klb capacity stage. W i t h  a split servicing 
mission a single, smaller vehicle (34.2 klb Capacity) would be adequate which, 
w o u l d  only require the 102 engine and aerobraking capability (no space basing). 
Finally, i f  the servicer is not retrieved, the E a r t h  Initiative w o u l d  require 
only the developnent of the advanced IOC engine. 
A single OTV delivers and retrieves 
2.2.4 OTV PHASED GROWT€I - UNMANNED PLANETARY INITIATIVE 
Figure 2.2.4-1 sumoarizes the OTV growth plan for the U r n &  Planetary 
Initiative. 
the base scenario and so is still a l o w  flight rate nmlel. 
mission is the lOklb Cassini mission in 1998 which rapires a C3 of 80-110 
s / s d .  The C3 of 80 s / s d  can be acccmnodated by a 50klb prapellant 
capacity OTV in an -le node using the e l 0  engine. 
requires a net Shuttle lift capability ( to  110 m) of 60klb. 
(1-75 sec) is ut i l ized w i t h  this propellant capacity, a C3 of about 90 
#/set* can be achieved instead. 
deliver a 62klb prapellant capacity OTV, the full 110 C3 can be acccarmodated. 
This initiative does not add a significant nurrker of missions t o  
The only driver 
W s  vehicle 
If an ICC engine 
If a large cargo vehicle is enployed t o  
In any event, there is no driving reason, either frm a fli- rate or  
requirements s tandpint ,  t o  add further program improvements. 
expadable OTV is the only vehicle required for t h i s  initiative. 
Thus the 
EXPENDABLE 
RL.10 (ISP-440) 
I UNMANNED PLANETARY INITIATIVE DOES NOT JUSTIFY GROWH b 
Figure 2.2.4-1 OTV Phased Growth - Unmanned Planetary Initiative 
10 
2.2.5 OTV PHASED GRQWTH - LUNAR INITIATIVE 
The Lunar Init iative has large flight rates and payload sizes w h i c h  makes it the 
most d ! 3 m x h g  ' of the identified initiatives. 
ini t ia t ive is shown in Figure 2.2.5-1. High t ra f f ic  rates beginning in the year 
2000 w i l l  than just i fy  
standpoint. 
requires man-rating and aeroassist while the 40klb surface delivery mission 
ckmnds a larye prapellant capacity reusable stage (98klb) which must be space 
based. 
subsystem (landing legs, engines, avionics, etc) as is spelled out la te r  i n  the 
Design Issues section. 
The OTV growth plan for t h i s  
engine and re-use technology f r m  a cost 
Fran a -ts StanCipOht, the round t r i p  IMnned mission 
kkiitiandlly, larding on the 11y3on requires significant qqrack of OTV 
BRAKE RATING BASING LANDINGS 
RE-USE * R E D u " c Y  *oN-oRaIT W D f f i L E G S  *EXPENDABLE IMPROVED 
*RL-lO(ISP-440) PERK)(#UNCE RENRNPAS DUALE"ES REPAHI M X T E " E S  
(19-475) &SIPPLY RADAASYST 
[LUNAR INITIATIVE JUSTIFIES ALL OPTIONS ON AGGRESIVE SCHEDULE 
Figure 2.2.5-1 OTV Phased Growth - Lunar Init iative 
Thus the Lunar Ini t ia t ive reqLres the full range of OTV improvements as is 
indicated i n  the chart. 
required in 2000 t o  support both the l5klb round-trip manned mission as  ell as 
the 38.5klb delivery mission. 
program wades a t  the year 2000. 
Init iative,  the ICC engine and aeroassist upgrades should be a t t a p t e d  earlier 
in the schedule t o  avoid flying too m y  htprovemnts a t  once. 
date for achieving these wades is 1996 which then allows a four year growth 
t o  the ultimate vehicle capability. A small landing mission in 1997 could be 
acccanplished by a ground based 50klb capacity OTV in  an -le rode. 
Man-rating, space basing and landing capabili ty are dll 
This sets a f i rm date for c q l e t i o n  of the 
It is f e l t  that in the case of the Lunar 
A reasonable 
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2.2.6 OTV GROWTH SUMlAFtY 
Figure 2.2.6-1 sumMlrizes the OTV grawth paths of each of the four mission 
options covered in this study. 
and Unmanned Planetary Initiative) do not require anything mre than a 50klb 
propellant capacity expendable stage. 
s t r i c t l y  +terpreted, -res an ICC engine, aeroassist, and space basing. 
Fledefinition of the unmanned servicer mission in  this set could reduce new 
developnent cbwn t o  only an ICC engine, however. 
Lunar Ini t ia t ive drives f u l l  develapoent of OTV systems including new engines, 
reuse ,  space basing, man-rating, and landing capability. 
'Itro of the mission scenarios (the baseline set  
The Earth Init iative mission set, 
The very aggressive Manned 
BASF SCEN ARlO 1 
LOW TRAFFIC 
EXPENDABLE O N  ONLY 
EARTH INITIATIVE 
MODERATE TRAFFIC, ROUND TRIP REQUIREMENT 
DEVELOP IOC ENGINE & AEROASSIST 
UNMANNED PLANETARY 
LOW TRAFFIC 
EXPENDABLE O N  ONLY 
LUNAR INITIATIV~ 
HIGH TRAFFIC, ROUND TRIP & LANDING REQUIREMENTS 
FULL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 
Figure 2.2.6-1 OTV Growth Sumrary 
2.3 GEO SERVICING OPTIONS FOR OTV 
An investigation w a s  condcted into alternate definitions of the unmanned 
servicing mission using current mass and p e r f o m c e  of the orbital maneuvering 
vehicle (W). 
in  the driver mission set discussed in  section 2.2.3. 
servicing were investigated for OTV as is il lustrated in  Figure 2.3-1. 
f i r s t  w a s  t o  deliver line replaceable units (W's) t o  GEo along with an W 
short range vehicle (SRV) w h i c h  would separate f r m  the OTV, perform the 
servicing maneuvers and operations, then rejoin the OTV t o  be returned t o  LM). 
The maximum cklta-V that can be accamdated by the SRV's mnqxopllant  system 
while separated f r m  the OTV i n  such a scenario is about 500 fps. 
This gives scarrewhat different performance figures frm that used 
'Itro cases for m 
The 
The figure 
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shows the weights of the various parts of the stack along with the propellant 
m u n t s  used by the SRV and OTV. 
The second case is for a higher on-obit servicing delta V than the SRV can 
accamn=Klate by itself. 
800 fps. 
bi-prop m e )  for the GEO servicing, or the OTV modified for perfonring the 
servicing ~ ~ n e u v e r s  on its own. 
fl ights in order t o  deliver the W and W's in the first fl ight and then t o  
retrieve them in the seccmd flight with a 50klb propellant capacity vehicle. 
The first fl ight in this option would also correspond t o  an eqended servicer 
mission where the second fl ight would not be neccesary. 
A working figure franpreviaus mission -1s is about 
The options studied include the use of either a ccmplete CPlN (SRV w i t h  
The aption using an CNV -res two OTV 
The second option *res only one flight with the OTV performing the on-orbit 
maneuvers. 
incorporate SRV cartpand links as w e l l  as cold gas capability. 
i f  the OTV can be made -le of perfonking the on-orbit mneuvers a t  
reasonable weight impact and &vel-t cost, the second option may be w o r t h  
Pursuing. 
bbdifications would have t o  be made t o  the basic OTV system t o  
It w a r s  that 
II - 800 FPS 
LRU'S 
SRV SEPARATES FROM OTV 
TO PERFORM SERVICING 
SRV -- 780 LBM MONOPROP. (500 FPS), 
880 LBM LOADED (1 180 MAX) 
OTV -- 48 K PROPELLANT 
FOR ROUND TRIP 
SRV -- SHORT RANGE VEHICLE 
SFE -- SMART FRONT END 
Figure 2.3-1 GEO Servicing Options 
OPTION A OPTION B - 
LRU'S I 2.5K I -
OMVISFE vi 
(BURNOUT) 
OTV 
LRVS E l  
U 
DRYSRV 1-i 
WITH SFE 
(6.2 K ) ,  
AND OW 
TRIP # l  : DELIVER LRU'S OTV PERFORMS 
AND OMV/SFE DELIVERY, ALL 
(950 LBM 81-PROP, SERVICING 
O W  - 40 K PROP.) MANEUVERS. 
AND RETURN 
TRIP Y2: RETRIEVE LRUS (50 K PROP.) 
AND OMV/SFE 
(OW - 36 K PROP.) 
The CPlN SRV can thus be used as a rendezvous capability k i t ,  however the mst 
weight-efficient package would be a total ly  redesigned front end for the OTV. 
This would also be greatly mre ex-pasive t o  inplanent. 
t o  perform rendezvous and docking along with a return capability opens up a 
In general, the a b i l i t y  
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variety of missions t o  the W. 
servicing; such missions as large space structure assembly, space manufacturing 
product retrieval f r m  high energy/inclination o&its, satellite inspection, and 
manned Mars vehicle assably  open new possibilities for  space transportation 
infrastructure. 
Besides the already i h t i f i e d  satellite 
2.4 SPACE BASE OPTIONS 
Figure 2.4-1 s h o w s  s a  of the options for  OW space basing. 
problems that space Station has encountered there are significant questions as 
t o  whether the OTV can be based on that faci l i ty .  
A and Extension #1 studies the Space Station is the mst desireable bas- 
location frm a program stand@nt. 
along with ready access by a servicing crew, as ell as being a centralized node 
for  traffic flow. 
With the recent 
As w a s  detailed in the Phase 
It provides a stable base and power s w l y  
1) SPACE STATION BASE 
- 
- EASIEST MANNED ACCESS - 
HANGAR Al lACHED TO SPACE STATION 
COVERED IN PHASE A REPORT 
2) FREE FLYER BASE - COORBITAL WITH SPACE STATION 
- 
- - 
30+ MILE SEP FROM STATION, FORMATION FLYING 
MANNED ACCESS VIA OMV AND / OR SHUITLE 
PROPELLANT SCAVENGING / HITCHIKING - ALL FLIGHTS TO STATION 
3) FREE FLYER DECOUPLED FROM SPACE STATION 
- 
- 
- 
NOT DEPENDENT ON SPACE STATION 
MANNED ACCESS VIA SHUTTLE ONLY 
MINIMAL NON-OTV SCAVENGING / HITCHIKING AVAllABLE 
4) SPACE TENDED MINIMAL BASE 
- - SERVICING DIRECTLY FROM SHUlTLE ( AVIONICS ONLY ) DEDICATED EXPENDABLE TANKERS AND / OR STS ACC - EARLY CAPABILITY OPTION 
Figure 2.4-1 Space Base options 
If it is not possible t o  base the W at the space Station the next best 
alternative is t o  deploy a free-fly- hangar co-orbital with the Station. 
concept layart for  such a fac i l i ty  w a s  sham in the Phase A AcccaMxlations 
report. 
still possible, however they are mre diff icul t  and require either an CMV + Crew 
W e  or  a Shuttle t o  a c c q l i s h .  
Station have potential for propellant scavenging and/or hitchiking. The free- 
flyer obviously has t o  supply its own att i tude cmtrol  and power. 
A 
m u s e  of its proximity t o  the Station, unplanned servicing calls are 
All booster f l ights t o  the vicinity of the 
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Along this same line, a free-flyer that  is m t e  f r m  the Station has all the 
disactvantages of a co-orbiter and few benefits. 
any support role but manned access and propellant resupply becane mch mre 
diff icul t  . 
It does relieve the Station of 
W e r e  such a &coupled free-flyer might be attractive is in  a minirrarm 
capability space base that is tm&d by the Shuttle (Figure 2.4-2) . 
represent a low-cost approach t o  space basing. 
possible, pr&ably avionics changeout only. Prapellant re-suply and tanking 
aperations could be performed using unmanned vehicles only ( X V  for tankage 
boost and a dedicated W for retrieval and berthing) , thus minimizing 
propellant-handling safety concerns. Problems with this approach include lower 
operational l i f e  for the OTV because of unservicable ccgnponent failures as w e l l  
as mre limited support for advanced missions. 
This would 
Chly limited servicing would be 
MINIMAL REPAIR CAPABlLllY 
PROVIDES LONG-TERM 
AmTUDE CONTROL (CMG'S) 
DOCKING PORTS FOR OMV. 
OW 6 RESUPPLY TANKS 
SOLAR ARRAYS FOR POWER 
AUTOMATED PROPELLANT XFER 
ION 
IlY 
PROPELLANTRESUPPLYTANKS 
ORBITAL INSERT BY LCV 
RETRIEVAL BY OMV 
1 
Figure 2.4-2 Minimum Space Base 
These last aptions represent work-arm& t o  reduced Space Station support 
capabilities. 
the Station base laid out in earlier portions of this Phase A study. 
However they probably represent higher cost options overall than 
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2.5 LARGE INCLINATION TURNS VIA AEROASSIST 
"he fact that the OTV has aerobraking capability can be used t o  improve the 
performance of missions -ring large plane changes. 
change prapulsively requires three burns, in general. 
the apogee of the orbit t o  a sufficiently high al t i tude where the orbital 
velocity is l o w  and can easily be changed in direction. 
#1 t o  raise the apogee (as w e l l  as performing a d l  arryxxlt of plane change), 
burn #2 performs the majority of the plane change a t  apogee, and burn #3 (at 
perigee) reduces the orbit back t o  law circular again. 
of apogee the better frm a performance s t m i n t ,  but due t o  aperational 
considerations it should be limited t o  20,000 t o  30,000 nm. 
To achieve a large plane 
The technique is to  raise 
This =roach uses burn 
The higher the altitude 
With the availability of aeroassist, this s a  technique can be improved upon by 
substituting an apogee reducing a e r m e w e r  for the third burn as is shown in 
Figure 2.5-1. 
raising the apgee, the second bum per fom the plane change as w e l l  as setting 
up the perigee taqeting for aerobraking. 
maneuver  reduces the velocity of the vehicle t o  that recpired for the final 
orbit .  It mclst be stessed here that the aeroassist is only used for apogee 
reduction, no aerodynamic plane ckmqe is prfomed. 
levels encountered in an aeroassist meuver, sensitive payloads may require a 
thermal shrd. 
atxmsphere, typically 250-450 f p s  depencllng ' on the final altitude desired. 
The s a  strategy as before is enployed for the f i r s t  burn in 
upon returning t o  perigee the aero- 
=use of the heating 
A smdll ckcularization burn is performed after leaving the 
0 USE OF AEROASSIST IN PLANE CHANGES 
4 2  3 2 
u' 1 
1) BOOST APOGEE VIA ROCKET BURN 
2) PERFORM INCLIN CHANGE AT 
APOGEE WHERE VELOCITY IS LOW 
3) UTILIZE AEROASSIST AT PERIGEE 
TO REDUCE APOGEE 
(NO PLANE CHANGE IN AERO) 
SIGNIFICANT AV SAVINGS OVER 
ALL-PROPULSIVE FOR AINC > 25" 
PAYLOAD PROTECTION CANISTER 
MAY BE REQUIRED DURING AERO 
Figure 2.5-1 Laqe Inclination Chnge Via Aeroassist 
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Figure 2.5-2 shows the results of performance ccarparisons between an optimized 
all-propulsive plane change and one a p l o y h q  aeroassist. 
orbit is 270 nm circular. 
and 90". The maximum alt i tude of apqee was limited t o  20,000 nm. 
seen that for plane changes greater than 25" a e r m s i s t  shows significant AV 
savings over the all-propulsive approach. Below 25O it is mre efficient t o  
stay with the all-propulsive approachbecause the intermediate apogee altitude 
is low. 
The initial and final 
The s ize  of the plane change was varied between 0" 
It may be 
0 COMPARE PERFORMANCE OF: 
3-BURN ALL-PROPULSIVE 
2-BURN USING AEROASSIST 
V.S. 
O INITIAL 8 FINAL ORBIT I 270 NM 
0 MAXIMUM APOGEE = 20000 NM 
0 POST-AERO AV = 450 FPS 
I AEROASSIST EFFICIENT FOR I I PLANE CHANGES > 25" I 
0 '  I I I I I I I 
0' 200 40. 60' 80' loo' 
ORBITAL PLANE CHANGE (DEGREES) 
Figure 2.5-2 Large Inclination Change Performance 
2 . 6  LUNAR MISSION PROFILES 
A key piece of the lunar ini t ia t ive analysis is landing mission profile 
characterization. Three basic types of lunar transfers were investigated as is 
described below: direct transfer, lunar orbit transfer, and transfer via the L1 
libration point. 
2.6.1 LUNAR PROFILE - DIRECT LANDING 
Various mdes of lunar transfer were investigated for advanced missions. 
f i r s t ,  shown in Figure 2.6.1-1, is a direct transfer f r m  low Earth orbit t o  the 
surface of t k  Moon and back. 
the mission t o  brake into a low Earth orbit. 
mission consist of trans-lunar injection (TLI), lunar landing, lunar takeoff and 
several small midcourse burns. 
?"ne 
An aeroassist meuver is uti l ized a t  the end of 
V e l o c i t i e s  derived for this 
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A three-body integration roL ine was used t o  r i v e  velocities required for 
fl ight in the ccxrbined Earth/-n system. 
circular orbit. 
propulsion requimts  can be minimized t o  8230 fps. 
lunar transit tire t o  110 hrs. Landing AV is the vertical impact velocity 
derived frm these simlations. The vertical landing case gives the highest 
velocity requiraents, thus landings t o  dl1 other locations an the m n  will 
require less AV. 
a t t e e d  a t  this tire since they are a strong function of the mission design 
which is beyond the scape of the present study. 
Earth departure was frm a 245 nm 
By using a minimUn TLI AV burn of 10035 fps the lunar descent 
This does increase the 
No assesmt for gravity losses i n  descent have been 
Figure 2.6.1-1 Lunar Profile - Direct Landing 
2.6.2 LUNAR PROFILE - LUNAR ORBIT 
The lunar orbit profile (Figure 2.6.2-1) uses an intermediate orbit 60 nm above 
the Moon before descending t o  the surface. Velocities were derived f r m  Apollo 
data and t h r e b o d y  integrated trajectories . The major maneuvers are trans- 
lunar injection (TLI), lunar orbit h e r t i o n  (LOI), lunar larding, lunar 
takeoff, and trans-- injection (=I). The trans-lunar trajectory is a 
"free-return" type w h i c h  w i l l  return t o  Earth i f  u)I cannot be achieved. 
lunar descent and ascent velocities are smaller than those in the previous 
direct landing case because the closed lunar orbit has less energy. 
orbit mck is probably mst apprapriate for a mature logistics setup where a 
permanent lunar orbiting station is i n  place. 
The 
The lunar 
18 
IPRE-ENTRY 
Figure 2.6.2-1 Lunar Profile - Lunar Orbit 
2.6.3 LUNAR LIBRATION POINTS 
&cause of the interactian of the Earth and bbon in  an rotating system, 
gravitationally stable and ma-stable  regions are created called the Earth-Wn 
libration points. There are five of these p i n t s  as is shown in Figure 2.6.3-1. 
They are fixed with respect t o  the E a r t h - r n  line as shown. Only the L4 and L5 
are truely stable points in that an abject placed in them w i l l  remain without 
further correction. 
gravitational saddle points that are stable in only t w o  of three dimensicms so 
an object placed in them w i l l  require periodic corrections t o  stay in place. 
The L1 point between the Earth and m n  represents an interesting positian for a 
lunar station. 
paths with the Earth. 
the Farth t o  L1 and then t o  the Moon as  is discussed in the next section. 
The rest of the points are rreta-stable, they are 
It is close t o  the Moon and has good access and ccarmUnication 
Mission profiles have been constructed w h i c h  travel frm 
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0 LIBRATION POINTS ARE 
GRAVITATIONALLY 
STABLE REGIONS 
0 L1 MAY REPRESENT 
A77RACTIVE STATION 
LOCATION 
CLOSE TO EARTH 8 MOON 
GOOD COMMUNICATIONS 
HOVERS OVER NEAR SIDE 
Figure 2.6.3-1 Lunar Libration Points 
2.6.4 LUNAR PROFILE - L1 STATION 
Figure 2.6.4-1 shows a lunar profile uti l izing the Ll libration point as a way 
station for This is carparable t o  the lunar orbit case but has 
certain advantages in that there is no need for plane alignrmt since the L1 
point is fixed w i t h  respect t o  the Earth and W n .  Such a point could be used 
for a lunar station with refueling andturnaround faci l i t ies  or as a mre -st 
transfer point bet- a dedicated lunar lander (serviced on the lunar surface) 
and Earth delivery vehicle. The profile shows  the Earth t o  L1 transfer occurhg 
on the left with the L1 t o  noon transfer on the right. Transfer velocities have 
been solved for frm three-body integration for dL1 but the touchdowdtakeoff 
delta-v's which are derived f r m  -110 program data. 
logistics. 
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Figure 2.6.4-1 Lunar Profile - L1 Station 
2.7 MANNED MARS MISSION IOGISTICS SUPPORT 
Planetary boost of a mnned spacecraft requires large velocities applied t o  
massive objects. 
can be broken up into smaller pieces. 
approaches t o  boostirig a payload into an escape trajectory with a C3 of 10 
kmz/se& w h i c h  is consistent with a trans-Mars orbit. 
is t o  perform a single large h r n  fran an initial low Earth park orbit into the 
escape trajectory with a required AV of 11,900 f p s .  
would require the largest booster because the spacecraft is already assenbled 
and must be injected a l l  a t  once. 
This normally requires a very large upper stage unless the job 
Figure 2.7-1 ccenpares three different 
The f i r s t  boost technique 
This is the approach that 
The next two approaches look a t  delivering the spacecraft in pieces t o  an 
energetic assesnbly orbit .  In this fashion, smaller transfer vehicles can be 
used t o  build up the interplanetary craft and then, since the craft is in a 
higher eneryy orbit, a smdller injection stage can be used for escape. The 
f i r s t  option looks a t  an e l l ip t ica l  assesnbly orbit with a perigee of 250 m and 
an apogee of 100,000 m. The AV required t o  reach this orbit is 9800 fps, once 
in it only 2100 fps is required t o  escape. This orbit gives favorable leverage 
for an OTV since large mxiules can be delivered for assembly, the OTV can be 
retrieved via aeroassist, and an expndable OTV can be used for the escape kick. 
It must be stressed that t h i s  approach does reduce the overall velocity 
requirerents (and thus net propellant) but reduce the size of the kick 
stages required, eliminating the developrent of a new and huqe Earth escape 
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stage. 
favorable w u r e  situation i f  a lm t h r u s t  propulsion system is used. 
The second option looked at a high altitude circular assenbly orbit  as -sed 
t o  the elliptic one just discussed. 
incurred as it takes 13200 fps t o  reach this orbit. 
large impulse of 7700 f p s  t o  escape this orbit. 
not an uptinaan approach. 
Additionally the highly elliptic Earth park orbit may represent a mre 
By circularizing, a large AV pendlty is 
Additionally it takes a 
Overall this assembly option is 
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e 16.OK i 5i Y 11.9K FPS 11.9K FPS 
20.9K FPS 
LARGE MARS CRAFT 
ESCAPE (C3-10) 
START AT 250 NM 
FIRST DELTA V TO 
ASSEMBLY ORBIT 
E 
SECOND DELTA V TO 
ESCAPE 
LOW HIGH HIGH 
EARTH EARTH- EARTH - 
ELLIPSE CIRCULAR 
(250 NM) (250X100K) (100K NM) 
Figure 2.7-1 Earth Escape V e l o c i t i e s  
The use of an elliptical assably  orbit for 1- interplanetary craft appears 
to have significant benefits. 
substantial ckvelopent costs it is wrthwhile t o  see whether existing OTV-class 
vehicles could be uti l ized instead. Figure 2.7-2 shows a concept for  assembling 
the Mars vehicle in a high energy Earth orbit that then requires a relatively 
sfiall delta-v for  escape. 
spacecraft mdules into the high eneryy assembly orbit where they would be 
integrated into a main spacecraft. 
OTV, used in an m d a b l e  mock, could boost the stack onto a trans-Mars 
trajectory. 
mission. 
Because larye new boost stages will represent 
Wtiple OTV fl ights could be uti l ized t o  boost J%rs 
mce the spacecraft w a s  assembled a single 
This approach maximizes use of existing stages t o  perform the J%rs 
The exaqle shown in Figure 2.7-2 is for a 5 t h  synchronous Earth orbit (250 
nm perigee, 126000 nm apcgee) &ere &rs spacecraft assembly takes place. This 
orbit was selected because it has a high eneqy state without beccpning so 
elongated that it enters into the lunar sphere of influence. 
regression rates are low. 
Thus nodal 
The perigee is kept at 250 nm for  accessibility frm 
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the Space Station where mxbiles would be checked out after reaching low Earth 
orbit. 
shown. 
fran the Space Station into the 5xSynch assably orbit .  
repeatedly, though extreroely quickly, through the Van Allen radiation belts. 
Typical performance figures for a 74Klb prapellant capacity OTV are 
This data shows that a 60.- modLlle could be boosted by a reusable OTV 
The orbit  passes 
MARS VEHICLE 
ASSEMBLY ORBIT 
(250x 126000 NM) 
MODULE ASSEMBLY \ 
MODULE CHECKOUT 
VAN ALLEN BELTS 
TRAVERSED RAPIDLY 
n 
OTV APPLICATON TO BUILDUP 8 BOOST OF 
MANNED MARS SPACECRAFT 
5xSYNCH ELLIPTICAL STAGING ORBIT 
TO MAXIMIZE ENERGY OF ASSEMBLED MMV 
1) CHECKOUT OF MODULES IN LOW ORBIT 
2) OTV BOOST OF MODULES TO 5xSYNCH 
3) ASSEMBLE MODULES IN SxSYNCH 
4) EXPENDABLE OTV GIVES ESCAPE KICK 
OTV PERFORMANCE (74K SPACE BASED OTV) 
STATION TO 5xSYNCH: 60600 LB 
5xSYNCH TO C3= 5: 499400 LE 
5xSYNCH TO C3-10: 354300 LB 
w n 
Figure 2.7-2 Manned Mars Mission Logistics Support 
Because of the short dwell time, the radiation doses do not 
a major r i sk  for  a craft designed for deep space operations. 
assesSment of this factor must await further studies, however. 
t o  represent 
A mre detailed 
mce the mddes have been assembled into the manned Mars vehicle (M)  , an 
-le 74Klb OTV can provide the escape kick for  various escape energies as 
shown. 
can boost a 354300 lb spacecraft into the trans+bxs trajectory. 
increased substantially by using larger propellant tanks or a two stage OTV 
approach. 
not be developed t o  enable a manned m s  mission. 
For a fair ly  typical ballistic escape energy of 10 k d / s e c 2  a single OTV 
It is thus of interest here that a new and very large kick stage need 
This can be 
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3.0 ACC OTV SAFETY ISSUES 
The purpose of this task  was t o  exaxnine ,-e key safety issues associated with 
the aft cargo carrier (E) OTV concept. 
meet- the latest safety r&rerrwts of the Space Transportation Systm (STS) 
was conducted which contrasted the E with the Shuttle caryo bay as a boost 
location. 
An evaluation of the technical ' risk in 
The approach was t o  identify the major hazards w e n t  in the concept and 
assess the difficulty in controlling them based an the current hazard control 
qproaches used by the STS and payloads. For the purpose of this assessrent, it 
was assured that STS payload requirements would be -sed on the OTV as this 
has been typical of upper stages flown by the STS to-date. 
mre stringat than STS element requirements. The latest payload requiresnents 
were  used (as contained in NHB 1700.7a and 1700.b Septmber draft) as w e l l  as 
the draft "return t o  flight" payload r e q u k m n t s  in developnent by NASA. In 
addition, carments by mnbers of the STS Payload Safety Review Panel at JSC w e r e  
incorporated where available. 
They are generally 
The assesSment was based on the abili ty of the concept t o  iq lement  typical 
hazard control approaches. 
following figures along with the typical control approach and the technical r i s k  
assessrent. 
Each hazard evaluated w i l l  be listed on the 
This assessrent could not consider detailed flight dynamics assessments (ET 
h-pact footprint constraints for  instance), or critique the STS ACC / OTV 
structural design. These issues have been consickred previously in the OTV 
phase A study but are outside the scope of the current assessment. 
m d i x  A contains sumoary sheets of a preliminary hazard analysis conducted 
for the ACC OTV. For several key subsystemdaperations, hazardous conditions 
and their causes and effects were identified along with hazard control 
assessments. 
the STS and PIX OTV were developed and are shown in m d i x  B. 
Based on this hazard analysis, a set  of derived recpirements for  
3.1 ACC OTV - VEIIICLE CONE'IGURATI~ AND FLIGHT PROFILE 
Figure 3.1-1 shows the overall launch vehicle configuration for an STS aft cargo 
carrier (m) OTV. 
Shuttle external tank (ET). This provides a large volume approxhte ly  27' in 
diameter where a payload can be located. 
ACC (or DACC) is used for weight efficiency. The Acx: concept has been studied 
in scam detail, as is reported in the "General Purpose Aft Cargo Carrier Study 
Final Report", May 1985 (NASA contract NAS8-35564). 
Figure 3.1-2 shows the boost configuration of the OTV in the dedicated A C .  The 
OTV has four propellant tanks (2 LLlx & 2 W )  distributed along the longitudinal 
axis.  
is deployed shortly after separation. 
jettisoned in ascent, shortly after STS SRB separation. 
The PCC is a hemispheric extension t o  the aft end of the 
For the OTV application the dedicated 
The aerobrake is folded up along the sides of the vehicle for  boost and 
The darned portion of the ACC is 
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I I 
ORB I TAL 
TRANSFER 
VEH I CLE 
- 
AFT CARGO 
CARR I ER 
EXTERNAL TANK 
SOLID ROCKET 
BOOSTER 
xr 2058 ~r 2404 
~ ~ 2 1 8 5  
E , 1 ,  / O,T,V.. 
INTERFACE 
Figure 3.1-1 ACC OTV - Shuttle Boost Configuration 
26.7 FT 
AV ION ICs 7 r ACS PROPELLANT TANKS 
15. 
ENGINE RL 10 \I CAT I I B  --- 4 CARGO CARRIER 
(HEMISPI IERICAL)  
Figure 3.1-2 ACC OTV Boost Packaging 
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Figure 3.1-3 shows t h e  ascent mission profile for an ACC OTV. The no- shuttle 
ascent profile is irrpacted as little as pssible, although the vehicle aerodynamics 
w i l l  be s m h a t  different due t o  the extension of the ET. Launch, SRE separation, 
and powered flight t o  orbit proceed in the s m  m e r  as now. ACC shroud 
separation occurs at T+156 sec, 24 sec after SRB separation. ET disposal targeting 
at  STS rrein engine cutoff (MECO) is iderrtical t o  today’s requimts .  
after MECO the OTV is separated via springs and, after the shuttle has performxi 
W-1 and departed the area, the OTV propels itself into a law park orbit. 
orbit, it awaits a rendezvous by the shuttle which then attaches its mission 
payload (wh ich  has been carried t o  orbit in the shuttle cargo bay). 
Shortly 
In this 
II 
SEPARATION SEPARATION 
STAGING \ 
SPLASH 
\ SPLASIIDOWW ...,. SHROUD 
&- 
LAUNCll RETURN TO 
LAUNCH SITE k DOWN 
EXlERNAL 
SEPARATI 
IMPACT 
- -_  
YHELAUMCII 
Figure 3.1-3 ACC CYI’V Ascent Prof i l e  
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3.2 MAloR HAZARDS ASSESSMENT 
THREE SERIES FLOW CONTROL 
DEVICES CONTROLLED BY 
ELECTRICAL INHIBITS 
SAME AS ABOVE 
TRIPLE SEALING VALVE 
VENT EXTERNALLY - 
DISCONNECT ON DEPLOYMENT 
AS ABOVE 
Tables  3.2-1 and 3.2-2 shows the major hazards that were assessed for their 
safety impaCts. 
with a technical r i sk  assessmnt for both the ACC and cargo bay approaches. 
This is the technical r i s k  of the concept's a b i l i t y  t o  ixtplenrent the typical 
control  roaches listed. cokmrents explaining the r i sk  assessment are also 
provided. 
Under a hazard group title, the individual hazards are l is ted 
AS LONG AS LINES ARE DRY DURING STS 
MISSION PHASES, THIS HAZARD SHOULD BE 
CONTROLLABLE 
MANYACCEPTABLEDESIGNWPROACHES 
EXIST 
LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CONTROLLABLE BUT 
SEE OTHER CONCERN UNDER EXPLOSION 
BELOW 
LEAKAGE CONTROLLABLE - COMPLEX 
DISCONNECT MECHANISM - PROBABLY 
DOABLE AND STILL MEET REQUIREMENTS. 
NEED THREE VENT PATHS (VALVES) 
AS ABOVE 
A l l  hazards u t  be controlled t o  an acceptable level. A "lowt' technical r i s k  
is considered t o  present a typical challenge equivalent t o  other program 
requireprwts (i.e. there appears t o  be nothing unique required t o  control this 
hazard). ''Mxtium" r i s k  presents a significant technical challenge and program 
impacts may result. 
controlling the identified hazard. 
does not have this design r i sk  due t o  the absence of particular harclware (e.g. 
the r i sk  of premature fir ing of a destruct system is ''"/A" t o  a stage having 
none). 
T a b l e  3.2-1 Major Hazards - Part 1 
''Hi@P r i sk  mans that there is no known solution for 
An ''"/A" means the particular design concept 
W A D  GROUP 
* PREMATURE MAIN ENGINE 
FIRING OR WADVERTENT 
DUMPING OF PROPELLANTS 
THROUGH MAIN ENGINE 
*PREMATURE HYDRAZINE 
ENGINE FIRING 
- PROPELLANT LEAKS 
A. TANK S E P A R A M  POINTS 
8. VAPOR VENT 
C. GROUND / ASCENT 
D. RETRIEVAL DUMP I FILL 
DRAIN 
[EXPLOSION: I 
PROPELLANTTANK 
A. FAIL TANK SEPARATION 
VALVES CLOSED 
OVERPRESSURE 
- 
ACC 
RWK 
- 
LOW 
LOW 
LOW 
LOW 
LOW 
LOW 
IIGH 
- 
- 
CARG 
BAY 
RISK 
- 
LOW 
LOW 
NIA 
MED 
MED 
LOW 
NIA 
- 
COMMENTS / I C(IxJCLUSK)Ns TYPICAL CONTROL APPROACH 
DRY DURING STS PHASES NEED COMPLEX RELIEF MECHANISM I f  
DUAL REDUNDANCY IN OPENING 
hND CLOSING FUNCTION 
PRESENTS POTENTIAL SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
IN CURRENT CONFIGURATION. FAILING 
PNEUMATIC VALVE IN VENT LINE WOULD 
RESULT IN CATASTROPHIC FAILURE. SEE 
ASCENTVENTREDUNDANCYCHARTFOR 
UPDATED CONFIGURATION. 
I 
The f i r e  hazards generally involve release of the propellant into the cargo bay, 
the A E  carrier, or inadvertent release on the launch pad. The controls for 
27 
these hazards are rated as low risk since "flow control devices" are used 
sirrti1a.r t o  other liquid systems. 
associated w i t h  the discannect mchaxn 'sms for these systems in the cargo bay. 
These must assure that no two failures w i l l  result in a partially released 
element. Pyrotechnic release mxhamms ' (very high reliabil i ty) might be used 
in these systems. 
The only risk assessed as being of concern are 
- 
CARG( 
BAY 
RISK 
- 
LOW 
LOW 
NIA 
NIA OR 
HIGH 
MED 
LOW 
LOW 
LOW 
NIA 
- 
The explosion hazards involve rupture of the prapellant tanks fram fail ing t o  
release internal pressure or by overpressurizing. 
w a s  with the tank separation valves in the E concept. 
single fa i lure  points should they f a i l  closedby vibration or inadvertent 
ccarmanding. 
the design w a s  changed as w i l l  be discussed further on. 
The only concern noted here 
These present potential 
Because of the lack of dual fault tolerance in the existing concept 
YANY ACCEPTED APPROACHES 
The fact that the OTV is not dependent on pressure for structural integrity is a 
positive safety feature of both OTV concepts. This was a major problem with the 
STS/Centaur system. 
STANDARD TECHNIQUES 
LOW RISK IF DESIGN DOES NOT USE 
PRESSURE. PRESSURE SYSTEM WOULD 
REQUIRE LAUNCH SEOUENCE TIE-IN. 
T a b l e  3.2-2 shows the conclusion of the explosion hazards and the collision 
hazards. 
failures that interfere with the O r b i t e r  or unacceptable loads inpacts on the 
O r b i t e r .  
Collision hazards are associated with structural failures, recham 'sm 
T a b l e  3.2-2 Major Hazards - P a r t  2 
IEXPLOSION (CONT): 1 
E. PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM 
OVERPRESSURE 
C. LOX COMPATBILITY 
* DESTRUCT SYSTEM 
* FAILURE TO WW 
LCOLLISION: j 
- DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM 
MALFUNCTION (INCOMPLETE 
SEPARATION I CAPTURE) 
* INTERFERE WITH CARGO BAY 
CLOSURE 
- PREMATURE SEPARATION 
* STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
A. VEHICLE 
E. COVER 
- 
ACC 
RISK 
- 
LOW 
LOW 
MED 
WA 
LOW 
LOW 
LOW 
LOW 
MED - 
LOW - 
TYPICAL CONTROL 
APPROACH 
00 NOT OPERATE SYSTEM 
WITHIN SAFE DISTANCE 
USE PROVEN MATERIALS 
USE E x i s n f f i  TECHNOLOGY 
UNKNOWN 
2 FT SCHEMES USING EVA OR 
JETTISON AS THIRD LEVEL OF 
REDUNDANCY 
SEE DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM 
4PPROACH 
2 FAILURE TOLERANT SCHEME 
1.4 FACTOR OF SAFETY 
SEE ABOVE 
COMMENTS / 
coNcLusloNs 
RESTRICTING ENGINE FIRING TO BE OUTSIDE 
OF SAFE DISTANCE ELIMINATES CONCERN. 
OTHERWISE. NEED 2 FT PRESSURIZATION 
SCHEME 
UNTESTED MATERIALS WILL REQUIRE TESTIN 
EXACT REOUTS OF ACC SYSTEM TED 
IF PROPELLANT MUST BE WYPED FOR STS 
ABORT (CARGO BAY ONLY), DESIGN MUST BE 
2 F.T. AGAINST PREMATURE DUMP. 
EXTREME CHALLENGE. 
MULTIPLE DISCONNECTS (VENTS. 
POINTS PRESENT CONCERN) 
AlTACH 
30-ABLE 
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The need for a destruct system for the ACC OTV is assumed but w i l l  be open for 
further study. 
destruct system must be drapped ( i f  nvxlnted on the ET) or positively deactivated 
prior t o  rendezvous with the Orbiter. 
If  needed, there w i l l  be d u m  technical r i sk  since the 
Because of the nunker of attach points betweem the cargo bay OTV and the 
O r b i t e r ,  the hazard of deploymnt system malfunction was rated as d u m  since 
developing a two failure tolerant mcham ' sm is extremely difficult  and usually 
requires EV?l work-arounds. The ACC configuration is rated as a low r i sk  since 
two failure tolerance is not required by safety (mecharu ' sm failure w i l l  not 
result in O r b i t e r  loss). 
The highest r i sk  collision hazard is associated with the failure t o  dxrp for the 
cargo bay configuration should dmp be deemxi necessary. 
interface would have t o  be both two failure tolerant against fail ing t o  dmp and 
two failure tolerant against premature dmp. 
appose each other in design iqlenwtat ion.  
situation, depndent on Os, landing weight, and/or post-landing cry0 inerting 
concems. 
instances, avoid the need t o  perform an in-flight chanp. Acceptable solutions t o  
the prablems of O r b i t e r  center of gravity, landing weight, and cry0 venting must 
be provided over the full range of vehicle flight envelops. 
If  +red, the OTV 
These two constraints directly 
The need t o  dump is an evolving 
However, it sems unlikely that a caqo bay OTV cculd, in a l l  
In the sections that follow, issues raised here w i l l  be discussed along with 
others dealing w i t h  ACC shroud presurization, proximity aperations, and LH2 tank 
jettison. 
3.3 ASCENT VENT REDUNDANCY 
A problm exists w i t h  the current design of the PDZ 
discussed in the previous section. Figure 3.3-1 shows the baseline propulsion 
schgMtic fran the 1984-1985 Phase A study. The areas of concern are circled. 
Three valves in series are used on the QI2 side, and two series valves on the 
032 side t o  control the ascent vent- process. Despite the fact that the 
valves have twin actuators, the system has only single fault tolerance, instead 
of dual, t o  the catastraphic failure of a valve failing closed w h i c h  would cause 
tank averpressurization. 
critical failures occurred in the ascent vent line. 
failure path that r a r e  such a drastic action and so it was f e l t  that a safer 
option would be t o  restructure this system t o  preclude OTV jettison. 
ascent vent as was 
Previously, the ACC OTV was to be jettisoned i f  two 
This is the only t w i n  
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-m- 
Figure 3.3-1 ACC OTV Propulsion Schematic (1985) 
The updated design shown in Figure 3.3-2 cures this prablem with parallel 
p n e m t i c  valves t o  provide for venting control and a single pyro actuated valve 
w i t h  twin ini t ia tors .  U- no& operating conditions only the pneumatic 
TWIN ACTUATED 
PNEUMATIC VALVE 
NORMALLY 
OPEN PYRO 
VALVE 
Figure 3.3-2 Ascent V e n t  l?dmdancy 
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valves would be used t o  d o s e  off the system for  post-ME03 fl ight.  
two critical failures cccured i n  the pneumatic system the pyro valve would be 
fired t o  seal the line. 
venting systen as w e l l  as three inhibits for preventing loss of propellant frm 
the tanks. 
However, i f  
This system provides for two fault tolerance in the 
3.4 ACC PRESSURE STABILIZATION 
Currently the dedicated Acc (DACC) uses internal pressure for  structural 
stabilization during the STS SRB ignition overpressure Nse.  
STS/Centaur kssons Learned highlights that one of the main problems w i t h  the 
Centaur was its pressure stabilized skin. In this case internal pressure was 
required throughout the fl ight t o  rnaintain structural integrity. 
the major prahibitions that has resulted frcm the Centaur cancellation is 
against pressure stabilized structures. 
one of two ways. 
A r e v i e w  of 
Hence one of 
This can be dedlt w i t h  fo r  the PM: in 
The first option would be t o  use t k  system as it stands. The argument here is 
tha t  the ACC pressurization is nut required for flight, but only for  the 
extremely brief period of time that the SRB ignition overpressure exists. 
adequate pressure in the ACC would then be me of the launch c d t  criteria t o  
be checked before the SRB ignition camrand could be issued. 
catastropkic rupture of the Rcc (which would be a fl ight critical structural 
failure anyway), any leak in the system would be slow enough tha t  the countdown 
could be halted before any ignition-critical pressurization levels were reached. 
This represents a ccanplication for the Shuttle f i r ing sequence mre than a 
fl ight-cri t ical  safety issue. 
An 
Short of a 
An alternate approach was investigated (Figure 3.4-1) that assessed the design 
inpact of making the ACC total ly  unpressurized for all phases of f l ight .  This 
SHROUD 1. SKIRT 
S TA 
2062.65 
I I 
S TA S TA 
2194.29 2249.25 2413.5 
GRAPHITE EPOXY 
OUTER SKIN 7 
BALSA 
WOOD 
CORE 
GRAPHITE EPOXY \ 
INNER SKIN 
Figure 3.4-1 Dedicated ALX: Ccqxsite Shroud 
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approach strengthens the ACC dane structure so that the SRB ignition pulse can 
be resisted solely with structural stiffness. 
weight manageable, a f i l anwt  wound  approach is neccesary. 
results in significant manufacturing caplication and an increase in weight of 
210 Ib. 
(5.1.4). 
In order t o  keep the fl ight 
This approach 
Further design details may be found in  the Structural Issues section 
Currently it appears that the first Wion gives an acceptable safety situation 
for the orbiter with a backout avenue represented by the c a r p s i t e  ACC design. 
3.5 ACC OTV PROXIMITY OPERATIONS 
Because the PIX OTV f l i e s  indepndently t o  low Earth orbit additional attention 
must be paid t o  preventing hazards t o  Shuttle operations. STS safe separation 
c r i te r ia  have been used throughout i n  desiqing the ACC OTV fl ight sequence. 
Figure 3.5-1 shows the relative motion of the O r b i t e r ,  Externdl Tank, and OTV 
after STS ME@3. 
s ta te  while the O r b i t e r  performs a normal ET separation sequence. 
hydrazine ACS system is turned on a t  a distance of 200 ft, consistent w i t h  STS 
safe separation cr i ter ia .  
The Cyrv separates via springs and coasts backwards in a passive 
The W 
t 
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Figure 3.5-1 OTV / O r b i t e r  Separation Profile 
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When the Shuttle performs its W-1 hum the two vehicles are about 1800 f t  
apart which should be adequate f r m  a plurrre ixrpkgement s t an rn in t .  The f i r s t  
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OTV MPS burn occurs at about 25 minutes after ME03 at  which time the the O r b i t e r  
is 52 m away. 
circular orbit) occurs about 77 minutes after ME03 at an O r b i t e r  separation of 
228 nm. 
OTV m a i n  engine burn. A unique concern t o  the A02 OTV is s a f h g  the cryqenic 
vehicle prior t o  Shuttle rendezvous and payload mate. 
sequence of system safing required t o  inert the vehicle prior t o  Shuttle 
contact. 
The secod OTV MPS burn (which injects the OW into a 140 m 
The O r b i t e r  rendezvous sequence cc~myances a few hours after this final 
Figure 3.5-2 shows the 
Four prirr!ary systems are adressed as follows. 
STS APPROACH SAFETY SEQUENCE RANGE 
1) SAFE MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM >200 NM 
The m a i n  prapllsion system ( M P S )  is nonrdly inert& at the end of each txlrn 
sequence and w i l l  thus not pose a hazard since the final OTV MPS burn is 
executed at least 200 nmi away. This operation m i s t s  of prging the engine 
of LOX and hydrogen, and remving pomr f r m  the electronics. 
COMMENTS 
PURGE ENGINE a LINES 
a ACTUATORS 
REMOVE POWER FROM VALVES 
Since w a t e r  duqx are not desirable i n  the Shuttle's vicinity the OTV's fuel 
cell water  collection tank w i l l  be purged at least 2 hours fran dccking. 
system has a 12 horn capacity so there should be no need for further chrmps 
during the 4 hours the Shuttle and OTV are in close proximity. 
The 
TheOWthermsdynarm 'c vmt  system (m) w i l l  be locked up at  a distance of 1000 
f t  fran the orbiter, prabably by ground cam\and. 
vent capability of at  least 6 hours i f  the OTV tank pressure is f i r s t  rechlced t o  
16 psi. This w i l l  eliminate uncttsirable gaseous venting during the t i m e  the two 
vehicles are in collision range. 
Thexmal analysis shows a no- 
I 2) SAFE FUEL CELL H,O DUMP SYSTEM PERFORM DUMP 2 HRS FROM DOCK I I NODUMPFOR12HRS 
VENT TANKS DOWN TO 16 PSI I 'O0OFT 1 NOVENTFOR4HRS I 3) SAFE THERMODYNAMIC VENT SYSTEM I 4) SAFE AlTlTUDE CONTROL SYSTEM CLOSE VALVES AT ENGINES I TBD I REMOVE POWER FROM VALVES 
~~ 
MONITOR a CONTROL FUNCTIONS: TANK TEMPERATURE a PRESURES 
( VIA REDUNDANT RF LINK ) ACS STATUS 
VALVE STATUS 
PAYLOAD LATCHES 
AVIONICS SUBSYSTEM STATUS 
POWER SUBSYSTEM STATUS 
Figure 3.5-2 ACC OTV / STS Prox. Cps. Safing Squence 
The final system t o  be safed w i l l  be the OTV attitude control system (a). 
Safety guidelines for the range at  which this n u t  be done are uncertain at  
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present, although it would be desirable t o  w a i t  unt i l  as l a te  as possible t o  
reduce residual att i tude rate disturbances. 
3.5.1 AL3C OTV ON-ORBIT PAYLQAD INTEGRATION 
QIe of the significant canplications associated with ACC OTV operations is the 
need for on-orbit integration of the OTV and spacecraft. 
operation is normally carried out on the ground it does not represent an 
insurmoUntable task  i f  canducted in  fl ight.  
spacecraft have u t i l i zed  on-orbit linking of two modules in  their operations 
including Gemini, Apollo, and Shuttle. 
maintaining a shple, standarized interface. Figure 3.5.1-1 shows a payload 
&signed for the specific payload. 
latches t o  enable on-orbit docking with the vehicle. 
c m  by the Shuttle for safety, probably through the M. The basic OTV 
avionics design u t i l i zes  a data bus which enables a single electrical cckrmand 
interface t o  the payload along with a p e r  plug. 
docking interface. 
pyrotechnic separation devices for spacecraft deployment. 
adapter connection w i l l  have been built up and verified on t k  ground before 
fl ight.  
Although this 
Many previous U.S. manned 
The key t o  these aperations is in 
adapter concept that has one end st- 'zed t o  the OTV and the other end 
"he OTV end contains guide pins and electric 
The latch system w i l l  be 
These features s h p l i f y  the 
The payload end of the adapter w i l l  probably u t i l i z e  
This payload-to- 
ON-ORBIT INTEGRATION OF TWO VEHICLES IS NOT A NEW ISSUE 
GEMINI, APOLLO, SHUTTLE DOCKING 
SIMPLE INTERFACE IS THE KEY 
OTV PAYLOAD INTERFACE: POWER, SINGLE DATA BUS TIE, LATCHES 
LATCH DRIVES CONTROLLED BY SHUTTLE THROUGH RMS (SAFETY) 
PAYLOAD 
OTV STANDARD 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 
PAYLOAD 7 
SEP PYROS 
OTV I OTV PAYLOAD LATCHES I 
Figure 3.5.1-1 ACC OTV QI-orbit Payload Integration 
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3.6 ACC OTV H ? l R D w  JETTISON 
At the end of its mission the reusable ACC OTV is recovered by the Space Shuttle 
for return t o  Earth. In order t o  f i t  the vehicle in  the Suttle cargo bay the 
large liquid hydrogen (M2) tanks nust f i r s t  be m v e d  leaving a rack consisting 
of the main engine, L@ tanks, avionics, ACS system and OTV structural core. 
Originally, the recovery of the ACC OTV included M renmval of the M2 tanks for 
stowage in t k  Shuttle and return t o  Earth. This apeared t o  be a feasible 
approach, howver it acldsd a very significant nurr&r of operations t o  the nofinal 
recovery process. muse these operations have hazards associated with them as 
w e l l  as the fact that stcwjng tankage in  the cargo bay requires hardware (weight 
pendlty) as w e l l  as volurre that could otherwise be allocated t o  other payloads, 
it is now felt that the I232 tanks should be jettisoned a t  the conclusion of MPS 
oprations, as is descrikd below. This w i l l  eliminate any reconfiguration 
operations w h i c h  w i l l  sirrplify recovery thus increasing safety. 
Table  3.6-1 shows the s q e n c e  of events required t o  safely dispose of the OTV's 
L H ~  tankage as w e l l  as the vehicle's a d r a k e .  
after the aeroassist manewer the aerobrake is jettisoned via springs. 
the trajectory is suborbital a t  this point, the orbital l i f e  of the aerobrake is 
less than 1 revolution. 
disintegrate because of the very high heat pulse and aercdynamic loads (peak 
k a t  flux of 450 BTU/FT2, peak load of 40 g's) act- upon an unsqprted 
structure with its engine doors open. This requires mch more extensive analysis 
and test, however, t o  verify. 
upn exiting the atmsphere 
=use 
It is f e l t  that the aerdrake w i l l  break up and 
Table  3.6-1 ACC OTV Hardmre Jettison Sequence 
BEGIN AT END OF AEROASSIST PHASE 
1) EXIT ATMOSPHERE 
2) JETTISON AEROBRAKE. 1 FPS SPRING SEP ( ORBIT: 25 X 140 NM) 
3) COAST TO APOGEE (1 40 NM) 
4) ORBIT RAISE #1A: MPS BURN TO 100 X 140 NM ORBIT 
5) JETTISON LH2 TANKS (ORBIT: 100 X 140 NM ) 
6) ORBIT RAISE #lB: ACS BURN TO COMPLETE PHASING ORBIT INJECTION, 
DUMP ALL RESIDUAL MPS PROPELLANTS 
7) COAST TO NEXT APOGEE 
8) ORBIT RAISE #2: PARK ORBIT INJECT INTO 140 NM CIRCULAR 
ALL HARDWARE JETTISONED INTO SHORT DURATION ORBITS 
AEROBRAKE - 34  REVOLUTION 
LH2 TANKS - LESS THAN 1 DAY ORBITAL LIFE 
MPS VELOCIW REQUIREMENTS = 280 FPS 
ACS VELOCITY REQUIREMENTS = 71 FPS (35 LB PROPELLANT) 
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After the OTV coasts t o  its f i r s t  apogee (Figure 3.6-2) , the main propulsion 
system (MPS) is used t o  raise the vehicle's perigee out of the amsphere. When 
this perigee value reaches 100 nmi, the MPS is shut down and the large LH2 tanks 
jettisoned. This leaves the tanks in a 140 by 100 nmi orbit w h i c h  w i l l  &cay in 
less than a day &e t o  the very low Mlistic n- (about one ~b/ft*) of the 
tanks. Because of the very thin skin of the tanks (0.025 inch thick), it is 
very unlikely that anything w i l l  reach the ground, thus an uncontrolled m a y  is 
acceptable. 
140 
GEO-DOWNLEG 
AEROBRAKEENTRY 
244 REV FROM JETTISON 
HEATING EXCEEDS TPS MARGINS 
q rnax = 453 B T U ~  SEC 
g max = 40 g's 
JANKAGF FNTRY 
WITHIN 1 DAY OF JETTISON 
( w / c d ~  = 1 LB I F T ~  ) 
THIN SKIN ( 0.025 INCH ) 
BURNS UP COMPLETELY 
Figure 3.6-2 ACC OTV Harclware D i s p o s a l  
Upon cq le t ing  the tank jettison sequence the OTV continues its orbit 
circularization maneuver using the smaller Acs translation jets. This secpence 
consists of injection into a phasing orbit with Rrigee values between 110 and 
140 d followed, after one t o  two revolutions, by an orbit Cicularization burn 
into the desired 140 nmi park orbit. The net additional propl lant  requirmt 
-sed by t h i s  jettison maneuver upm the hydrazine ACS system is only 35 lb. 
Figure 3.6-3 shows the savings for the Shuttle payload bay volume i f  the large 
OTV Lta tanks are jettismed rather than being returned t o  Earth intact. 
Because of the increasing value of STS dam capability (as heightened by Space 
Station aperations assessments) this approach a p ~ e a r s  t o  be an attractive one. 
Not only could additional on-orbit payloads be retrieved by the Shuttle lxlt also 
low-density payloads could be carried throughout the flight in the STS cargo bay 
because of the volume saving-s realized in carrying the OTV in the ACC (at 
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launch, only the OTV's payload and a minimal munt of OTV return ASE is carried 
in the Shuttle cargo bay, not the OTV itself). 
A B J 
ORBIlEA 
SECT A-A SECT B-B 
Figure 3.6-3 LH2 Tank Jettison - STS P/L Bay Savings 
The reduction in STS payload bay volm required is frm 85% (LH2 tank 
retrieval) down to 40% (LH2 tank jettison. 
reduces the munt of OTV ASE that the Shuttle must carry, frm 2659 lb down to 
920 Ib. It also reduces the ACC OTV retrieval ccmplexity s h c e  no tank m v a l  
operations or OTV reconfiguration are required to be performed by the Shuttle 
prior to berthing in the orbiter bay. 
Jettisoning the LH2 tanks also 
In general, the option of jettisoning the OTV LH2 tanks is an attractive one and 
is recchrmencbxl for future OTV assessmnts. 
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3.7 ACC OTV SAFETY CONCLUSIONS 
W i t h i n  the constraints of this study, 
identified for the ACc CYTV concept frm a safety s t m i n t .  Althoughthe ACc 
concept does require new Shuttle aperating r e g h ,  primarily in the boost 
phase, their use does not represent high technical r i s k  frm a develapnent 
standpoint. 
i f  an in-flight dunp ramins a recpimnmt. 
that is both d u d  fault tolerant t o  chrmp init iation as well as dmp inhibit 
represents a significant technical challenge. 
no potential show st-rs were 
There is a potential shm stapper with the caryo bay configuration 
The safe develaprrent of a system 
The ACc OTV has definite safety -ages over the cargo bay configuration as 
follows : 
a. TIE venting system disconnect me char^ 'sms are not safety critical since 
the orbiter is not at risk should they f a i l  t o  operate correctly. 
mst likely not be needed at all). 
b. The need t o  dunp is not a r i s k  t o  the Orbiter should it f a i l  (it muld 
c. There is no requiremtnt for  post-landing inerting of the cryogenic 
systems in the event of an in-flight abort (the CTV is jettisoned with the ET) . 
The two d m  risk items associated w i t h  the 14Lx configuration are not show- 
stappers and are not considered serious disadvantages. 
valve concern has been eliminated cclrrpletely w i t h  an alternate concept. Only 
the potential new destruct sys tm remainS as both a technical and additianal 
safety risk.  
acceptable since an extensive history in designing these systems exist. 
Various mrnbers of the STS Payload Safety Review Panel were  contacted and asked 
i f  there were any lessons learned f r m  the return t o  flight effort  w i t h  regard 
t o  cryogenic stages in the payload bay. 
w e r e  not s t r i c t ly  prohibited t3ut that "all the Centaur problems n u t  be solved" 
w h i c h  w o u l d  involve m j o r  modificatims t o  the o a i t e r  for additional venting 
provisions that were planned for  the Centaur and possibly others. The panel 
mmbers contacted said they have not yet seen a &sign that mets all of the 
The tank separation 
The safety r i sk  associated w i t h  t h i s  system should be made t o  be 
They said that these type of stages 
requirements. 
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4 . 0  DESIGN ISSUES 
The design issues addressed dur i rq  this study extension are listed below: 
Near t e r m  expadable vehicle ckfinitian 
- performance enhancmt options 
- cost trade studies 
Ground based OTV characteristics 
- performance t o  rn 
- payhck for reuse 
- technology demnstration opportunities 
Lunar mission acccarmodation 
- mission qtimization 
- Lunar transfer vehicle definition 
- Lunar landing considerations 
- Cry0 engine throttling issues 
C p t h  cryogenic shuttle VV OTV 
- vehicle characterization 
- performance sumnary 
An llinitialvt m d a b l e  vehicle was defined and performance caparisons =re 
mde w i t h  the ground based reusable concept ckvelaped in earlier Phase A effort .  
The intent was t o  provide a vehicle concept that  represents a prcqram start in a 
time frame earlier than for the ground based reusable concept. 
that  pertains t o  the near term expadable is in choosing t k  performance 
enhancerents that fit the time frame of program start. 
develapnent was pursued starting in 1988, the earliest ICC date would be 1993. 
Data for this aggressive date, alang w i t h  several later ones, is shown in this 
section. 
The main issue 
If a smwhat aggressive 
The Lunar mission optimization, Lunar transfer vehicle and lander definitions, 
and cryogenic engine implications of Lunar landing constitute a major portion of 
the design issues. 
correspond to the Shut t le  "C" vehicle concept. 
Final subjects include OTV concept definitions that 
4.1 NEAR TERM EXPENDABLE VEHICLE DEFINITION 
The Wroad taken in defining an early or flinitiallf expadable vehicle was t o  
start w i t h  a concept tha t  would grow into the ground based reusable vehicle. 
T a b l e  4.1-1 shows the items that would differ &tween a ground based reusable 
vehicle and an expmdable preckessor. One obvious difference between a 
reusable aeroassisted vehicle and an expendable version is tk aerobrake. 
the brake can be a m  or removed as a uni t  without irpcting the remaining 
stage structure. 
avionics and mteoroid protection requirerents. 
time on orbit and no need t o  return t o  LM). 
used rather than a newly develaped engine; once again t o  provide a vehicle that 
could be made available at an early date; say, 1993. 
But, 
Other dry weight benefits for an W d a b l e  stage include less 
This is primarily due t o  less 
Also, an existing RLlOA could be 
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T a b l e  4.1-1 Deltas Frm Ground Based Reusable 
m 
- REMOVE AEROBRAKE 
- RLlOA-3 VS. IOC ENGINE 
- THINNER METEOROID BU,WER 
- BAlTERIES INSTEAD OF FUEL CELLS 
- GROUND UPDATE INSTEAD OF GPS FOR STATE VECTOR 
- 2219 AL FOR TANKS 
' 
- 
-1419 
+75 
-80 
-26 
-52 
+323 
?he character of the first OTV design d e p ~ d s  upon the year of inteMcled Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC) . This is &e t o  the availability of desirable 
technologies occurring at different dates. For instance, if 1995 w a s  the target 
date for IOC rather than 1993, an advanced engine may be available. 
addition, aluminum-lithium alloy could perhaps be used for tankage instead of 
2219 al&um for increasedperfomce.  
In 
The concept shown in Figure 4.1.1-1 illustrates a version of OTV that is 
possible t o  develop i n  the near tern (1993) w i t h  relatively low r i s k .  
example, the concept incorporates the n 1 O A  which is an existing engine now in 
proctuction. 
manratable. 
rather than fuel cells or heavy rechargable batteries. 
selected over all-alminum d m  t o  the performance advantages, the availability 
of the ccgnposites in the tim frarre of interest (1993), and the relatively s m a l l  
develqmnt cost difference. All-aluminum tanks were selected due t o  the 
uncertainty of X-Li alloy availability in an early timfranrt. These tanks were 
sized t o  hold 50 Wm of propellant in order t o  enable the vehicle t o  deliver 
the 22 Klbn  platform t o  GM>. 
into the proposed STS aft cargo carrier. 
shows the vehicle w i t h  a naninal propellant load of about 4 5  Wmn w h i c h  
corresponds t o  the current lift capability (55 Wm) of tlae shuttle. 
For 
This vehicle concept is intended t o  be expendable and not 
pdditianal features include lightweight silver-zinc batteries 
Ccanposite structure w a s  
These tanks are also the largest that w i l l  f i t  
The e i g h t  staterrrtnt in the figure 
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TANK MATERIAL 
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ENVIRONMENTAL CTRL 
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ORIENTATION CTRL 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
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DRY WEIGHT 
PROPELLANTS, ETC 
LOADED WEIGHT 
1106 
650 
246 
944 
187 
328 
182 
540 
41 89 
45424 
49613 
DEBRIS L METEOROID A 
SHIELD 
STRUCTURE 
RL10-A 
ENGINE 
Figure 4.1.1-1 A02 m d a b l e  OTV Baseline 
The performane improvemnts have k e n  calculated for several vehicle enhanmts  
considered for the term expendable vehicle concqt. These performance 
enhancerrwt deltas shown in Figure 4.1.1-2 are the benefits in GEO payload capability 
w i t h  an STS launch weight constraint of 55klkx-n. 
ckltas are nearly the sarre as the dry weight reductions for each of these options. 
Therefore, these caparisons are relatively indepmdant of STS l i f t  capability. The 
engine upgrades, however, include both the dry Weight differences frm the RLlOA and 
the performance improvements due t o  ixreases in specific impulse. 
The tankage and s t ruc tue  performance 
4.1.2 COST TRADE S"DIEs 
In order t o  ca-pre these performance enhancmmts for q l i c a t i o n  on t h e  expmdable 
vehicle, a cost assessnwt of them was ma& by catparing the Mefits of increased 
payload capabilities. 
applied t o  the three expndable OTV trade studies that follow. All costs are reported 
in 1985 dollars and exclude fee and ContingenCY. The trade study results report only 
the affected subsystem and exclude the total stage E. This provides v is ib i l i ty  t o  
the results w i t h i n  the order of magnitude of the expcted cost of the OTV enhancements 
and precludes them being overwklrred in the to t a l  LCC estimate. 
T a b l e  4.1.2-1 highlights the major groundrules and assmptions 
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1438 
AL - LI COMPOSITE IOC (475s) RL10-IIB (460s) 
2219 AL 2219 AL RL1 OA RL1 OA 
TANKAGE STRUCTURE ENGINE ENGINE 
vs. vs. vs. vs. 
Figure 4.1.1-2 Performance E2lharlC-t Del tas  
T a b l e  4.1.2-1 Cost Groundrules: Expendable OTV Tracks 
All Cost Estimates Are In 1985 Dollars And Exclude Fee 
Cost Deltas Include Only the Impact Of The Proposed Enhancement 
NSTS CPF Assumed At $73M / Flight Per Study Groundrules 
Reference Expendable Stage Average Unit Cost At $50M 
- Aluminum Structure, Aluminum Tankage, RL-10 Engine 
Trade Study Cost Benefits Analysis Include 
- Delta DDT&E (Represented By The Y-Axis Offset) 
- Delta Unit Cost (Factored Into Recurring Benefits On Per Mission Basis) 
- $/LE Impact Based On P/L Lift Differences Between Trade Alternatives 
-- Benefit Based On $/Lb To Geo Performance Of Reference Candidate 
-- Includes Delta P/L Only 
The NSTS cost per fl ight used for purposes of transportation costs t o  l o w  earth orbit 
(LEO) was $ 7 3  (consistent w i t h  the governmint sqplied groundrules) . 
expendable stage average Unit cost is $50M. The reference vehicle configuration 
includes a l h m  structure, aluminum tanks, and the R G l O A  engine. 
The reference 
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The track study results are presented in the form of cost deltas. These delta costs 
are derived fran the estimates of three major e l m t s  of cost. The first cost element 
is the DDT&E cost estimate of the respctive enhancerent candidates. In the results 
presentations that follow, the delta DDT&E costs are represented as  the offset on the 
Y-axis. This offset includes the cost estimate for developing the lighter *ight 
(structures and tanks) or  higher performing (IOC engine) trade study candidate. The 
second elenwt is the unit  cost estimates. In the v d a b l e  vehicle this is treated 
as a cost per mission item. The delta unit  cost is cabin& w i t h  the third cost 
element which is the perceived P/L delivery benefit of the lighter weight or higher 
performing trade candidate. This elenwt of cost represents a measuresrwt of the 
potential payload benefit of the higher perfofilling trade study candidate. The benefit 
is calculated on a cost per mission basis. The delta P/L weight is calculated on a per 
pound basis at  the cost of delivering each additional pound at  the cost per pound t o  
of the less attractive trade study alternative. 
The cost results of replacing the aluminum airframe w i t h  ccanposite structure are shown 
in Figure 4.1.2-1. The DDT&E and Unit cost for the aluminum airframe are $21.9M and 
$1.3,  respectively. The ccslposite airfrarre exhibits higher costs ($27.%) but 
slightly lower uni t  costs (S1.m. The delta DDT&E cost estimate is represented by the 
offset on the Y-axis. The additional 
airframe is $5.9~.  There is a slight unit cost benefit due the ccarposite of 
approximtely $0.1M. 
investnwt required for  the caps i te  
55K Orbiter 72K Orbiter 
P/L, Composite Structure 12,245 Lbs 18,127 Lbs 
PL, Aluminum Structure 12,009 Lbs 17,891 Lbs 
Della PIL 236 Lbs 
Composite VLb (GEO) $10,045 $/Lb $ 6,785 S/Lb 
Aluminum S/Lb (GEO) $10,240 $lib S 6,875 VLb 
8 0 .  
60 - *  
40 -. 
20 -. 
i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IO AluminumStructure 
1 -20 A d d a i i  P A  Mass To Otbbi (K Us) 
I --7 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
~ i w M i s s i o n s  
Figure 4.1.2-1 Aluminum vs. Carpsite StructUreS Trade 
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The two plotted lines represent the d a t i v e  cost benefit given a range of Orbiter 
lift capability of 55K lbs t o  72K lbs . The slope of the benefit lines are a 
ccgnbination of the per unit  cost difference and the derived P/L benefit of the lighter 
ccanposite airfram. The stage P/L e i g h t  differences (236 lbs per mission) can be 
translated into deliverable P/L for each of the orbiter performance mures .  The 
additiandl P/L capability is costed at the cost p r  pound r a r e d  t o  deliver that 
m u n t  of P/L using the stage w i t h  the aluminum airfrarre ($10.2K /Lb for the 55K 
Orbiter case and $6.9K /Lb for the 72K Orbiter case). The additional investment i n  the 
ccanposite structure is paid back w i t h i n  3 t o  4 missions. 
The cost results of replacing the alminumtanks w i t h  alminum-lithim tanks are shown 
in Figure 4.1.2-2. The DDT&E and unit cost for the aluminum tanks are S14.m and 
$2.4M, respectively. The a l h u m  l i t h i u m  tanks exhibit higher DDT&E 
Unit costs ($2.9M). The higher DDT&E cost is driven by the prcbable mirmt of 
prforming a Mcated cryogenic proof test w i t h  the n e e r  material while avoiding 
such a test w i t h  the aluminum tanks. Mditionally, the unit  cost difference affects 
the cost of the g o u r d  test -. The higher unit cost of the alminm lithium 
tanks is due primarily t o  the higher materials cost. Little difference in fabrication 
between the two materials is expected at this time. 
($27.5M) and 
55K Orbiter 72K Orbiter 
PL, Aluminum Lithium 12.602 Lbs 18,484 Lbs 
PL, Aluminum 12,245 Lbs 18,127 Lbs 
Deita PIL 357 Lbs 
Aluminum Lithium V U  (GEO) $ 9,760 VLb $6,654 VLb 
Aluminum WLb (GEO) $10,045 ULb 
:‘i 
BO 
4 / 55Klbm Orbite+ 
Delta DDT&E : +$7.3M 
/*’ 
0 , Reference: 
8 IO 12 14 16 AluminumTanks 
Addilbrrl PIL Masa To OrML (K Lbs) -20 
I I I I 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
~ h r e M i s s i o n ,  
Figure 4.1.2-2 Aluminum vs Al-Li Tanks Trade  
The additional DDT&E hvestrrent required for the aluminum-lithium tanks is $7.34. The 
unit cost delta is approxhtely $0.5M per set of tanks. 
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As i n  the previous trade study results, the two plotted lines represent the cumulative 
cost benefit given a range of O r b i t e r  lift capability of 55K lbs t o  72K lbs. The slop 
of the benefit lines are a ca&i.nation of the per uni t  cost difference and the derived 
P/L benefit of the lighter aluminum lithiuntanks. The stage P/L weight differences 
(357 lbs per mission) can be translated into deliverable P/L for each of the orbiter 
performance measures. The a t i o n d l  P/L capability is costed at the cost per pound 
required t o  deliver that  m u n t  of P/L using the stage w i t h  the aluminm tanks 
($lO.OK/Lb for the 5% O r b i t e r  case and $6.8K/Lb for the 72K Orbiter case) . The 
alumhum-lithium tank payback occurs w i t h i n  3 t o  4 flights. 
The cost inpact for developing the ICC engine is shown in Figure 4.1.2-3. The DDT&E 
and unit cost for  the RL-10 are $14.8M and $1.7M, respectively. The DDT&E includes 
primarily ground test hardware and test aperations requiremnts due t o  integration of 
the RL-10 t o  the new m d a b l e  stage. The DDT&E cost e s t h t e  ($234.8M) for the 102 
engine represerrts a new engine &velopmnt program. The un i t  cost estimate for the new 
engine ($2.2M) is not as significant a cost factor between the two alternative 
engines. 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
-100 
-200 
-300 
P/L, D C  Engine 
P/L, RL-10 Engine 
72K Orbiter 
19,997 Lbs 
18.127  Lbs 55K Orbiter 13,683 Lbs 12,245 Lbs 
I Delta P/L 1.438 Lbs l % M L b s  I -.- - - --- 
IOC Engine t/Lb (GEO) E 8,990 YLb $ 6,150 ULb 
AL-10 Engine ULb (GEO) $10,045 ULb $ 6,785 ULb 
- 
I -  t Reference: 
30 40 50 60 RL-10 Engine 
M d H i o d  PA. Mmsa Toorbil (K Lb.) Delta DDT6E 
t 1 I I I I r I I 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
amtdalkn,hassiom 
Figure 4.1.2-3 RL10 vs ICC Engine Track 
The additional DDT&E investmmt required for the ICC engine is $220.0M. The uni t  cost 
delta is approximately $0.5M engine. 
~s in the previous tm trade studies, the two plotted lines represent the CurniLative 
cost benefit given a range of O r b i t e r  lift capability of 55K lbs t o  72K Ibs. The slope 
of the benefit lines are a cminat ion  of the per unit cost difference and the derived 
P/L benefit of the performance gains due t o  the higher Isp of the IOC engine. The 
stage P/L capability differences (1438 lbs per mission in  a 55K O r b i t e r  and 1870 lbs 
p r  mission in a 72K Orbiter) can k translated into deliverable P/L for each of the 
orbiter performance values. The additional P/L capability is costed at  the cost per 
pound -red t o  deliver that  m t  of P/L us- the stage w i t h  the RL-10 engine 
($lO.OK/Lb for the 55K O r b i t e r  case and $6.8K/Lb for the 72K Orbiter case) . Due t o  the 
higher investment cost in the new engine program the payback of the initial investnmt 
is in the 15 t o  19 missions range. The overall benefit after 40 missions is mch mre 
significant than in the previous trades. 
Figure 4.1.2-4 shows the differen= in developmt costs between each of the 
proposed vehicle enhancemmts and the existing technology subsystem. 
qualification of the prapellant tanks and the structure w i l l  have t o  be 
p r f o m  independant of the materials used. 
the difference in develaprent costs are essentially related t o  materials 
characterization and subscale testing. 
available; therefore, the IOC engine developrrent cost delta is primarily the 
develapnent cost of the IOC engine. 
Design and 
So, for the tanks and structure 
The RLlOA already is in p r d c t i o n  and 
200 
150 
DEVELOPMENT 
COST DELTA 
($MI io0 
50 
0 
7.3  
AL - LI COMPOSITE 
vs. vs. 
220 - 
- 
IOC 
vs. 
2219 AL 2219 AL RLi OA 
TANKAGE STRUCTURE .. ENGINES 
Figure 4.1.2-4 Fnhanasn-mt Developrrent Cost Deltas 
A g o d  indication of the w o r t h  of each of the vehicle e n h a n c m t s  is the munt 
ckvelcpwnt dollars spent for the p e r f o m c e  gained. 
the enhancmmts ccanpare on this basis. 
Li tanks enhancement. 
Figure 4.1.2-5 shows how 
The best bargain w a r s  t o  be the Al- 
The IOC engine is the highest in terms of cost per Ursn of 
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increased performance; however, this mhancemnt is obviously the single mst 
important qqra& in terms of absolute performance increase. 
0 
200 
I 1 I 1 
DEVELOPMENT 
LBM INCREASE 
IN PAYLOAD 
WLBM) 
COSTPER 150 
100 
50 
NOTE: STS PAYLOAD TO 11 0 NMI 
= 55KLBM 
i 
AL - LI COMPOSITE Ioc 
vs. vs. vs. 
2219 AL 221 9 AL RLlOA 
TANKAGE STRUCTURE ENGINES 
Figure 4.1.2-5 Eslhancglwt Costs Per Lbm P/L Improvepnent 
The conclusions of the cost trade studies on the performance enhancerents 
indicate that the enhancemnts should be ~plrsued as soon as they are available. 
The payoff for the ICC engine is in  5 years i f  the flight rate is 4 per year. 
The tankage arid structure trades both suggest t ha t  the e n h a n c m t s  pay for 
themselves in 5 flights or less arid availability of the enhancerent is the only 
other considerat ion. 
The schedule of availabil i ty for each of the vehicle enhancemwts is shown in 
Figure 4.1.2-6 along with the earlier available subsystem tws. mst of the 
enhancements under consideration could conceivably be made available by 1993 i f  
the go-ahead w a s  in early 1988. 
engine and the Al-Li alloy p r v l l a n t  tanks. 
The ones in question include the ICC advanced 
The llultimatell achranced engine would take an estimated 7 1/2 years t o  fully 
develop according t o  Pra t t  & Whitney; hotever, presumably an earlier version of 
this engine (the ICC engine) could be available in 5 years. 
alloys under consicleration for propellant tanks are presently unckrgoing 
materials characterization (which is typically a 5 year period). 
design, develaprrtnt, and qualification of 
?”ne new Al-L i  
The final 
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ADVANCED ENGINE(S) 
1990 1992 1994 1996 
YEAR 
IOC ENGINE (475 S), 5 YRS 
ADVANCED (480+ S) ,  7 112 YRS 
Figure 4.1.2-6 Enhancesnent Develaprwt T h s  
tanks w i t h  these materials must then be prfonred a f t e r  the characterizations 
are ccmplete. 
available in 1993. 
These tim estimates suggest that these alloys w i l l  not be 
The recamrended conclusions for the initial expendable vehicle are that each of 
the enhancawnts examined should be incorporated as s m  as possible (&perding 
upon their availabil i ty).  
initial OTV w i l l  have. 
IOC date, then, determines which enhancments the 
4 . 2  GROUND BASED OTV CHARACTERISTICS 
During earlier Phase A effort, the ground-based reusable vehicle concept shown 
in Figure 4.2-1 was developed. 
the s m  structure and same size tanks, but the reusable concept incorporates a 
new technology, reusable engine. ’I”ne reusable vehicle offers potential economic 
advantages over the expmdable vehicle, providing that the launch vehicle costs 
are sufficently low and the launch capability is sufficiently high. 
addition, the reusable vehicle could provide an excellent mans of ckmnstrating 
future technologies such as those required for space basing. 
will be discussed in this section. 
The reusable and the expendable concepts have 
In 
These subjects 
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TANK MATERIAL STRETCHED DEDICATED 
2090 AL-LI 7 ACC OML 
OPERATIONAL 
ENVELOPE 
DOORS 
(2 PLACES) 
GRAPHITE EPO 
ACC 
7.5 K 
IOC ENGINE 
GRAPHITE POLYIMIDE 
HONEYCOMB COVERED 
WITH CERAMIC FOAM 
TILES 
--- 
1 MULTI-PLY NICALON 
AEROBRAKE HEWI 1234 
TANKS 025 
STRUCTURE n4 
ENVIRONMENTAL CTRL 307 
MAIN PROWLSON 904 
OAIENTAl'KlN CTRL 187 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 435 
G K L C .  156 
CONTINGENCY (15%) 755 
DRY WEKjM 55n 
m0pEuANTs.m 4 ~ 2 4  
LOADED WEIGHT 51011 
Q-FELT AND SEALED 
NEXTEL ON GRAPHITE 
/ POLYIM~DE FRAME 
INFLATED TORUS 38 
BRAKE 
NICALON CLOTH 
NEXTEL CLOTH 
AND SEALER 
Figure 4.2-1 Ground Based %usable OTV 
4.2.1 RmTsABLE VS EXPENDABLE 
Weight and performance smmries for both the expndable vehicle baseline and 
the grmd based reusable vehicle concept are shown in T a b l e  4.2.1-1. 
p e r f o m c e  n-rs are given for both a 55 klhn STS and a 65 kU=m STS, the 
latter representing a perfomce-enhanced vehicle. The standard STS 
p r f o m c e  t o  110 NM had t o  be adjusted for AIX: OTV operati-. Because the 
OTV is deployed at MELD the shuttle's 
stage into park orbit, this is a perforrrance gain for the shuttle (the 
p r f o m c e  loss t o  the OTV is accounted for i n  its missim propl lant  
computations). Shuttle p e r f o m c e  groundrules also require sufficient CMS 
prapellant t o  deorbit the shuttle and cargo bay payload in case of a failed 
deploymnt . 
(since they are the only pieces in the orbiter cargo bay at MEo3) w h i c h  
typically totals  less than 15 Klb. Finally, the orbiter must f l y  t o  the 140 NM 
OTV park orbit for payload rating which is a performance penalty for the 
shuttle. When a l l  the above factors are considered for a standard STS l i f t  
capability of 55 Klb t o  110 NM, the net capacity t o  MELD is 53460 lb for an ACC 
OTV mission. For a 65 K l b  capacity shuttle, the adjusted ACC OTV l i f t  
capability (Onr + payload + ACC + ASE) is 64,290 Ib t o  MECO. 
The 
system does not have t o  inject the 
This groundrule would only q l y  t o  the OTV's payload and ASE 
The w e i g h t s  remain 
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the sarre for each stage for the ACC and payload ASE for the two launch weight 
capabilities. 
two STS capacities. 
The propellant, payload, and to ta l  l i f to f f  weights differ for the 
Figure 4.2.1-1 shows OTV payload delivery capability t o  GED as a function of STS 
delivery capability for the reusable and expenwle vehicle concepts generated 
during this study. By increasing STS lift capability, the o?v concepts can be 
loaded w i t h  mre propellant and thus f ly  heavier payloads t o  their final 
destination. 
deliver t o  110 nmi. 
The STS lift capability shown corresponds to what the Shuttle can 
It may be concluded frm the figure that the expendable vehicle concept is 
capable of delivering significantly greater payload t o  GE53 than the reusable 
concept. 
use w i t h  OTV. 
OTV not carry an aercbrake and propellant t o  return itself t o  LEO i f  the mission 
is constrained by l imi t ed  STS capacity. Another conclusion is tha t  the cost per 
pound of payload t o  GM> for the reusable OTV, including develcpwnt, prcduction, 
and operations costs, is higher than for the expendable for OTV class payloads 
depending upon STS capability. 
This may be crucial i f  a larger launch vehicle is not available for 
In other words, 1- payloads going t o  GED may require that the 
This is discussed i n  the following paragraph. 
T a b l e  4.2.1-1 STS ACC OTV E O  Performance Baseline 
WEIGHT SUMMARY IN LBM 
EXPENDABLE fRL1O) REUSABLE floc) 
ACC 41 40 41 40 
PIL AS€ 895 895 
OTV ASE 300 (PIDA ONLY) 1333 (EXPEND LH2 TANKS) 
OTV DRY 41 89 5577 
PROPELLANTO , 31708 (38678) 33270 (39963) 
P/L* 1 2228 (1 6088) 8245 (1 2382) 
TOTAL* 53460 (64290) 53460 (64290) 
FOR 55 K STS (65 K STS) 
50 
NOTE: OTV MISSION START IS FROM MECO. INITIAL PARK ORBIT IS 140 NMI 
OTV + P/L + ASE + ACC = 53460 LBM FOR 55 K ORBITER 
25 I 
20 
15 
PAYLOAD 
TO 
GEO 
(KLBM) 
10 
5 
IOC ENG 
EXPENDABLE RL1 OA 
IOC ENG 
\REUSABLE 
. o  I 
50 55 60 65 70 75 
STS LIFT TO 110 NMI - KLBM 
Figure 4.2.1-1 Payload t o  GEO W i t h  STS 
The ground based reusable vehicle concept has lower performance in terms of GEO 
payload than the expendable concept. 
expending a vehicle can presmably be significantly reduced on a pr-flight 
basis by the reusable vehicle. 
the reusable concept after the investrrent is made t o  develop it. The crossover 
point CcBnpared t o  the cost of us- an expendable vehicle is a function of what  
the STS lift capability is. 
proprtionately larger payload relative t o  that of the V d a b l e  vehicle for 
higher STS capacities. 
capability is greater than 65 Klhn. 
However, the unit  costs associated with 
Figure 4.2.1-2 shows the paL33ack associated w i t h  
In ather words, the reusable vekicle carries a 
The conclusion is that reuse appears attractive i f  STS 
4.2.2 TlZCHKIm DEM3NSTRATIckJ OPPORTUNITIES 
After initiating the OTV program w i t h  perhaps a ground based expendable vehicle there 
will be -&unities t o  demnstrate technologies that w i l l  be required for the 
evolution of the OTV t o  reuse, space basing, aeroassist, etc. 
shown in T a b l e  4.2.2-1, w i l l  typically be after the carpletion of a payload delivery 
mission, for -le. 
operation of prototyp o?v hardware that has llccm along for  the ride" or other 011J 
support equipmt prototypes that w i l l  be used w i t h  the post mission GTV for 
technology dmonstratian. 
These wrtunities, as 
The demonstrations w i l l  essentially consist of in-space 
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- EQUAL CUMULATIVE MASS TO GEO 
- $10 WFLT COST FOR USING REUSABLE VEHICLE (SEE VOL IX, TABLE 8.2.4-1) 
- DELTA DDT 8 E i $434M ($164M-AERO, $22OM-ENGINE, $50M-OTHER SUBSYSTEMS) 
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50 
CUMULATIVE 
COST 
BENEFIT 
(1985 $M) -50 
-100 
-1 50 
-200 
-250 
-300 
-350 
-400 
I 65 K STS 8 
LT 
72 ST’ 65 K STS 
$1 OOWF 
I 10 m /  30 40 50 / 60 
55 K STS 
-450 I 
F igure 4.2.1-2 Reusable V e h i c l e  Payback Over Expendable 
T a b l e  4.2.2-1 Technology Demnstration Opportunities 
AEROASSIST 
LONG TERM CRYOGENIC STORAGE 
FAILURE DETECTION AND ISOLATION 
ON - ORBIT SERVlClNQ 
SPACE BASED REFUELING 
EQUIP EXPENDABLE VEHICLE WITH 
AEROBRAKE AND GUIDANCE PACKAGE FOR 
RETURN FOLLOWING DELIVERY MISSION 
EQUIP EXPENDABLE OR REUSABLE VEHICLES 
WITH VARIOUS THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
AND INSTRUMENTATION FOR POST MISSION 
LONG TERM SYSTEM EVALUATIONS 
INSTRUMENTED VEHICLE RECOVERED AND 
RETURNED TO GROUND FOR INSPECTION TO 
CORRELATE DEGRADATION TRENDS 
& U P  G.B. OTV WITH ORUS (ORBITAL RE- 
PLACEABLE UNITS) FOR SERVICING DEMON- 
STRATION USING STS AS PLATFORM WITH 
EVA AND/OR ROBOTICS/TELEOPS 
RETURN EXPENDABLE TO LEO OR USE G.B. 
REUSABLE (BEFORE RETURNING TO EARTH) 
FOR ON-ORBIT REFUELING DEMONSTRATION 
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4 . 3  LUNAR VEHICLE DESIGN ISSUES 
4.3.1 LUNAR TRANSFER (X#?AF?IsoNS 
A study was performed in order t o  determine the opthum strategy for delivering 
payloads t o  the Lunar surface. 
candidate mission scenarios for the 40 Klhnpaylcad delivery mission. 
Performance calculations were conducted for 
The direct t o  surface method consists of using two  stages (om of w h i c h  contains 
landing legs, radar, etc.) t o  do a Surveyor type of landirg an the b%xn  w i t h o u t  
f i r s t  going into Lunar ozbit. The f i r s t  stage does the f i r s t  kick frcm LM> and 
then returns i t se l f  t o  LED via aerccapture. The second stage then finishes the 
transfer, performs the landing, then ascends f r m  the bbon and returns i tself  t o  
m. 
The dedicated lander approach uses two transfer vehicles t o  &liver the 40 Klhn  
payload and prapellant for the lander t o  Lunar orbit. Then t h  prapellant is 
transferred t o  the lander and the payload is delivered t o  the surface. 
lander then returns t o  Lunar orbit. 
The 
A mission scenario was examined tha t  cansidered a two stage -roach in w h i c h  
aerobrake and landing lqs would be . m e  in Lunar orbit. The f i r s t  stage 
would do the initial kick in LFx> and the second stage would cmplete the 
transfer t o  Lunar orbit for the swap and subsequmt completion of the payload 
delivery t o  the Lunar surface. 
retum t o  Lunar orbit t o  swap the landing legs back for its aerobrake and return 
t o  earth. 
For the return lq, the landing stage would 
The dedicated lander scenario was also examined for use frcm the Earth-mn 
libration point L1. 
aperation described earlier but for lander basing a t  L1 instead of i n  Lunar 
orbit .  
?"nis scenario is identicdl t o  the dedicated lander 
The resulting propellant quantities reqyired for each of the mission scenarios 
are shown in Figure 4.3.1-1. 
the Lunar surface appears t o  be the direct transfer t o  the surface w h i c h  is 
depicted in Figure 4.3.1-2. 
associated with &ta; lhg a dedicated lander in either Lunar orbit or Ll. 
also avoids the operations associated with ecpiwt chanqmut going t o  and frm 
the Moon. 
The mst e c o n d c a l  method of payload delivery t o  
This mission option avoids the logistics prablems 
It 
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Figure 4.3.1-1 Lunar Transfer  Canparisons 
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Figure 4.3.1-2 Lunar Profile - D i r e c t  Ascent 
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4.3.2 LUNAR TRANSFER VEHICLE DEFINITION 
Figure 4.3.2-1 dqicts the transfer vehicle concept selected for delivering 
payloads, OTV's + payloads, etc. toward the Lunar surface, Lunar orbit, or t o  a 
libration point. 
(one containing Lunar landing d f i c a t i a n s )  could deliver the 40 Wm payload 
t o  the Lunar surface and return tkmselves t o  LM>. 
larger version of the 74 k space based vehicle that was reccmened for  routine 
GEO delivery missions. 
propellant loads. 
of the engines may need t o  be uprated for better overall vehicle p e r f o m c e .  
The vehicle w a s  s ized such that two stages of this concept 
The vehicle is essentially a 
With further vehicle cptimization, however, the thrust levels 
only the tanks have been upsized for the 1zge.r 
Several groundrules e r e  assunrxl t o  m l y  t o  a Lunar landing scenario w i t h  an 
W. 
upon the configuration candidates. 
allowed because of the need t o  descend arad land in an upright orientation. For 
instance, two engines w i t h  one engine out w o u l d  experience an att i tude 
misalignmmt due t o  the thrust vector not coinciding w i t h  the axis of symrretry. 
%m Lunar landings w i l l  be manned, thus engine out capability was irrposed 
In addition, attit& misalignmnts were not 
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Figure 4.3.2-1 98 K B n  Lunar Transfer V e h i c l e  
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The thrust  level requiremats associated w i t h  -110 landings were adopted as 
groundrules for this study. These included thrust level variation dmingthe 
landing seqence in order t o  provide 0.31g at descent ignition t o  0.06% at 
touchdown. 
necessity. 
Therefore, continuous throttling capability of the m a i n  engines is a 
OTV AND PROPELLANT 
WEIGHT AT TOUCHDOWN 
TOTAL TOUCHDOWN WT. 
MINIMUM THRUST 
DESCENT IGNITION WT. 
MAXIMUM THRUST 
T a b l e  4.3.3-1 shows the weights of OTV, payloads, and propellants at  Lunar 
touchdown for two different missions. 
level at touchdown fram the &mllo landing thrust  requirements (0.06%) , the 
minimum thrust levels for Lunar landing vehicle were derived. Likewise, the 
descent ignition weights and 0.31g were used t o  obtain the maximUm thrust  
levels. 
Using these weights and the suggested g- 
11.7K + 24.8K = 36.5KLBM 1 1.7K + 13.2K = 24.9KLBM 
15K + 36.5K = 51.5KLBM 40K + 24.9K = 64.9KLBM 
0.065g(51.5K) = 3.3KLBF 0.065g(64.9K) = 4.2KLBF 
89.5KLBM 112.8KLBM 
0.3lg(89.5) = 27.7KLBF 0.319(112.8) = 35KLBF 
In order t o  accmmdate these thrust level requireiwnts, three (in-line), four, 
and five-engjne configuration W d a t e s  were considered for Lunar landing 
missions. 
three (cluster) e n g h  configurations would cause an att i tude misalignment upon 
engine-ut. 
m u s e  of increased weight, decreased reliability, large engine pattern, 
increased costs, and increased ccslplexity. 
A single engine cannot meet the engine out requirgllent and two and 
Eslgine systems w i t h  greater than five engines were not considered 
T a b l e  4.3.3-1 Thrust Levels for Lunar Landhg 
I 15K MANNED I 40K DELIVERY 
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Table 4.3.3-2 Lunar Landing mghe Configuratians 
MAIN ENGINE i MISSION RELIABILITY : THRUST RANGE : THROlTLING : 
CONFIGURATION; (10BURNS) ; PERENGINE i RATIO ; REMARKS 
4 
4 
: -HIGHTHRUST 
; REQUIRED 
; RATIO' , ' - LARGE THROlTLlNG 
; 1.1K-35KLBF ; 32:l , 
: -WIDE PAlTERN 
I 
I , 
, , 
I 
, 00 i .9864 I 0.8K - 17.5 KLBF : 21 :1 00 i 
I 
, 8 - LOWEST RELIABILITY 
, : ANDCONTROL 
: - LARGEST PAlTERN 
i O , ~ ~ K - ~ I , ~ K L B F  18:1 ; -COMPLEXDESIGN .9797 
("")* : ~ SUAJ-LESTTHROlT. 
; RATIO 
* FINAL DESCENT AND LANDING WITH THREE ENGINES 
Four engines were chosen for Lunar landing a@ications based upon the 
assessnwt results presented in Tab le  4.3.3-2. 
engines is bet- tha t  of three and five engine system. 
requirmt and thrott l ing ratio are mch reduced f r m  those of the three engine 
system and not significantly laryer than those of the five engine system. The four 
engine system w a s  also chosen because it has the smallest pattern for packaging within 
a circular perhter and may offer the best growth path f r m  an existingtwo engine 
system. 
The system re l iab i l i ty  of four 
However, the maxirmrm thrust 
A f ive engine configuration would have the lowest required thrott l ing rat io  if one of 
the larding ground rules was changed t o  allow aperating engines t o  be shutdown. 
two apposing outboard engines of the five engine pattern were shutdown &riq the 
Lunar descent, the throttling range of the system would be r d c e d  t o  1O:l & there 
would still be engine out capability with the reminhg three engines. 
re l iab i l i ty  irrplications of shutting down aperating engines should be assessed, 
however, in choosing five engines rather than faur. 
If 
The safety and 
The modifications shown in Table 4.3.3-3 must be made in converting a space 
based OTV fran orbit-to-orbit delivery capability t o  delivering payloads t o  the 
Lunar surface. The two additional engines w i t h  increased thrust  and continuous 
thrott leabil i ty are needed for a lunar landing. 
radar, and landing software must be added in order t o  accomTy3cJate the landing 
scenario. For the return t o  LM) f r m  the m n ,  s l ight ly  beefed up structure and 
thicker TpS an the aerobrake are required carpared t o  the vehicle only returning 
f r m  GED or an initial kick towards the moon (see Section 6.6) . 
protection requirements are not presently thought t o  differ mch f r m  those for 
LEO-GEl transfer. 
Ln addition, landing legs, 
Wteoroid 
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Table 4.3.3-3 Lunar Landing Deltas 
ITEM 
ADD 2 ENGINES + PLUMBING 
AEROBRAKE 
RADAR 
LANDING LEGS 
METEOROID SHIELDING 
LANDING SOFTWARE 
PRIMARY STRUCTURE 
DELTAS (LBM) 
702 
573 
69 
1495 
0 
SMALL 
64 
2983 
--- 
?"ne concept shown in  Figure 4.3.3-1 was created by incorporating the Lunar 
landing modifications t o  the 98 Klt=m Lunar transfer vehicle. 
transfer vehicle and this lander concept would together be capable of delivering 
40 K13m t o  the Lunar surface, then both vehicles would return themselves t o  LM). 
The figure also shows a design concept for landing legs that fold under the 
aerobrake hard shell into a d i e t e r  ccsnpatible with delivery t o  E O  in  the STS 
The 98 K13m 
UEWiI 
AEROBRAKE 
TANKS 
STRUCTURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CTRL 
MAIN PROPWSloN 
CfiIENTATloN CONTROL 
ELECTRIC SYSTEMS 
G N B C  
CONTINGENCY (15%) 
DRY W E W  
PROPELLANTS, ETC 
LOADEDMlGHT 
2298 
1073 
2726 
203 
2083 
265 
535 
219 
1530 
11732 
98OOo 
109732 
98000 Ibm PROPELLANT 
CAPACITY 
45.2 FTDIA 
AEROBRAKE 
4 - 17 KLBF ENGINES 
(THROlTLEABLE) 
4 - LEG LANDING 
GEAR (ALUMINUM) 
LEFT ON SURFACE 
Figure 4.3.3-1 98 K13m Lamar Lander 
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cargo bay. 
initial launch of both. 
support the landing of the heaviest payload (40 kllm) . 
ke fashioned t o  be attachable t o  the aercbrake structural ring or through the 
aerobrake directly t o  the stage structure. 
Figure 4.3.3-2 shows the arranqrmmt of the four engines reccrmmded for lunar 
landings. 
t o  the engines' axes, and then withdrawn into the engine cmprtmmt alongside 
the engines during wine nozzle extension, engine operation, and nozzle 
retraction. 
Therefore, the leg asserbly could ke attached t o  the vehicle after 
The leg assgobly could 
The a l m i n u m  structure of the four legs was designed t o  
The aerobrake cloors are intenckd t o  rotate open t o  positions parallel 
A dedicated Lunar lander concept, shown in Figure 4.3.3-3, was sized for  the 
W s e  of Zepnaining in Lunar orbit and delivering t o  the surface the payload 
that the 98 Kkrn vehicle could deliver t o  Lunar orbit. 
&&cat& lander would be placed into Lunar orbit and serviced there (or perhaps 
on the surface) for  use in transferring payloads between Lunar orbit and the 
Lunar surface. This scenario implies that the dedicated lan&r is refueled in 
either Lunar orbit  or on the surface of the m n .  
vehicle is capable of delivering about 42 Kllm frm LM> t o  Lunar orbit; 
therefore, the dedicated 1anck.r was sized t o  deliver this size payload t o  the 
Lunar surface and then return itself t o  Lunar orbit. 
In other words the 
The 98 -transfer 
- 4 ENGINE CONFIGURATION 
- ENGINE DOOR STOWAGE SEQUENCE: 
1) OPENDOORS 
2) PULL DOORS UP INTO 
ENGINE CAVITY 
I 
SIDE VIEW 
A - A  
4 A  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
# 
I 
L 
L AXIAL VIEW 
L 
L 
'- A 
Figure 4.3.3-2 Lunar Lander wine CQTlPartment 
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TAMS 
STAUCTURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CTRL 
MAIN PROPULSION 
0RIENTATK)N CONTROL 
ELECTRC SYSTEMS 
G N a C  
CONTINGENCY (15%) 
DRY WUGHT 
PROPELLANTS, ETC 
L O A D E D M W  
- 
1087 
2726 
203 
2083 
265 
535 
219 
106B 
8186 
44Ooo 
52186 
4 - 17 K ENGINES 
(TH ROTTLEABLE) 
4 - LEG LANDING 
GEAR (ALUMINUM) 
-.*, Gum, 
44000 Ibm PROPELLANT 
CAPACITY ,.us .nu 
Figure 4.3.3-3 Dedicated Lunar Lancler 
The selected baseline Lunar transfer vehicle ( w i t h  98Klhn loaded propellant) w a s  
used in determining payload capabilities in performing Lunar missions in various 
ways. 
t o  the surface that correspond t o  each of these options. 
OTV's providing transportation return themselves t o  LED. 
qyantity is shown, this m u n t  of propellant w a s  assun& t o  be available at the 
location indicated, either via propellant hitchhiking on another flight, 
scavenging unused propellant frm a previous OTV, etc. 
of the 98 klhn s i z e  transfer vehicle and 98 klhn larsler, dedicated 1anck.r 
concepts are shown delivering payloads t o  the surface (frm Lunar orbit or L1) 
and then returning to their basing location. 
These options are shown in Figure 4.3.3-4 along w i t h  the payload amunts 
In each case, the 
Wherever a refueling 
In addition t o  the usage 
P e r f o m c e  paretrics for the 98 k m t r a n s f e r  vehicle and 98 k l h  lander are 
shown in Figure 4.3.3-5. The payload weights are given as a function of loaded 
prapellant for the 98 klhn capacity vehicle. 
t o  the Lunar surface. 
surface back t o  LM>. 
return of the UlY t o  LEO. 
vehicle. 
vehicle frm LM> t o  Lunar orbit. 
Tb~o cases are shown for delivery 
One case is for round t r i p  of the payload t o  and frcm the 
Both options use one transfer vehicle and one landing 
The other case is for payload deliveryto the surface and 
The third case is for delivery capability of one 98 k l h t r a n s f e r  
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PAYLOAD 11.7K 40K 26.7K 29.7K 53.7K 20K 9.8K 42K 91K 48K LbiiK\l 
SURFACE 
98 K 
OW 
SPACE 
STATION 
ORBIT 
& \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \  
Figure 4.3.3-4 
\\\\\ \\.\. 
O W  
I L  
ow1 
NEAR-TERM 
OPTION 
BASELINE VEHICLE: 98K SPACE BASED 
0 REFUELING QUANTITY IN LBS. 
Lunar Delivery optians 
40 
30 
PAY LOAD 
(KLBM) 
20 
10 
NOTE: SPECIFIC IMPULSE - 475 SEC 
LUNARSURFACE 
ROUND TRIP 
1 STAGE 
2 STAGE LUNAR 
SURFACE DELIVERY 
0 1  
50 60 70 Kl 90 1M) 
LOADED PROPELLANT PER STAGE - KLBM 
\\\ 
Figure 4.3.3-5 Lunar OTV Performance 
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Cryogenic engine technology should not be taken for granted for the Lunar 
landing mission. 
engine pattern that mets the ground d e s  a t h r o t t l i q  range of abart 20:l is 
required (18:l for  five wines, 21:l for four). 
successfully chonstrated a 1O:l throttling range w i t h  an RLlOA-3-7 w i t h  no 
m j o r  engine d f i c a t i o n s  required. 
changes t o  this engine configuration in order t o  provide for  mth cabustion 
throughout the range of thrust. 
kat  exchanger is likely t o  be required in order t o  gasify the oxygen before it 
reaches the injector (downstream of the oxygen tur- shown in Figure 4.3.4- 
1) in order t o  prevent instabilities in ccknbustion. 
of the engine, the pmp discharge pressure is relatively low. 
across the injector may be too law t o  prevent feedback frcan the canbustion 
chamber (pressure fluctuations propagating upstream into t k  feed system) ; 
therefore the need t o  gasify it upstream of the injector. 
The engim configuration track study suggests that for  an 
Pratt & Whitney has 
Haever  the 20:l range would require 
For throttling ratios of greater than 1O:l a 
W i t h  low thrust aperation 
Thus, the delta P 
Oxidizer Control 
Fuel 
Cavltatlng Venturl 
Oxidizer Control 
f (Throttle - Pumped 
f (Pc and Tj i,n THI) 
f (Throttle - Pumped 
Opera tion) 
Fuel Control 
Operation) 
(Closed in THI) 
Cavitating Venturi 
f (Throttle - Pumped 
Operation) 
(Open in THI) 
Figure 4.3.4-1 RLlOA-3-7 Propellant Flow schematic 
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So, the current RLlO engine cycle is capable of modification t o  perfom 20:l 
throttling. wzt, this throttling range may not be necessarily of a purely 
continuous natue. Due t o  a thrust range discontinuity caused by the required 
oxygen phase change, the cycle w i l l  not allow unlimited up and down thrott l ing 
through this discontinuity. For -le, between 25 and 100% of full thrust, 
liquid oxygen is s m l i e d t o  the injector and sufficient upstream pressure is 
provided by the turbine discharye for stable canbustion. Between 5 and 20% of 
fu l l  thrust the turbine discharye pressure is too low t o  provide stable 
cabustion w i t h  liquid oxygen, therefore a heat exchanger is needed t o  provide 
gaseous oxygen t o  the injector ami the cabustion chanber. 
bet- 20 and 25% of full thrust a discontinuity exists due t o  the phase change 
of oqqen. Operation i n  this range, either continuous or repeated, is not 
reccBmytnded since damage t o  the engine could occur due t o  the unstable nature of 
the carbustion. 
In the region 
For the Lunar landing scenario w i t h  a l l  four engines operating, no problm 
exists w i t h  this thrust range discontinuity because o m  the i n i t i a l  descent 
h.ms (relatively high thrust) are ccmpleted, the engines' thrust level is 
d r w  t o  a range that would accmmdate hover and final descent. This 
thrott l ing down corresponds t o  passing through the phase change discontinuity 
and into the gaseous oxygen operation range (the 5 t o  20% range) as shown in 
Figure 4.3.4-2. 
hover/final descent thrust range for the remixing engines spans the thrust 
discontinuity region. 
standpoint since the abi l i ty  t o  throt t le  up and down through this thrust ran- 
repeatedly is inportant in a controlled landing. 
The problm results when an engine-out condition occurs and the 
This is unacceptable f r m  an engine life and rel iabi l i ty  
FOUR ENGINES 
OPERATING 
ONE ENGINE OUT 
( TWO OPERATING) 
PERCENT 
OF FULL 
THRUST 
FOR EACH 
ENGINE 
75 , INITIAL DESCENT 
DECELERATION 
50 
25 
REGION OF TWO-PHASE 
INSTABILITY 
HOVER AND FINAL 
DESCENTRANGE 
0 
Figure 4.3.4-2 Expanckr Cycle Throttling Discontinuity 
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The possible solutions t o  the thrust range discontinuity problem are as follows: 
a. 
t h r u t t l i q  through the thrust discontinuity w i t h o u t  causing unacceptable 
instabilities and chugging. 
between the turbopump and the injector - one for li&d oxygen, and one for the 
heat exchanger loop with gaseous oxygen. 
U f y  the heat exchanger circuit and engine control system t o  accamrOdate 
This inplies perhaps a dual path for  the oxygen 
b. 
discontinuity repeatedly in an engine out condition can be avoided or minimized 
(essentially restricting the landing thrus t  range f lexibi l i ty) .  
probably 1ll~3an a performance degradation shouldbe expzcted d additional 
prapellant (contingency) may be required. 
Design the mission aperations so that the need t o  pass through the thrust  
This would 
c. Change the groundrules on engine-mt so that w h m  it occurs the,contingency 
aperation requires return t o  Earth or abort t o  Lunar orbit, and not successful 
landing on the m n .  
criteria upan engineout and then perhaps drive the engine configuration design 
back t o  two engines). 
unmanned mission. 
(This would also relieve t3-e no-attituck-misalignmnt 
Abort t o  the hmar surface may be an alternative for an 
d. Develop an advanced engine cycle (such as Aerojet Techsystems has praposed) 
that gasifies oqgen at all thrust levels and thus provides f u l l  thrust range 
continuous throttling. 
cryogenic space engine cycle that  is significantly altered f r m  the a 1 0  cycle 
that exists today. 
' P i s  requires an advanced engine develaptrent for  a 
e. U s e  six main engines (instead of four) in order t o  provide for engineout 
capability, resMin between 5 and 20% of full thrust for  haver and final descent, 
and t o  keep individual engine thrust level less than 17kbf. 
4 . 4  SHUTTLE I'C" EXPENDABLE OTV 
In the event that a large cryogenic upper stage is required t o  be launched frm 
the ground in an expndable launch vehicle with a 15 f t  diamter constraint 
(e.g. Shuttle l lC1l ) ,  the concept shown in Figure 4.4-1 may be optittun. 
tandem toroid configuration (LOX contained in the toroidal tank) is the shortest 
arrangerrent that can be d e d  w i t h  and hydrcgen in a 15 f t  cargo bay. 
Short length is even mre essential in an increased pyload capacity launch 
vehicle (with 15 ft diameter and 60 f t  length constraints) than it is in the 
Orbiter bay since volume constraints are mre pronounced w i t h  the increased 
payload capability. 
resulting nurr&r of reqyired STS flights, etc. f r m  previous mission capture 
analyses (see Vol .  IX) . 
in this situation. 
The 
Length is the mst h p r t a n t  cost driver i n  tenns of the 
Therefore, the enphasis upon short length is necessary 
A single engine w a s  chosen for  this unmanned, -&le vehicle application. 
Not only does the single engine f i t  into the minhun length configuration, but 
it provides the maxirrarm performance of any engine configuration. 
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TANK MATERIAL 
GRAPHITE EPOXY 
HONEYCOMB SHE 
AVIONICS RING 
TANK STRUTS 
b!EmI 
TANKS 
STRUCTURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CTRL 
MAIN PROPULSION 
ORIENTATION CTRL 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
G N. h C. 
CONTINGENCY 
DRY WEIGHT 
PROPELLANT, ETC 
LOADED WEIGHT 
1399 
1329 
464 
1002 
187 
328 
102 
734 
5625 
58924 
64549 
/ TRUNNION . FRAME (2 PLACES M I D  fi AFT) GRAPHITE EPOXY LONGERONS (8 PLACES) 
GRAPHITE EPOXY 
(5 PLACES) 
c INTERMEDIATE FRAMES 
Figure 4.4-1 ShuttleYY Expendable OTV (15ft &a) 
with a 100 W=m launch vehicle payload capability t o  LEO, the concept is capable 
of delivering 26000 Urn t o  
10 k l h  for ASE. 
be man-rated, the single engine arrangement is the highest performance 
candidate. 
w i t h  an FUOA engine. This performance includes 
Unless the vehicle w o u l d  ever need t o  carry men and therefore 
If Shuttle "C" cares into existance, it w i l l  provide a mch larger payload 
capability t o  LEO than is presently available. 
With t h i s  in mind, expendable upper stages that match this lift capability may 
be highly desirable. 
stack weight for both the Centaur G' and the Shuttle ''C" OTV concept. 
Current estimate is 100 k M .  
Figure 4.4-2 shows the pyload t o  GEO as a function of 
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30 
PAYLOAD 
TO 
GEO 
(KLBM) 
20 
Q SHUTTLE"C" 
OTV CONCEPT (RLlOA) 
(26 K) 
0 
40 60 80 100 
TOTAL STACK WEIGHT - KLBM 
(STAGE, PAYLOAD, PROPELLANT) 
* 
CENTAUR REQUIRES STRUCTURAL MODS 
(MAX CAPABILITY TODAY = 10 K P/L) 
Figure 4.4-2 Ekpendable Vehicle Catparison 
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5 . 0  s m u m  ISSUES 
The structural issues addressed &.ring this study extension are listed below: 
Acc Expndable OTV Definition 
Airframe 
Enhancewnts - tanks, engine 
Meteoroid shielding 
CcPllposite ACC 
Battery selection 
Ground Based Fasable OTV Vpdates 
&&rake 
Wteoroid shield 
LCV Expndable OTV Issues 
IXN OTV Ccncept Definition 
ASE for I%v (Side rmmt and In-line) 
Airfrarre Analysis 
5.1 ACC EXPENDABLE OTV DEE' INI TION 
The general arrangment and weight breakdown for our selected expadable OTV 
transported in the ACC are shown in Figure 5.1-1. 
detail on the stage weights. 
T a b l e  5.1-1 shows additional 
The -le OTV is based on the same 
TANK MATERIAL 0 
2219 AL 
~ 
MEGtII 
TANKS 
STRUCTURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CTRL 
MAIN PROPULSION 
ORIENTATION CTRL 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
G N. b C. 
CONTINGENCY (15%) 
DRY WEIGHT 
PROPELLANTS, ETC 
LOADED WEIGHT 
1106 
650 
246 
944 
187 
328 
102 
540 
4189 
45424 
49613 
DEBRIS 6 METEOROID 
SHIELD 
RL10-A 
GRAPHITE EPOXY ENGINE 
STRUCTURE 
BATTERIES 
Figure 5.1-1 ACC Expndable OTV Baselhe 
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arran-t as the ground based reusable OTV, i.e., four-tank cryogenic single 
engine configuration. 
reusable OTV are used on the m d a b l e  vehicle, e.g., carpsite airframe, 
propulsion feed system, avionics equipnmt, and thermal control. 
Wre =liable, m y  of the same ccarponents frm the 
2 STRUCTURES 
3 PROPELLANT TANKS 
4 PROPULSION FEED SYS 
5 MAIN ENGINES 
6 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
7 G . N a C .  
8 COMM 81 DATA HNDLG 
9 ELECTRICAL PWR 
10 THERMAL CONTROL 
11 AEROBRAKE 
m u Y E W I  
12 FLUIDS 
RESIWAL-LH2 
RESIDUAL-LO2 
HYDRAzI)JE 
PREsSuRANr 
COOLANT 
lEKuwmn - 
FUEL-LH2 wFPR 
OXIDIZER-LO2 w/FPR - 
35 MAIN PROP WFPS 
49613 IGNITION WEIGHT 
J!EwEuL 
878 
1272 
698 
388 
21 5 
128 
81 
377 
153 
000 
96 
579 
400 
14 
00 
5m 
6342 
37993 
45!m 
Table 5.1-1 Pcc Expendable Weight SumMlry 
The major differences fran the gromd based reusable concept are: no aerobrake, 
A l  2219 tanks instead of Al-Li 2090 tanks, an RL10-A engine, and Ag-Zn batteries 
i n  place of the fuel cell system. Scme CN&C eqyipnent has been remved, or 
replaced by a smaller system. 
4189 Ib. 
The total  dry weight of the ACC expndable OTV is 
The original 2219 aluminm airframe concept is a rmilti-naember truss work based 
on the v o l m  and weight efficient principals suggested by Larry Ectwards (NASA 
€32). Figure 5.1.1-1 shows a view of the airframe and some typical cross 
sectional views of the builtup mepnbers. 
model based on the loading conditions and a FS of 1 .4 ,  and then checked for 
buckling and deflection. 
cchnposed of "T's'' and a web plate w h i c h  are fastened together by rivets.  
sections are then joinedby splice plates and weldedto form the entire 
structure. 
Each mn33er has been sized by a NASTRAN 
The truss wxk consists of individual builtup sections 
The 
The airframe weighs 684 lb, including f i t t ings and attachments. 
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Figure 5.1.1-1 Original Aluminum Airframe Design 
As part of the weight optimization effort, the airframe structural analysis was 
recalculated using Graphite/Polyimide (&/Pi) and Polymthacrylimide foam. The 
analysis was based on the same rrcdel, loading conditions, and SF as the 
aluminum airframe, and utilized the &/Pi and foam mterial praperties. Figure 
5.1.1-2 shows a view of the airframe and SCXE typical cross sectional views of 
the builtup IWIJ3er.s. 
conposed of a foam core and bonded face sheets. To form the entire structure, the 
sections are joined together by overlaid and bonded @/Pi splice plates. The 
a i r f m  weighs 454 lb, including fittings and attachmnt. 
using a conposite structure instead of the similar aluminum structure. Since the 
cost and schedule inpacts of using the canposite structure are minirral , it was 
chosen over the aluminum. 
The truss work consists of individual builtup sections 
230 lb are saved by 
5.1.2 TANKAGF, AND -S 
T a b l e  5.1.2-1 shows the tankage and engine e n h a n m t  candidates and weight 
breakdmn for the ACC expadable W. 
vehicle is the replacerent of the Al 2219 tanks w i t h  Al-Li 2090 tanks which results 
i n  a dry weight saving of 349 Ib. 
engine into the propulsion system which saves an additional 78 lb dry weight f r o m  
the baseline vehicle in addition t o  increasing Isp considerably. 
The first mxlification t o  be mde t o  the 
The second mxlification incorporates an 102 
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and BONDED 
WEIGHT 454 LB 
DRY WEIGHT 
DELTA 
Figure 5.1.1-2 Cmpsite Airfrarrre Design concept 
Table 5.1.2-1 ACC Expmdable Ehhancerents 
41 89 
I BASELINE 
COMPONENTS 
TANKS 
STRUCTURES 
ENVIRONMENTAL CTRL 
PROP. wlo ENGINE 
MAIN ENGINE 
ORIENTATION CTRL 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
G. N. & C. 
CONTINGENCY 
WEIGHT (LE) 
1106 
650 
246 ' 
607 
337 
187 
328 
182 
546 
AL-U TANKS 
WEIGHT (LB] 
799 
650 
246 
607 
337 
187 
328 
182 
504 
3840 
-349 
REMARKS: 
BASELINE COMPOSITE AIRFRAME 
2219 AL TANKS 
RL10-A ENGINE 
ENHANCEMENT # l  - REPLACE 2219 AL TANKS WITH 2090 AL-LI TANKS 
NO OTHER CHANGES 
ENHANCEMENT #2 - REPLACE RL10-A ENGINE WITH IOC ENGINE 
REPLACE 2219 AL TANKS WITH 2090 AL-LI TANKS 
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IOC ENGINE 
WEIGHT (LB) 
AL-U TANKS 
799 
650 
246 
607 
272 
187 
328 
182 
494 
3762 
-424 
The procedure for determining propellant tank wall thicbess is shown in Figure 
5.1.2-1. 
head) are rmltiplied by the proof test factors and divided by the fracture 
toughness ratio (FTR). 
and the specified n m h r  of cycles w h i l e  the FTR is adjusted for tenperatme. 
Figure 5.1.2-1 also shows the calculation results for the *red proof test 
pressures. 
The tank rmxirmm operating pressure (consisting of ullage and inertial 
The proof test factor is adjusted for temperature effects 
Requlrementr Requlremenla Load' 
b Deslgn Process 
Y leld-Ult 
Check Slzlng 
v k y / a  Wall Thickness*-+ 
- Margins - Ullage - Proof Faclor - Geomelry - Tenslon 
- inerllr O'r Analysls Pressure - ' Fracture Data - Membrana - Compression 
(Head Pressure) - Bosor v 
Tank 
LO2 
LH2 
Proof Pressure (Pp In Psig) 
1 I I 
Pp = p (Llmll Fllghl) X Proof Faclor +Fracture Toughness Aollo 
49  39 1.42 1.12 
26 22 1.42 1.20 - 
Figure 5.1.2-1 Main Propel lant  Tanks 
Figure 5.1.2-2 shows the results of the LO2 tank stress analysis (using the BOSOR 
shell program) including capability margin, rt-mbrane force, and wall thickness. 
The tank w a s  originally sized using AL 2219 and a 0.025-in. minirnnn gage was 
recarmwded. As a weight optimization alternative, Al-Li 2090 was considered and 
the minirnrm gage was reduced to  0.018-in. 
Figure 5.1.2-3 shows the results of the LH2 tank stress analysis (also using the 
EOSOR shell program). Like the LO2 tank analysis, the tank was originally sized 
using AL 2219 and a 0.025-in. minirnnn gage was recarmwded. When Al-Li 2090 was 
considered the minimUm gage was reduced t o  0.015-in. 
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221 9 
2090 
h 
Figure 5.1.2-2 LO2 Tank Design 
221 9 
2090 
Figure 5.1.2-3 LH2 Tank Design 
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5.1.3 OTV DEBRIS/ME!EDFflID ASSESSMENT 
Debris and meteoroid protection was sized for  the ground based vehicle concepts. 
To meet a proposed 0.999 probability of no damage per mission frm space debris 
or meteoroids, the OTV w i l l  require a bmpr at s m  spacing froan the pressure 
wall. W i t h  a minirrOmn Al-Li alloy pressure wall thickness of 0.015-in. for 
structural a d o r  fabrication requirements, and 0.5-in. of 0.788 Ib/cu f t  MLI t o  
meet thermdl requirements, only the bmper thickness and its location w e r e  
varied t o  achieve wropriate levels of penetration resistance. 
thickness of the pressure wall or  thermdl blanket was not analyzed as part of a 
to t a l  system trade. 
Additional 
A parametric study was performed us- different burper thicknesses and 
spacings. 
diameter t o  penetrate each design. 
following mechani sms. (1) If the weight per uhit  area (areal density) of the 
butper is insufficient t o  fragment the projectile, then penetration w i l l  occur. 
This is ass& t o  be 15% of the particle's areal density. 
-r and MLI stop all fragments fran reaching the rear wall, that w a l l  must 
absorb all the moanenturn. 
wall was used for  this failure mck. (3) Since space debris impact at  3 lan/s 
w i l l  not shock the debris enoughto vaporize it, the critical debris diameter 
was 1.2 t h s  the carbined thickness of the l.xrmper and the effective MLI 
thickness. 
penetration of l o w  density materials i n  NASA 'IMX-53955, in ccmparison t o  the 
penetration of the aluminum sheet in NASA 8042. 
The probability of penetration was calculated frm the particle 
Penetration my  occur by several of the 
(2) Even i f  the 
The RmJcwe11 equation for no yield of the pressure 
The equivalent aluminum thickness of the MLI was calculated frm the 
The probability calculation was based on an exposure area of 14&, space &ris 
flux frcxn JSC 20001, and a meteoroid flux f r m  NASA SP 8012. 
profile of the OTV was used t o  calculate effective -sure t h s  at 400 km 
based on: 
altitude; (2) the meteoroid shadowing of the OTV by the Earth; and (3) a 
&focusing factor for  the attraction of the Earth's gravity on meteoroids. 
T a b l e  5.1.3-1 lists the assmptions used durhg the study. 
The alt i tude 
(1) the density of space ckbris tracked by N3RAD as a function of 
Bmpr thickess has a strong influence on the prcbability of p e t r a t i o n  for 
thin bLnopers as shown in Figure 5.1.3-1. 
up by the btnrper, then cratering of the rear wall w i l l  occur. 
bumper thickness increases, the rear w a l l  can no lonw absorb the nu=pnentum of 
the inpact. 
a larger mass projecti le can be stapped. 
If the incident particle is not broken 
However, as 
Increasing the spacing spreads the m t u m  over a larger area and 
73 
Table 5.1.3-1 OTV Debris/Wteoroid Assmptions 
- 
DEBRIS TIME hrs 
EXPENDABLE . 15 30  
REUSABLE 112 210 
METEOROID TIME hrs 
. 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
MINIMUM OF 0.5" THICKNESS OF MLI USED FOR THERMAL REQUIREMENTS - 0.788 Ib/tt 
MINIMUM AL-LI PRESSURE WALL THICKNESS 0.015" FOR STRUCTURE/FABRICATION 
MINIMUM DIAMETER PARTICLE TO PENETRATE CHOSEN FROM 
PROJECTILES NOT SHATTERED BY BUMPER WILL PENETRATE - BUMPER AREAL DENSITY 2 0.15 x PROJECTILE DIAMETER x DENSITY - NO BENEFIT FROM MIA ASSUMED 
PRESSURE WALL MUST ABSORB ALL MOMENTUM (RI APOLLO EQUATION) - NO BENEFIT FROM MLI ASSUMED 
LOW VELOCITY DEBRIS WILL BE STOPPED BY BUMPER + MLI ONLY - MLI FRAGMENT PENETRATION RESISTANCE EQUIVALENT TO 0.032"AL - .CRITICAL DEBRIS DIAMETER = 1.2 x TOTAL THICKNESS OF BUMPER + MLI 
EXPOSURE TIMES RATIOED TO 400 KM ALTITUDE 
JSC 20001 USED FOR DEBRIS FLUX AT 400 KM 
140 m 2  EXPOSURE AREA 
1 -  
~ 0 - O - o - S  = 1.0"-0-0 
=:'--.'S I 0.75'8-H 
o-o--o-o---o-o-~ I 0.5~,0-0 
Probabil ity 
Penetration 
of NO 0.9985 
Expendable O W  
0.025" Wall 
0.5" MLI 
0.001 0.01 0.1 
Bumper Thickness (inch) 
Figwe 5.1.3-1 OTV Debris/M&eoroid Eurper - Ekpndable 
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The size of a meteoroid and the size  of debris which can be stgrped by each 
design is used t o  calculate a flux of each size particle (or larger) frm NASA 
‘IMX-8013 or  NASA JSC 20001, respectively. 
appropriate exposure time and area t o  calculate a probability of no penetration. 
For an eqendable vehicle, a layer of Beta Cloth w i l l  suffice as a bmper w i t h  a 
0.6-in. standoff as shown in T a b l e  5.1.3-2. Expected increases in the space 
Wris and meteoroid environment w i l l  affect these numbers, and changes t o  the 
envirorrnvant over the lifetime of the program must be considered. W i t h  a worse 
environment, the -le vehicle would be d f i e d  closer t o  the praposed 
reusable vehicle design. The reusable design w o u l d  be modified for a worse 
environmtnt by using a 4-in. standoff, increasing the bmpr thickness, and 
adding beta cloth or  kevlar cloth on top of the MLI for increased fragment 
protection. 
the need for  increased protection, and the design should allaw for  the larger 
Each flux is used w i t h  the 
Increases in the environment shouldbe watched closely t o  determine 
standoffs that might be -red. 
, 
Table  5.1.3-2 OTV Debrishteoroid m r  Sizing 
BUMPER MIN BUMPER 
THICKNESS SPACE TO WALL 
[inch] [inch] 
EXPENDABLE 
REUSABLE 
0.003 0.6 
0.006 1.5 
USE BETA CLOTH WITH AN AREAL DENSITY EQUIVALENT 
TO THESE THICKNESSES OF ALUMINUM 
5.1.4 DACC CYNFOSITE SHFOUD 
The effects of the overpressure at  SRB ignition on the AIX: shroud have been 
assessed and a ccgoposite m a t e r i a l  ACC shroud (unpressurized) w a s  catpared t o  the 
all aluminum pressurized ACC shroud. The worst case for pressure loading occurs 
at ignition when an overpressure exists on the shroud which varies frm 0.5115 
psia at the connecting ring and increases w i t h  axial distance t o  0.900 psi  at  
the dare center. Figure 5.1.4-1 shows the external pressure distribution on the 
shroud. 
Structural rquirmts  are outlined in T a b l e  5.1.4-1. 
overpressure at ignition which makes the structure buckling critical. 
shroud is designed t o  w i t h s t a n d  accelerations up t o  3.1% in the axial direction 
The major load is the 
The 
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and up t o  2.5g in the radial/normal direction. 
requirement, a FS of 1 .4  was used for all internal and external loads, a d  a FS 
of 2.0 was used for all txlckling critical loads. 
accounts for  the uncertainty between the design and test data. 
Although not a specific 
the higher FS for  budcling 
' 5 1  
0.0 PSI 
0 
im 150 
DISTANCE FROM TANGENT LINE (m.) 
CVLINOER SECTION 
DOUC SECITON I 
WIER~AOIUS 16s 5 IN. 
LENGTH 240 IN - 
STA 2441 
6-- Q 
AXIAL 
- 
C ..
@!=!E 
Figure 5.1.4-1 Pressure at Ignition and Shroud Gecgnetry 
Table  5.1.4-1 STS Structural Design Requirements 
0 Factor of Safety 
2.0 for buckling 
1.4 for all internal & external loads 
0 
0 Acceleration 
Ignition overpressure = 0.9 psi (max.) 
Liftoff Axial = +2.49G 
Normal = 0.82G 
- 0.37G 
Meco: Axial = 3.15G 
Normal = 0.81G 
Handling: 2.5G 
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Detailed preliminary structural analyses were performed on the baseline shroud 
design. A finite-difference ccenputer code (Bo=) evaluated the buckling 
stabi l i ty  of the shroud under external pressure loading. 
mthcds were used t o  evaluate the structurd integrity of the shroud under 
acceleration and handling loads. 
shroud is structurally adequate under the specified structural loading 
conditions. 
s k i r t  joint under acceleration loading and in the shroud cylinder under external 
pressure. 
T a b l e  5.1.4-2 Structural Analysis S~nrmary 
C l a s s i c d l  closed form 
Analyses results indicate that the carpsite 
T a b l e  5.1.4-2 shows that the rnhhnnFS  is 1.4 a t  the shroud-to- 
COMPONENT 
CYLINDER 
DOME 
JOINT 
LOAMNG CONDITION 
EXTERNAL PRESSURE 
ACCELERATION 
DURING ROTATION 
EXTERNAL PRESSURE 
PORTOPENING 
ACCELERATION 
HANDLING-BENDING MOMENT 
HANDLING-AXIAL PULL ON 
ANALYSIS METHOD 
BOSOR 4 (1 1 
CLOSED FORM 
BOSOR 4 (1) 81 
CLOSED FORM 
' BOSOR 4 (1 1 
BOSOR 4 (1 1 
CLOSED FORM 
(1) BUSHNELL 0.. 'STRESS, STABILITY AND VIBRATION OF COMPLEX BRANCHED SHELLS 
' OF REVOLUTION,' NASA CR-2116, OCTOBER 1972 
FACTOR OF SAFETY 
1.42 
>10 
2= 10 
6.33 
>lo 
1.4 
121 FACTOR OF SAFETY - ALLOWABLE VALUE / ACTUAL VALUE 
In the cckoposite shroud design shown in Figure 5.1.4-2, the h e r  and outer 
skins w i l l  be a sandwich structure. 
graphite fiber using HBRF 5% epoxy resin. 
by volume. The lamina properties for this caanposite are: 
fiber direction is 17.21 x 106 psi; the mdulus across the fibers is 9.662 x lo5 
psi; and the Poisson's ratio is 0.275. 
The skins w i l l  be fi1-t wound AS4W-12K 
This canposite w i l l  have 50% fiber 
the mdulus in the 
The cckoposite design core is cckoposed of balsa wood  w i t h  the grain perpendicular 
t o  the skins. The balsa has a mdulus perpendicular t o  the grain of 16,000 psi, 
a mdulus parallel t o  the grain of 330,000 psi, and a shear nodulus of 14,450 
psi.  
In constructing this sandwich skin, the AS4W/55A cckoposite w i l l  be wound onto 
the mandrel a t  an angle of 2 10' and a thickness of 0.04-in. a t  the tangent 
line. To ccarplete the h e r  skin,  a 0.02-in. thick hoop ply w i l l  be wound f r m  
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SHROUD 1. SKIRT 
GRAPHITE EPOXY 
OUTER SKIN Y 
2062.65 2194.29 2249.25 2413.5 
BALSA 
WOOD 
CORE 
GRAPHITE EPOXY \ 
INNER SKIN 
Figure 5.1.4-2 DACX: Colrposite Shroud 
tangent line-to-tangmt line on the cylinder. T k a  a 0,625-in. layer of bdlsa 
core will be applied to the h e r  skin. 
outer skin will be wound on top of it which has the same layup and thicknesses 
as the h e r  skin. 
withstanding the specified buckljng loads. 
Once the core has been applied, an 
This type of constructian results in a shroud capable of 
Table 5.1.4-3 shows the weight breakcbm and ccanparison of the unpressurized 
carpsite shroud and the pressurized metal shroud. 
and payload support beams w e r e  baselined for both concepts. 
the sam structural requirmts in developing the concept configurations. 
The metal pressurized shroud consists of riveted chem milled gore panels, a dcpne 
cap, and a riveted chem milled barrel structure. 
panel gage was rechlced. 
ignition to counteract the oil-canning effect of overpressurization on the 
thinner panels. 
The aluminum forward skirt 
Both designs used 
To optimize the weight, the 
This approach necessitated pressurizing the shroud at 
As discussed earlier, the ccmposite shroud configuration is a sandwich structure 
consisting of an h e r  and outer skin made of Graphite/Epoxy and a core of balsa 
wood. The dcme and barrel integral structure is designed to accOambOdate 
overpressurization at ignition without pressurizing the shroud. 
sandwich also serves as part of the thermal control system. 
The ccenposite 
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Tab le  5.1.4-3 I K C  Shroud Weight Corrparison 
SKIRT 
STRUCTURE 
THERMAL PROTECTKlN 
AVIONK=S/ELECTRICAL 
PROPMECH 
ORDNANCE 
CONTINGENCY 
SUBTOTAL 
SHROUD 
DOME 
ATTACH FLANGE 
SEPARATION ASSY 
THERMAL PROTECTION 
PROPMECH 
ORDNANCE 
ATTACH HRDW 
CONTINGENCY (15%) 
METAL 
PRESSURIZED 
WEIGHT (LB) 
2556 
173 
152 
125 
23 
454 
3483 
781 
62 
191 
858 
9 
74 
20 
299 
SUBTOTAL 2294 
TOTAL 5777 
COMPOSITE 
UNPRESSUREED 
WEIGHT (LB) 
2556 
173 
152 
125 
23 
454 
3483 
1248 
62 
21 1 
554 
9 
74 
20 
326 
2497 
5980 
DETLAS 
WEIGHT (LB) 
0 
+467 
0 
+20 
-304 
0 
0 
0 
+27 
+210 
+210 
Translating the t w o  different design concepts into a weight difference prcduces a 
net weight increase of over 200 lb for the ccqosite shroud. 
-site structure is 467 lb heavier than the xretal shroud, a 304 lb weight saving 
is realized i n  the t h e d  control. An advantage is gained by eliminating the need 
for pressurization. w i t h  the ccatposite shroud. 
Although the 
Table 5.1.5-1 lists the five batteries amsickred t o  replace the OTV fuel cell 
power system. Each candidate's characteristics are listed w i t h  their advantages 
and disadvantages. 
The Ag-Zn alkaline batteries are cycle-limited secondaries tha t  are used in m y  
pr- applications. They have high-e.neryy density, a relatively poor cycle life, 
little loss of capacity during dry storage, high reliability, and storage capacity. 
Although they have a narmr operating temperature range, the Ag-Zn batteries- 
when discharged at high rates t o  obtain T[121xiT[um output, and by using their self- 
heating capability-can sqplenwt battery heaters. 
The N i a  alkaline batteries are used when long-life secondary batteries are 
required. 
low dischaqe rate (less than 40% of storage capacity), and medium reliability. 
These batteries have law energy density, high cycle life, a relatively 
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Table  5.1.5-1 Battery Candidates 
CHARACTERISTICS ADVANTAGES I DBAWANTAGES I 
NICKELIADYUU a a.m 12s -1OTOO UIW LOW 
NICKEL-HYDROGEN s ZS-O 12s . ~ T O Q  YD LOW 
UTHIUM-IHloNYL CHLORIDE ' 1 I I  a 3  - a m 1  Y O  LOW 
NECad 12 4 TO co 
NCM 2a 
0 Lcsoaz 
The Ni-H battery is a hybrid system utilizing the hydrogen electrcde f r o m  the fuel 
cell and the nickel electrode froan the N i a  cell. 
energy density and cycle life than the N i a  secondary batteries. 
recharge fraction of 1.06, a 65% ckpth  of discharge, a low discharge rate, and high 
SF. However, due t o  the presence of e x t m l y  flanable hydrosen gas, controls 
mst be inplmted t o  constrain cell pressure w i t h i n  safety limits. 
This battery has a higher 
It also has a 
The two Li batteries (i.e., Lithium-Thionyl chloride and Lithimsulphur Dioxide) 
have the highest energy density of a l l  the primary and seaxdaq  p w e r  sources. 
They have a long shelf life, high cell voltages, and a wide range of aperating 
terrperatures. They also have a l o w  discharge rate, low capacity, and potential 
danger t o  humans and equipr3-k due t o  the explosive nature of Li ~ u n d s .  
these batteries are relatively new, their reliability and SF are yet t o  be 
determined. 
Galileo Prabe. 
Since 
T e s t i n g  is being performd and their use is proposed on the Jupiter 
The mission requimts for the V d a b l e  o?N power source are: 
system w i t h  an aperational time of 33 a s ;  an average w a t t  use of 446 watts; a 
a single use 
use of 964 watts; and a voltage of 28 volts (nclminal) . 
In addition t o  meting the mission requirements, the selected battery mst met the 
five design criteria shown in T a b l e  5.1.5-2 : 
(2) low technology risk; (3) high degree of reliability; (4) high factor of safety 
(FS) ; and (5) a lightweight system, i.e., less than or equal t o  the 270 lb fuel 
(1) medium t o  high energy density; 
cell systan. 
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Tab le  5.1.5-2 Battery Selection 
MISSION REQUIREMENTS BATTERY REQUIREMENTS 
SINGLE USE 33 HR DURATION ENERGY DENSITY MEDHIGH 
AVG WATTS 446 WATTS TECHNOLOGY RISK . LOW 
MAX WArrS 964 WATTS RELIABILITY HIGH 
VOLTAGE 28V (nominal) SAFETY FACTOR HIGH 
WATT-HR 14718 WEIGHT UGHT 
BAlTERY WEIGHT based on WH/LB 
WATT-HR W B  WEIGHT 
SILVER-ZINC 14718 58 254 
NICKEL-CADMIUM 14718 12 1227 
LITHIUM-THIONYL-CHLORIDE 14718 150 98 
NICKEL-HY DROGEN 14718 25 589 
UTHIUMSULPHUR DIOXIDE 1471 8 150 98 
BAlTERY SEL ECTED SILVER-ZINC 
TECHNOLOGY RISK 
REUABILTY HIGH (Mission success) 
SAFETY FACTOR HIGH (No incidents) 
WEIGHT LOW (254 LB) 
LOW (In service now) 
Each battery being considered shall met the mission requirements for a pwer 
source on an expendable UW. When j-ed on the battery mpirements, the Silver- 
Z i n c  (%-Zn) batteries met each of the five criteria. Due t o  their  low energy- 
density and corresponding high s y s t m  weight, the Nickel-cadmium ( N i a )  and 
Nickel-Hydmgen (Ni-H) batteries are eliminated. 
have a higher energy density and l o w  systems weight, they have a high technology 
risk since their reliabil i ty and FS have yet t o  be fully determined. 
Although Lithium (Li) batteries 
The Ag-Zn batteries have an en- density of 58 Wlb and a system's w e i g h t  of 254 
lb (1270 lb). 
includirig T i t a n  and Transtage. Wreover, there have been no safety  incidents 
associated with these batteries. The fact that they are currently i n  service, are 
hicjhly reliable with a high FS, gives the Ag-Zn batteries a desirable low 
technology risk rating. 
They are currently i n  service on a n m b r  of space vehicles, 
5'.2 GROUND BASED CRYOGENIC REUSABLE OTV UPDATES 
Figure 5.2-1 shuws the general arrangemnt and weight breakdam of our selected 
groundbased crycgenic OTV transported i n  the ACC. Tab le  5.2-1 shows additional 
detail on the stage weights. 
configuration uses the volun? and weight efficient principals (suggested by Larry 
Ecfwards) t o  fit into the stretched version of the ACC (42-in. stretch). 
The four-tank single advanced technology engine 
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TANK MATERIAL STRETCHED DEDICATED 
ACC 
OPERATIONAL 
ENVELOPE 
DOORS 
(2 PLACES) 
7.5 K 
IOC ENGINE 
GRAPHITE POLYIMIDE 
HONEYCOMB COVERED 
WITH CERAMIC FOAM 
TILES 
GRAPHITE EPO 
MULTI-PLY NICALON 
0-FELT AND SEALED 
NEXTAL ON GRAPHITE 
POLYIMIDE FRAME 
AEROBRAKE 
TANKS 
ENVIRONMENTAL CTRL 307 
MAIN PROPULSION 904 
ORIENTATION CTRL 107 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 435 
G N. h C. 156 NICALON CLOTH 
CONnNGENCY (15%) 755 
DRY WEIGHT 5577 AND SEALER 
PROPELLANTS, ETC 45424 
LOADED WEIGHT 51011 
STRUCTURE 774 
BRAKE NEXTAL CLOTH 
- L 
Figure 5.2-1 Grcsund Based Reusable 
Table 5.2-1 Ground E?ased Reusable Crrv Weigh t  Sumrary 
WBS GROUP 
2 STRUCTURES 
3 PROPELLANT TANKS 
4 PROPULSION FEED SYS 
5 MAIN ENGINES 
6 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
7 G. N. & C. 
8 COMM & DATA HNDLG 
9 ELECTRICAL PWR 
10 THERMAL CONTROL 
11 AEROBRAKE 
QBy-mwI 
12 FLUIDS 
RESIDUAL-LH2 
RESIDUAL-Lm 
HYDRAZINE 
PRESSURANT 
COOLAM 
u!mxEEw 
YSABLE MAIN PROP, 
FUEL-LH2 w/FPR 
OXIDIZER-LO2 wFPR 
JGNmON WEIGH1 
huBuwau  
44335 MA MPROP wmq 
51011 IGNmON WEIGHT 
WEIGHT (L B) 
1089 
949 
727 
31 3 
21 5 
180 
99 
433 
153 
1419 
m 
96 
579 
400 
14 
10 
fi6z6 
6342 
37993 
51011 
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The 38 f t  diameter aerobrake folds forward when stowed in the ACC. 
aerobrake is discarded after fl ight and is not stowed in  the Orbiter for 
retrieval. 
inlet pressure requirements. 
tank minimUm gage is 0.015-in. 
Insulation (MLI). 
The 
The Aluminum Lithium (Al-Li) prapellant tanks are designed by engine 
The IO2 tank miniTMn gage is 0.018-in. and the LH2 
The tanks are insulated with N t i l a y e r e d  
'The I32 tanks are m v e d  on orbit arid are discarded and allowled t o  re-mer the 
atmosphere arid vaporize. 
propulsion) are stowed in the Orbiter cargo bay for retrieval after mission 
carpletion. The structure is of lightweight gra@ite/epoxy. The propellant 
load was selected t o  enable full use of the projected 72 Klhn NSTS lift 
capability on GExl delivery missions. 
The core system (rr>2 tanks, structure, avionics, and 
Table  5.2.1-1 shows the la tes t  weight changes t o  the rete 
ground-based OTV. 
T a b l e  5.2.1-1 Ground Based OTV Weight Change summary (lb) 
COMPONENTS I OCT'86 
AEROBRAKE 
TANKS 
STRUCTURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CTRL 
MAIN PROPULSION 
ORIENTATION CTRL 
ELECTRICAL SYS 
G. N. & C. 
CONTINGENCY 
DRY WEIGHT 
DELTA 
1566 
524 
774 
424 
904 
187 
61 3 
156 
772 
5920 
DEC '87 
1234 ('1 
825 (21 
774 
307 (31 
904 
187 
435 (4) 
156 
755 
5577 
-343 
(1) 
and the 25.5 f t  support frame removed resulting i n  a decrease of 332 Ib. 
The aerobrake's hardcore center has been d f i e d  f r m  25.5 f t  t o  13.5 ft, 
(2) 
for the Al-Li 2090. 
IIyrnbrane thickness for the gore panels on both tanks. 
also reanalyzed and their thickness increased. 
evaluation was a weight increase of 301 lb. 
The I242 and L132 tanks w e r e  reanalyzed per the la tes t  property information 
This analysis required an increase in weld land and 
The c d c a l  ends were 
' k is  result of this re- 
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(3) 
on data developed during the space Station study program, allowing a mch 
thinner bLlmper which procbces a weight saving of 117 lb. 
(4) 
mvirorrmental Control - the debris/mteoroid shield was recalculated based 
Electrical System - the S-Band system w a s  replaced with a lighter system. 
5.2.1 AEFDBRAKE M3DIFICATIONS 
T a b l e  5.2.1-2 shows the weight changes i n  the 38 f t  dimeter aerobrake that 
occur due t o  a recb,lction in the diameter of the hard shell center. 
a 25.5 f t  &meter hard shell center was used t o  allow s-le folding and 
stowage of the aerdrake flex section ribs. 
developed (see below) which allows a smaller and lighter center section. 
5.2.1-1 shows the intended reduction in hard shell diameter. 
surface density of 1.05 Ib/sq f t  w a s  reduced f r m  25.5 f t  t o  13.5 f t .  
(-400 sq f t )  was covered with Flexquilt TPS a t  0.49 lb/sq f t .  
was a weight saving of 215 lb. 
Originally, 
A new folding t d q u e  has been 
Figure 
The center, with a 
T h e  area 
The net result 
Table 5.2.1-2 Aerobrake Wight Changes 
WEIGHTS (LB) 
'COMPONENTS 
HEAT SHIELD 
HARD SHELL w/TPS 
TPS w/FLEX QUILT 
MECHANICAL SYSTEM 
DOORS w/ MOTORS 
TORUS SYSTEM 
SPRINGS 
SUPPORTS STRUCTURE 
RIBS 
RING FRAMES 
CONTINGENCY 
WAS 
531 
330 
85 
112 
36 
249 
223 
235 
IS 
120 
526 
70 
112 
36 
249 
121 
185 
DELTAS 
-41 1 
+196 
-1 5 
0 
0 
0 
-1 02 
-50 
TOTAL 1801 1419 -382 
A secondary effect occurs f r m  r m v i n g  the rib supported a t  25.5 f t  and using 
the a t t a m  frame a t  13.5 f t  t o  support the ribs. This d f i c a t i o n  results 
in a 102 ~b weight saving. 
382 Ib. 
IncludiniContingencies, the t o t d  weight saving is 
Figure 5.2.1-2 shows the stowage arrangemnt for the 38 f t  aerobrake. 
accmmdate the aerobrake with a 13.5 f t  diameter hard shell center, the ribs 
have been clocked off the centerline of the tanks by 15', w i t h  a 30' typical 
spacing. 
tank centerline with a spacing of 40'. 
aperational envelop and avoid interfering with the LH2 tank. 
To 
However, the ribs on either side of the ~2 were clocked 20' off the 
This allows the ribs t o  fold w i t h i n  the 
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TAB1 (1075 SO FT) 
13.5' OTV ATTACHME 
and RIB SUPPORT FR. 
iNT 
A - B  
Figure 5.2.1-1 Aerabrake Design Cbnges 
FIXED AEROBRAKE 
(13.5 FEET DIAMETER) 
DEPLOYED AEROBRAKE 
(38 FEET DIAMETER) RIB ARRANGEMENT TO ACCOMMODATE STOWAGE 
bhun LH2 TANK - 40' APART 
20' OFF CL OF TANK 
15' OFF CL OF TANK 
bhvn LO2 TANK - 30' APART 
TYP SPACING - 30' APART 
Figure 5.2.1-2 Aerobrake Stcwage Arrangcmmt 
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For a reusable OTV, a t  least two layers of Beta Cloth should be used with a t  
least a 1.5411. standoff (shown earlier in Table  5.1.3-2) and with a bmpr 
thickness of a t  least 0.006in as determined frcm Figure 5.2.2-1. 
increases in the space Wris and mteoroid e n v i r o m t  w i l l  affect these 
nurbers and changes t o  the enviroxmmt over the lifetime of the prcqrax-n mt be 
considered. 
using a +in. standoff, increasing the h q e r  thickness, and/or adding beta 
cloth or kevlar cloth on top of the MLJ for increased protection from 
fragmntation. 
Expected 
The reusable design would be d f i e d  for a worse e n v i r o m t  by 
1 .oooo 
-e-S 2.0"-e-e 
0.9995 - 
Probability 
Penetration 
Of NO 0.9985 - 
' 
Reusable OW 
0.01 5' Wall 
0.5" MLI 
0.9970 
0.0010 0.01 00 0.1000 
Bumper Thickness (inch) 
Figure 5.2.2-1 OTV Debris/b&teoroid Bmper - Reusable 
5.3 LARGE CARGO VEHICLE (LCV) EXPENDABLE OTV 
5.3.1 LCV o?N CDJCEPT DEFINITION 
Figure 5.3.1-1 shows the general a r r m t  and breakdown of our selected 
expmdable configuration which w i l l  be used in either a sidernount or Mine m 
payload elanent. shows additional detail for the stage weights. Table 5.3.1-1 
The IxN -le concept uses the same features as the Acc expendable baseline 
OTV, i.e., ccnpsite airframe, Al 2219 tanks, W-Zn batteries, %lo-A engine, 
avionics equiprent, and the same prapeilsion feed system. 
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2219 AL 
WElGnT 
TANKS 1150 
STRUCTURE bBI 
MAIN PROPULSION 944 
G. N. & C. 182 
CONTINGENCY (15%) 556 
DRY WEIGHT 4273 
PROPELLANTS, ETC 50424 
LOADED WEIGHT 54697 
ENVIROMENTAL CONlROL 259 
ORIENTATION CONTROL 187 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 328 
DEBRIS 6 METEOR01 
SHIELD 
RL10-A 
ENGINE 
GRAPHITE EPOXY 
STRUCTURE 
BATTERIES 
Figure 5.3.1-1 ICV Expendable OTV 
Tab le  5.3.1-1 ICV OTV Weight Sumrary 
WBS GROUP 
2 STRUCTURES 
3 PROPELLANT TANKS 
4 PROPULSION FEED SYS 
5 MAIN ENGINES 
6 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
7 G. N. & C. 
8 COMM & DATA HNDLG 
9 ELECTRICAL PWR 
10 THERMAL CONTROL 
11 AEROBRAKE 
LmYYEwI 
12 FLUIDS 
RES1 DUAL-LH2 
RESIDUAL-LO2 
HYDRAZINE 
P R E S S U M  
COOLANT 
JNERT W F I G m  - 
FUEL-LH2 wFPR 
OXIDIZER-LO2 w/FPR 
JGNITION WE IGHT -
49250 MAIN PROP W F P q  
54697 IGNITION WEIGHT 
W 
WEIGHT fL B) 
905 
1323 
698 
388 
21 5 
128 
81 
377 
160 
000 
ma 
107 
643 
400 
10 
00 
s4.33 
7036 
4221 4 
54697 
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PE m j o r  difference hetween the two vehicles is the U I ~  tank configuration. 
The LH2 tank diameter was reduced and a barrel section a- because the pyload 
elmsnt enveloped (25 f t  diameter) is smaller than the ACC envelop. 
vehicle is rear-mounted on the airframe instead of tap-rrounted. Scarre additional 
Also, the 
support struts were r-ed. 
4273 lb. 
The total dry weight of the LCV expndable OTv is 
5.3.2 ASE FCR LCV (SIDE MXN" AND IN-LINE) 
Figure 5.3.2-1 shows the ASE ccanponents and weight breakdown for the LCV 
-le OTV sidemunt configuration. The ASE is designed t o  s-rt and 
launch the OTV frm a 27.5 f t  x 90 f t  unmanned Payload (P/L) W e .  
rear-rrrounted on a tilt table deployment mecbaru 'sm and rotated into a launch 
angle. The OTV forward end is supported by an adapter frame. 
deflections have been checked using a NASTRAN -1. 
ASE c a p n e n t s  is 2904 lb. 
The OTV is 
The loads and 
 he t o t a l  weicjht of the 
OTV ATTACH. 
(4 PLACES) ROTATION 
TRUNNION 
SUPPORT FRAME DEPLOYMENT 
ADAPTER 
FRAME MOTOR 
KEEL TRUNNION 
SECT. A-A 
FWD FRAME 
SECT 8-8 
DEPLOYMENT 
MECHANISM 
(ROTATES 30') 
AS€ 
FWD FRAME 
DEPLOY. ADAPlER 
ROTATION TRUNNION 
MOTOR L ARMS 
SUBSYSTEMS 
PROPIMECH 
ORDNANCE 
CONTINGENCY 
TOTAL 
m m w  
WEIGHT (1 
578 
527 
301 
553 
315 
100 
120 
23 
379 
2904 
L L.-* ..-.. -. 
PAYLOAD MODULE (27.5' X90.0') LA 
Figure 5.3.2-1 ASE for  LCV Side+bunt of OTv 
Figure 5.3.2-2 s h o w s  the ASE camponents and weight breakdmn for  the LCV 
expendable OTV inline configuration. 
and hardware) is the same structure as on the Aoc. 
The ASE equiprent ( sk i r t ,  support barns,  
The OTV is mounted fram the 
88 
rear, using the urbilicals and attach points. 
separates just forward of the OTV s p r t  beams. A NASTRAN rrodel was used t o  
check the s w r t  beam for sizing. The total  weight of the ASE cQnponents is 
3409 Ib. 
!RE shroud (27.5 f t  x 90 ft) 
U E  
SKUn 
FRAMES 
ATTACH HRDW 
PROPNECH 
AWOWCIELEC 
ORDNANCE 
COI(TI~ENCY 
TOTAL 
-0 
1748 
810 
108 
125 
152 
23 
44s 
3408 
I OTV ATTACH POINT 4 RICE$ 
PAYLOAD FAlRwM - 
t-T 2 5' 
f 
.r -" 
i 
! -- 
SECTKHJ A 4  
OW ATTAGWENT 1 SUPPORT BEAUS 
I
I 
I 
SHROUD SEPARATION 
JOINT 
FWD 
c- 
I / FM) TANK 
Figure 5.3.2-2 ASE for LCV In-Ihe J%unt of OTV 
5.3.3 AIRFRAME ANALYSIS 
Figure 5.3.3-1 shows a tabulation of the cap loads for the LCV vs. A02 launch. 
To mintah the structural capability of the rack, LCV loads were  designated t o  
transfer the payload axial  (X) and Y and 2 m x m t  loads directly into the rack 
support structure. This is accmplished by placing a 6-in. diameter axle tube 
along the axis of the propellant tanks. 
The rack support beams are simply s q x r t e d  a t  the vehicle w a l l .  Although 
several ccmputer runs were made w i t h  the fuel tank struts both fixed and free, 
no significant load difference or deflection was found. 
A stress analysis of the n e w / d f i e d  OTV rack ard support structure was made t o  
substantiate the in tegr i ty  of the structure. 
the new design are: 
The two principal requirements of 
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(1) The new/rrcdified rack must react the payload (14 Klb) and fuel tank loads, 
whereas the current rack is designed t o  react only fuel tank loads; and 
(2) The d f i e d  rack is supported by a grillage of deep 1-w located aft of 
the fuel tanks, whereas in the current design the rack support structure is 
located at the forward exxi of the rack. 
LO2 
TK AXLE 
6" DIA 
LH2 
TK AXLE 
6" DIA. 
REMARKS: W 
MAIN LOAD PATH 
--- REAR MOUNTED -- TANK AXLE 
--- FRONT MOUNTED -- AIRFRAME 
--- TANK AXLES 3' TO 6" IN DIAMETER 
--- AIRFRAME -- NONE 
1 
MAJOR MODIFICATIONS 
--- ADDITION TANK SUPPORT STRUTS 
- 
UWlb8 
Numbu 
1 
2 
3 
4 
. 5  
' 6  
7 
8 
0 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
10 
20 
21 
22 
23 
-
- 
CAP LOADS (Itlpa) 
W.r 
26.7 
44.1 
62.0 
87.0 
13.4 
17.7 
15.0 
07.8 
73.3 
50.6 
74.1 
58.1 
66.6 
21.1 
2.5 
8.2 
15.1 
33.0 
13.3 
36.7 
29.1 
33.5 
8.7 
Now 
12.70 
14.71 
10.36 
14.16 
01.76 
00.62 
04.34 
44.90 
32.60 
12.30 
19.40 
34.70 
80.33 
11.00 
00.80 
00.44 
04.01 
03.88 
01.00 
Deleled 
05.24 
06.96 
01.84 
CAP AREA (sq I n )  
waa 
0.478 
0.807 
1.513 
1.513 
0.231 
0.334 
0.334 
1.743 
1.743 
1.470 
1.470 
0.995 
1.220 
0.810 
0.067 
0.151 
0.263 
0.658 
0.240 
0.656 
0.858 
0.658 
0.373 
NOW 
0.478 
0.807 
1.513 
1.513 
0.231 
0.334 
0.334 
1.743 
1.743 
1.470 
1.470 
0.085 
2.260 
0.810 
0.067 
0.151 
0.263 
0.925 
0.500 
Deletd 
0.025 
0.925 
0.925 
Figure 5.3.3-1 LCC VS Acx: OTV Cap Loads 
P r e l h h a q  b a n  sizes were calculated by hand 
g-emztry. 
the element loads were determined by NASTRAN. 
for the structural elenents w e r e  found. 
was column buckling. 
deflection in  any direction at u l t h t e  load w a s  l i m i t e d  t o  3-in. t o  satisfy the 
stiffness requirements. 
based on the existing rack 
The rack FEM was then revised using these new section properties, and 
Based on the NASTFAN results, MS 
In general, the critical failure mock 
In addition t o  the stress requirements, the maxirmrm 
Other major d f i c a t i o n s  t o  the rack include tying the forward outboard ends of 
the rack together with four 3-in. diameter tubes. 
the payload support structure. 
together with four struts. 
fuel tanks. 
These tubes could be part of 
The aft ends of the fuel tanks are also tied 
These struts remain with the OTV t o  s t a b i l i z e  the 
90 ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
6.0 HIGH SPEED AEROASSIST 
Several different classes of entries have been studied in the course of this 
contract as is sumnarized in Figure 6.0-1. 
aeroassist t o  reduce an existing high-energy elliptical Earth orbit down t o  a 
low park orbit suitable for Shuttle or Space Station retrieval. There are three 
missions i n  this class: geosynchronous return, lunar return, and planetary boost 
return. The second class of rrCissions is that of Earth capture. Here aeroassist 
is used t o  capture an existing hyperbolic flyby into a highly elliptical Earth 
orbit for  later retrieval. Encounter C3's  ranging from 8.0 t o  68 lm?/sec2 have 
been investigatedt consistent w i t h  return frm Mrs. 
are those representing capture into Mars orbit. These are similar t o  the Earth 
capture cases ht for a different parent body; the C3 range is from 8.2 t o  60.0 
kIt?/sec2. 
Earth return class missions u t i l i ze  
The third class of missions 
For each aeroassist condition, three different sets of data have been prepared. 
First, an aero-entry error analysis derives the level of uncertainty associated 
w i t h  the particular entry. 
control and vehicle lift rquirenwts. Second, an entry control and loads 
parametric graph shows control corridor and &eleration loads sensitivities. 
This data is used t o  establish vehicle L/D and structural sizing. The third 
chart i n  each s e t  shows peak stagnation heating and integrated heating data 
which is used t o  size the thermal protection system (TPS) . 
This analysis is critical t o  establishingtrajectory 
THE FOLLOWING CLASSES OF ENTRIES ARE SUMMARIZED: 
1) GEOSYNCHRONOUS ORBIT RETURN 
2) LUNAR RETURN 
3) PLANETARY BOOST RETURN 
4) EARTH CAPTURE C3- 8.0 16.0 32.0 68.0 KM2/SEC2 
5) MARS CAPTURE C3= 8.23 13.0 31.0 60.0 KM2/SEC2 
FOR EACH ENTRY THE FOLLOWING DATA IS CONTAINED 
1) AEROENTRY ERROR ASSESSMENT 
2) CONTROL & LOADS DATA CHART 
3) HEATING DATA CHART 
Figure 6.0-1 Aeroassist Classes 
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6.1 AERQASSIST OVERVIEW 
Figure 6.1-1 i l lustrates  an aerobrakhg maneuver f r m  a highly elliptic Earth 
orbit down t o  a lower one. 
taryeted t o  a desired location in the Earth's amsphere. 
occu~s while the vehicle is in  the sensible atmosphere. 
perform a controlled velocity reduction such that the vehicle has the desired 
apogee upon exit f r m  the atmosphere. 
height as the desired final park orbit which is achieved by a post-aero apogee 
boost. 
The initial entry orbit 's  perigee is carefully 
The aeroassist phase 
Its object is t o  
This apogee is generally a t  the same 
ENTRY ORBIT 
PERIGEE BOOST 
Figwe 6.1-1 Earth Return t o  Low Orbit 
The process of aero-capture, shown in Figure 6.1-2, is very similar t o  that of 
aeroassist except that  the incaning trajectory is hyperbolic. This means that 
without the aero-maneuver the vehicle would e scap  the planet, hence the term 
"aerocapture". Otherwise the principal is the same with an aero phase followed 
by a perigee raise maneuver, performed a t  apogee. 
which would deploy an entry capsule to  the surface after a stable park orbit is 
achieved. 
Also shown is a lander option 
92 
/ LANDER OPTION
RAISE I DEORBIT 
PERIGEE 
MANEUVER ? 
CAPTURE ORBIT 
Figure 6.1-2 Planetary Pero-capture 
6 . 1 . 1  AERQASSIST CONDITIONS 
T a b l e  6.1.1-1 and 6.1.1-2 sumMlrize several important pre- aMsl post-entry 
parameters for the aeroassist maneuvers studied. T a b l e  6.1.1-1 shows the Earth 
return and capture missions discussed previously. The in i t ia l  sd -ma jo r  axis 
is for  the pre-entry orbit and is a measure of the entry interface energy state. 
The aero velocity reduction is the m u n t  of inertial velocity that is reroved 
frm the body by the aeroassist manewer. Finally the exit orbit apogee is the 
target that the aercmanewer has achieved when the vehicle leaves the 
atmosphere. 
The Earth return a e r m m r s  all use an exit orbit apogee taryet of 245 nm 
which is consistent with return t o  the Space Station. 
ramewers use an exit target of 38485 nm w h i c h  represents an Earth-synchronous 
orbit when the perigee is r a i sed to  250 nm. This elliptic orbit must be used 
because of the excessive energies involved i n  the higher C3 Earth rncounters. 
The Earth capture 
T a b l e  6.1.1-2 s m i z e s  the same infomation as above for the Mars capture 
missions. 
final perigee altitude of 270 nm. This orbit is of strong interest because of 
its combination of favorable site reconnaissance and c d c a t i o n  relay links. 
The exit apogee target is for a Mars synchronous orbit that has a 
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Table 6.1.1-1 Aeroassist conditions - Earth Entries 
INITIAL AERO VELOCITY 
SEMIMAJOR AXIS REDUCTION CASE 
GEO RETURN 7.97513 E7 FT 7809.3 FPS 
LUNAR RETURN 8.95096E8 FT 10099.1 FPS 
PLANET. BOOST 4.1 8627 E8 FT 9851.4 FPS 
EXIT ORBIT 
APOGEE 
245 NM 
245 NM 
245 NM 
c 3  
8 K d /  SE? 
16 K d /  SE? 
32 K d I S E ?  
68 Khn?/SE@ 
Table 6.1.1-2 Aeroassist conditions -Mars Entries 
INITIAL AERO VELOCITY EXIT ORBIT 
SEMIMAJOR AXIS REDUCTION APOGEE 
-1.63468 E8 FT 2588.9 FPS 38485 NM 
-8.17341 E7 FT 3716.2 FPS 38485 NM 
-4.08671 E7 FT 5877.7 FPS 38485 NM 
-1.92316E7 FT 10366.5 FPS 38485 NM 
INITIAL 
SEMIMAJOR AXIS 
- 1.70712 E 7  FT 
13 K d l  SE? -1.08087 E7 FT 
31 K$/SE? -4.53267E6 fT 
60 K$/ S E 6  -2.34188 E6 FT 
c 3  
8.23 K d 1  SEc2 
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AERO VELOCITY EXIT ORBIT 
REDUCTION APOGEE 
3223.6 FPS 18108 NM 
4536.3 FPS 18108 NM 
8866.2 FPS 18108 NM 
14564.8 FPS 18108 NM 
6.1.2 PLANETARY DATA 
EpIRI)( 
2.09256627E7 FT 
;308555024E7 FT 
7.2921151466-5 RADISEC 
1.407645794E16 FT3ISEC2 
0.0010826 
-0.000002565 
-0.000001 608 
Tab le  6.1.2-1 sumMlrizes the key data for Earth and Mars used in the analysis of 
the various aeroentries described. 
and sizes, spin rates, gravitational constants, and atrmspheres. 
This includes in fomt ion  on planet shapes 
M 4 s  
1 .I 14567E7 FT 
1.107448E7 FT 
7.0882181E-5 RADlANSEC 
1.512468E15 FTWSEC2 
0.001965 
0 
0 
Table 6.1.2-1 Planetary Data 
6.1.3 COLJTROL CORRIDOR DEFINITION 
Safe flight through the atmsphere is restricted t o  a region which can be 
controlled w i t h  the lift available t o  the vehicle. 
vector point- t o  control its trajectory. 
continuous lift up ami continuous lift dam. 
l imit-  conditions define lower and upper (respctively) boundaries for vehicle 
f l igh t .  Conditions which exceed these baundaries w i l l  result in either re-entry 
or skipout. 
The entry vehicle uses lift 
The limits of this control are 
Trajectories run w i t h  these two 
For the purposes of establishing a working concept (Figure 6.1.3-11, these 
boundary profiles are characterized by their preentry vacuum perigee altitudes. 
The difference in the perigee altitudes for the two limiting conditions is known 
as the dynamic control corridor. This corridor represents the zone within which 
an orbital targeting routine must a im the vehicle for a successful aerapass. 
The size of this control corridor is established by error analysis (next 
section). 
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lREENTRVl I 
*CONTROL CORRIDOR BOUNDED B Y :  
CONTINUOUS L I F T  UP CASE 
(LOWER BOUNDARV) 
CONTINUOUS L I F T  DOWN CASE 
(UPPER BOUNDARY) 
*RESULTING CORRIDOR IS 
EXPRESSED AS THE PERIGEE 
ALTITUDE SEPARATION OF TIIE 
VACUUM TRAJECTORIES. USE 
OF VACUUM ORBITS EASES 
ORB I TAL GUI DANCE TARGET INC. 
NOIE:  CURVATURE OF TRAJECTORY INVERTED B Y  
VERTICAL EXAGGERATION OF DIAGRAM 
Figure 6.1.3-1 Control Corridor Definition 
6 . 1 . 4  AERO ERROR ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
An error analysis w a s  corducted for each of the aeroassist entry conditians t o  
determine levels of trajectory control required. 
the uncertainties h variables of the entry process. 
aercdynamic control reqyired, an estimate of each vehicle's L/D can be made once 
control corridor sensitivities have been derived. 
error analysis assuqtions that are cmmn t o  all entries. 
that w e r e  accounted for include: navigation errors, final midcourse correction 
burn uncertainties, atmspheric density variability, vehicle angle of attack and 
ballistic coefficient variations. 
detail in each error analysis page that follows. 
This error analysis evaluates 
By sizing the level of 
T a b l e  6.1.4-1 surmrarizes 
The uncertainties 
Tkse variables are discussed in greater 
6 .2  EARTH RETURN RESULTS 
The following sections smmrize the data and results for Earth return 
aeroassists. 
boost mission. 
These incluCae return f r m  W, from the Moon, and fram a planetary 
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T a b l e  6.1.4-1 Aero Error Analysis Assmptions 
ASSESSMENT OF ENTRY ERRORS SETS CONTROL CORRIDOR SIZE AND UD 
THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS ARE COMMON 
NAVIGATION: 1) EARTH AEROBRAKING UTILIZES GPS SYSTEM YIELDING 
1020 FT AND 0.1 FPS NAV STATE ACCURACY 
2) MARS AEROBRAKING UTILIZES OPTICAL NAV YIELDING 
1 .O NM AND 0.12 FPS ACCURACY PER 10000 NM SEP FROM MARS 
FINAL NAV UPDATE FOR MIDCOURSE AT 1.5 HR FROM MARS ENTRY 
FINAL MIDCOURSE CORRECTION AT ENTRY MINUS 1 .O HOUR 
ATMOSPHFRF' 1) EARTH DENSITY VARIABILITY = f 30 % 
MARS DENSITY VARIABILITY = f 50 96 2) 
W L F  OF Al-rACK UNCFR TAINTY: f 2.0" ON 9.0" (EARTH) OR *2.0" ON 12.0" (MARS) 
BAl I ISTIC COFFF ICIFNT UNCFRTAINTY ; f 8% ON WICDA 
IMPACT OF ALL ERRORS EXPRESSED IN THE EQUIVALENT VARIATION IN PERIGEE ALTITUDE 
6.2.1 GEO RETURN AEROASSIST- ERROR ANALYSIS 
T a b l e  6.2.1-1 surrmarizes the aeroassist error analysis conducted for the GI33 
return case. A series of error sources w a s  considered with their h p c t s  being 
n o m i z e d  t o  an e q u i d e n t  variation in vacuum perigee. 
effects was then used t o  s ize  the aero-control corridor and L/D of the vehicle. 
The sources e r e  grouped into two categories: 1) targeting errors w h i c h  cause 
the vehicle t o  miss its desired entry &point and 2) aerodynamic variations 
w h i c h  cause the vehicle t o  f ly  a different atnmspheric trajectory than expcted. 
The RsS t o t a l  of these 
Tare t ina  Frrors - The last opportunity t o  correct the vehicle's incaning 
trajectory occurs one hour before entry with a final midcourse correction burn. 
All errors prior t o  this point are nulled out and only those factors that 
disturb the burn and subsequent fl ight are considered. 
rnisaligrurwt m u n t  t o  about 0.lo based on current star tracker and IMU d r i f t  
assessmmts. This translates t o  a 140 f t  error in vacuum perigee altituck. 
Cutoff Errors - Acceleramter error for a 20 f p s  correction hum. 
Navigation Error - Earth aeroassist can make use of the G l o b a l  
Estimates of the @S error at this stage are 1020 f t  in position 
This leads t o  perigee errors of 1044 f t  and 404 ft, 
a) Pointing Errors - Midcourse burn attitude errors due t o  IMU 
b) 
c) 
Positioning System ( W S )  w h i c h  is a set of hifpily accurate navigation 
satellites. 
and 0 . 1  f p s  in velocity. 
respct ively . 
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T a b l e  6.2.1-1 GED P e r m t r y  Error Analysis 
EQUIVALENT 
PERIGEE ERROR 
TARGETING ERRORS 
(FINAL CORRECTION BURN AT ENTRY MINUS 1 HR) 
- POINTING ERROR 
- CUTOFF ERROR 
- NAVERROR 
P 140 FT f . l  DEG 
= 1333 FT 
= 1044 FT 
404 FT 
.33 FPS ACCELEROMETER 
FROM 1020 FT POSITION UNCERTAINTY 
FROM 0.1 FPS VELOCITY UNCERTAINTY 
AERODYNAMIC VARIATION 
ATMOSPHERIC UNCERTAINTY = 5700 FT i 30% DENSITY - UD UNCERTAINTY 9700 FT f 2" AT 7.2' ANGLE OF ATTACK (f 30% UD) 
- BALLISTIC UNCERTAINTY = 1700 FT f 8% WICDA 
RSS = f 1780 FT 
= f 11400 FT = f 1.87 NM FROM AERODYNAMICS 
= f 0.29 NM FROM TARGETING 
I = f 11500 FT = f 1.90 NM NET VARIATION I 
I CONCLUSION: 5.04 N.M. CONTROL CORRIDOR REQUIRED TO COVER ERRORS WITH 33% MARGIN I 
I .  
c] V m  - No two aero-entries w i l l  be exactly alike. The inpact 
of variations in  the atmosphere and the vehicle are accounted for here. 
atmospheric density variation is currently estimated t o  be about 30%. 
variations in the entry location and aercdynamics consistent w i t h  Viking and 
Shuttle data. 
c) Pallistic Uncertainty - Wight uncertainty = 150 Ibs (propellant 
residual uncertanty), coefficient of drag (Cd) variation = 5% (Shuttle and 
V i k i n g  experience), and brake area variation = 3% (to cover uncertainties in 
flexible brake gecsretry) . 
coef f icient is 8%. 
a) Atmospher ic  Uncertainty - The unknown ccanponent of the Earth's 
b) L/D Uncertainty - An angle-of-attack variation of 2" d u e  t o 
The RSS effect of these factors on ballistic 
Because all the abave factors are indepxknt  tkir effects are RSS'ed together 
t o  yield a net variation in  perigee of +1. 9 0  nm. T h i s  f i g u r e  i s  i n c r e a s e  
33% t o  account for control lags and other dynmnic effects (based on aero- 
guidance experience) which gives a net control corridor requirement of +2 . 5 2  nm, 
or a net wic t th  of 5.04 nm. This size control corridor sets an L/D of 0.12 for 
the entry vehicle. 
6.2.1.1 GEO RETURN - CONTROL & LOADS 
Figure 6.2.1.1-1 sumnarizes aeroassist control corridor growth and vehicle 
deceleration loads as a function of L/D. Various entry trajectories were 
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generated uti l izing a pre-entry ellipse w i t h  an apogee of 19323 nm that  is 
consistent w i t h  return frm a geosynchronaus orbit. 
targeted t o  an apogee of 245 nm w h i c h  represents return t o  the Space Station 
(however return t o  a lower park orbit w i l l  not significantly change the 
results). 
lift up and lift down trajectories t o  generate the parametric data base. 
Because of natural sensitivities, this data is shown as a function of L/D. 
The post-aero exit  orbit is 
Aerodynamic L/D and ballistic coefficient were varied for continuouS 
0 RETURN FROM GEO TO S.S. 
ENTRY APOGEE - 19323 NM 
AERO EXIT APOGEE - 245 NM 
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Figure 6.2.1.1-1 GE33 Return Control C a d s  
The difference bet= the pre-entry vacum perigees for lift up and lift down 
aero-trajectories defines a control corridor w i d t h  which represents the region 
in w h i c h  the vehicle can be steered t o  the desired exit conditions w i t h  the 
available lift. Since the error analysis of the previous section has defined 
the magnitude of this control corridor, the vehicle's required L/D is set. 
a control corridor w i d t h  of 5.04 rn an L/D of 0.12 is required for GEO return. 
For 
Peak entry deceleration is shown for continuom lift up and l i f t  down 
trajectories. 
lift up case which is thus used as a worst case loading condition for structural 
sizing. For this case, an L/D of 0.12 results in peak loads of 3.5 g's. 
The highest values of deceleration are always encountered in the 
6.2.1.2 GEO RETURN - HEATING 
Figure 6.2.1.2-1 shms heating information for return frm GEO t o  the Space 
Station. Stagnation point convective heating values are calculated using a 
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modified Fay-Riddell rrrethod normalized t o  a 1.0 f t .  radius @%=re. 
convective heating is cc&ine.d w i t h  an estimate of non-equilibrium heating the 
net heat flux on the brake can be ccmputed. 
convective heating only. 
coefficient w h i c h  is its principal sensitivity over the range of the study 
space. 
when t h i s  
The data shown in the charts is the 
Heating data has been shown as a *ion of ballistic 
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Figure 6.2.1.2-1 GEX) Return Heating 
Peak stagnation heating determines which TPS materials are acceptable for the 
aerobrake. 
Integrated stagnation heating is shown for the l i f t  down maximal condition. 
This parameter determines the required thickness of the aerobrake's insulating 
TPS . 
The lift up condition generates IMxirpal peak heating values. 
6.2.2 LUNAR RETURN AEROASSIST 
Tab le  6.2.2-1 shows entry error analysis for the lunar return condition. 
primary difference between the lunar entry error analysis and that conchcted for 
the GEX) return is in the sensitivity of the incaning trajectory t o  dispersions. 
The lunar entry condition is faster because of the mch higher apogee of the 
incckning orbit  (287700 m), consistent w i t h  a lunar free return. The actual 
dispersions are the same because of a c m n  Earth environment for  entry. 
The 
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Tab le  6.2.2-1 Lunar Feturn Aero-entry Error Analysis 
. EQUIVALENT 
PERIGEE ERROR 
TARGETING ERRORS 
(FINAL CORRECTION BURN AT ENTRY MINUS 1 HR) 
- POINTING ERROR =140FT f .1 DEG 
- CUTOFF ERROR = 1320 FT .33 FPS ACCELEROMETER 
- NAVERROR - 1030 FT FROM 1020 FT POSITION UNCERTAINTY 
FROM 0.1 FPS VELOCITY UNCERTAINTY 400 FT 
AERODYNAMIC VARIATION 
- ATMOSPHERIC UNCERTAINTY 18800 FT f 30% DENSITY - UD UNCERTAINTY - BALLISTIC UNCERTAINTY = 1600 FT f8% W/%A = 10900 FT f 2" AT 8" ANGLE OF AITACK (f 30% UD) 
' RSS = f 1720 FT 
= f 12500 FT = f 2.06 NM FROM AERODYNAMICS 
= f 0.28 NM FROM TARGETING 
I = f 12600 FT = f 2.08 NM NET VARIATION I 
I CONCLUSION: 5.53 N.M. CONTROL CORRIDOR REQUIRED TO COVER ERRORS WITH 33% MARGIN I 
The 5.53 nm net control corridor s ize  sets a minirmn L/D requirmt of 0.11 for 
the entry vehicle based on the control parametrics in the next section. 
analysis of aerobrake sizing actually increased this L/D for load relief 
pecvliar t o  the lunar vehicle application. 
later on in this reprt. 
An 
This issue is discussed in detail 
Figure 6.2.2-1 shows control corridor arrl deceleration loads data for  Lunar 
return. 
curves for lift up and lift down conditions. 
used t o  s ize  structural elenrants. 
Control corridor data is derived by differencing the v a m  perigee 
The peak deceleration level is 
Figure 6.2.2-2 shows heating data for the Lunar return case. 
heating determines wbich materids are thermally suitable for brake construction 
w h i l e  integrated heating sets the -red TPS thickness. 
Peak stagnation 
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Figure 6.2.2-1 Lunar %turn Controls & Loads 
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Figure 6.2.2-2 Lunar Return Heating 
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6.2.3 PLANETARY BOOST RETURN AERQASSIST 
Figure 6.2.3-1 shows the control and loads data for return from a worst case 
planetary boost mission. Initial entry orbit has an qmg-ee of 130900 nm which 
results f r m  a very energetic planetary &ploy mission (#17500, Planet  B & C) . 
Because the energy of this return is very close t o  tha t  for the lunar return 
case the error analysis is not Shawn but w o u l d  
in  the lunar return section above. 
ahost identical t o  that shown 
0 RETURN FROM PL. BOOST TO S.S. 
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Figure 6.2.3-1 Planetary Boost =urn - Control & Loads 
Planetary boost convection heating data is shown in Figure 6.2.3-2. 
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Figure 6.2.3-2 Planetary Boost Return bating 
6.3 MARS AEROCAPTURE RESULTS 
The following sections suna r i ze  the data and results for  Mars aerocaptures. 
These represerrt missions where an in i t ia l ly  hyperbolic encounter trajectory w i t h  
Mars is mxiified into a closed orbit about the planet by means of an aeroassist 
maneuver. Because the aeroassist maneuver captures the vehicle into Mars orbit 
it is terrrred an ltaerocapturelt. 
were considered: C3 = 8.2, 13, 32, and 60 M/secz.  The aero-exit apogees were 
ta rge ted to  18108 nm which corresponds t o  a bbrs synchronaus condition. 
Four different hyperbolic encounter eneryies 
- 
6.3.1 MARS AEROCAPTURE, C3=8.2 - ERROR ANALYSIS 
. I  
T a b l e  6.3.1-1 sumnarizes the error analysis conductedto derive Mars capture 
control requirements. All errors are normalized into equivalent variations in 
perigee altitude which is the strangest driver t o  aercentry uncertainty. The 
variables are categorized into targeting errors and aercdynamic uncertainties. 
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Tab le  6.3.1-1 Mars Captm Aero-entry Error Analysis: -8.2 ld/se&? 
EQUIVALENT 
PERIGEE ERROR 
TARGETING ERRORS 
(FINAL CORRECTION BURN AT ENTRY MINUS 1 HR) 
- POINTING ERROR P 138 FT f .1 DEG 
- CUTOFF ERROR = 1300 FT 3 3  FPS ACCELEROMETER 
- NAVERROR = 6694 FT FROM 6883 FTPOSITION UNCERTAINTY 
776 FT FROM 0.136 FPS VELOCITY UNCERTAINTY 
AERODYNAMIC VARIATION 
ATMOSPHERIC UNCERTAINTY 14900 FT f 50% DENSITY - UD UNCERTAINTY 
- BALLISTIC UNCERTAINTY a. 2400 FT f 8% W I k A  
= 5200 FT f 2" AT 12" ANGLE OF ATTACK (f 17% UD) 
RSS = f 6860 FT 
= f 16000 FT P f 2.63 NM FROM AERODYNAMICS 
= f 1.13 NM FROM TARGETING 
I = f 17900 FT = f 2.94 NM NET VARIATION I 
I CONCLUSION: 7.82 N.M. CONTROL CORRIDOR REQUIRED TO COVER ERRORS WITH 33% MARGIN I 
The targeting errors result frm inaccuracies in the execution of the final 
correction burn one hour before entry and include allocatians for pointing 
error, cutoff error and navigation error. The pointing error of 0.1" r e s u 1 t s 
frm stellar update alignment errors and subseqyent MJ drift which corrupts the 
desiredpointing of the final correction. The velocity cutoff error of 0.33 fps 
results frm anboard accelermter errors and is a working figure derived frm 
the OTV configuratian. 
navigation capabilities and represents a final onboard trajectory solution 1.5 
hours before entry (half an hour before the final midcourse). 
error contributions are RSS'edtogether t o  yield a net perigee variation due t o  
targeting errors of _+ 1.13 mi. 
~IE navigation error is representatiVe of vi- 
These indepndent 
The aerodynamic errors result frm variations in the Mars atmospheric density as 
w e l l  a s  in vehicle aercdynamic properties during the entry phase. 
atmosphericvariationoff 5 0 %  i n  d e n s i t y  i s  a s s u m e d  ( a s  c o m p a r e d  w i t  
Earth applications) which is derived frm the cool versus warm density mckls 
contained in the ELLS Wfermce At- (Kliore, 1982). The L/D uncertainty 
results f r m  a vehicle trim attitude variability of f 2" i n  t h e  c o n t i n u u m  f l o l  
region of entry. The s i z e  of the variation is that derived for the OTV, when 
the Mars vehicle beccmes better defined a similar derivation w i l l  be possible 
for its specific configuration. Finally, a ballistic uncertainty of f 8 % i s  
carried which also represents a quantity derived f r m  the OTV. 
arodynamic variations is f 2 . 6 3  nm i n  n o m i n a l  p e r i g e e  a l t i t u d e .  
A Martian 
The RSS of the 
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whm the targeting and aerdynamic errors are ccanbined a net perigee variation 
o f *  2 . 9 4  n m i .  r e s u l t s .  T h i s  v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  a e r o e n t r y  
coveredby the control capability of the vehicle in order t o  successfully 
acccanplish the aeroassist. Frm exprience w i t h  the OTV aeroentry process a 33% 
margin is added t o  the net variation t o  account for control lags. 
in a net control corridor requirerent of 7.82 m which then sets the L/D of a 
Mars entry vehicle w i t h  this hyperbolic encounter C3 at 0.32 using the control 
sensitivity data contained in the next section. 
?“nis results 
6.3.1.1 W AEROCAPTURE, - 4 . 2  - m L  6 IAADS 
Figure 6.3.1.1-1 surmEtrizes the growth in control corridor and deaderation 
loads as a function of L/D. 
a pre-entry hyperbolic C3 of 8.2 krr?/sec2 and a Mars capture apogee of 18108 nm 
(post-aero) . Aerodynamic L/D and ballistic coefficient here varied for 
continuous lift up a d  lift down trajectories t o  generate the parametric data 
base. Because of natural sensitivities the data on pre-entry perigee alt i tude 
and peak deceleration is shown as a function of L/D. 
Various entry trajectories were generated uti l izing 
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ENTRY w 4 . 2  ~ ~ 2 6 6 ~ ~ 2  
AERO EXIT APOGEE - 18108 NM 
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0 PEAK DECELERATION 
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Figure 6.3.1.1-1 Mars capture, -8.2 - Control & Lmds 
t r a  j t  
The difference between the pre-entry vacuum perigees for l i f t  up and lift down 
aero-trajectories defines a control corridor w i d t h  which represents the region 
in which the vehicle can be steered t o  the desired exit conditions w i t h  the 
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available lift. With error analysis having defined the magnitude of this 
control corridor, the vehicle's required L/D is set. 
w i d t h  of 7.82 nm, an L/D of 0.32 is required for Mars capture at this C3. 
For a control corridor 
Peak entry deceleration is shown for lift up and lift down trajectories. 
highest values of deceleration are always encountered in the continuous lift up 
case w h i c h  is thus used as a worst case loading condition for  structural sizing. 
The 
6.3.1.2 MARS AEROCAPTURE, C3~8.2 - HE?kTING 
Figure 6.3.1.2-1 shows heating information for the Mars capture with an 
encounter C3 of 8.2 ]anz/sec*. Stagnation point convective heating values are 
calculated using a modified Fay-Riddell method normalized t o  a 1.0 f t  . radius 
sphere. 
equilibrium keating the net heat flux on the aercbrake can be ccmputed. 
data shown in the charts is the convective heating only. Heating data has been 
shown as a function of ballistic coefficient which is its principal sensitivity 
over the raqe of the study space. 
Men t h i s  convective heating is cabin& with an estimate of non- 
The 
120- 
loo - 
m- 
64- 
U I -  
20 - 
BALLISTIC COEFFICIENT ( LB I FT2 ) 
0 MARS CAPTURE 
ENTRY C3 - 8.2 KM26EC2 
AERO EXIT APOGEE - 18108 NM 
BASE LID - 0.20 
0 PEAK STAGNATION HEATING 
2OK - SETS TPS MATERIAL REOMTS z 
15K 2 o INTEGRATED HEATING 
4 SETS TPS THICKNESS 
IOU 2 : 
Figure 6.3.1.2-1 Mars Capture, -8.2 - Heating 
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Peak stagnation heating determines which TPS materials are acceptable for the 
aerobrake. The lift up condition shown generates maximal peak heating values. 
Integrated stagnatim heating is shown for the lift cbwn maximal condition. 
This parameter detennines the required thickness of aerobrake's insulating 
TPS . 
6.3.2 MARS AEROCAPTURE, -13 
T a b l e  6.3.2-1 sumnarizes the error analysis conhcted for a Mars capture w i t h  an 
encounter C3 of 13 )crrj/sec*. The primary difference between this analysis and 
that conducted for the previous 8.2 l d / s e c 2  Mxs capture is in the dispersion 
sensitivity of the faster incmingtrajectory. 
solution at entry minus 1.5 hours occurs further out w h i c h  increases the state 
vector error t o  7824 f t  i n  position and 0.155 fps  i n  velocity. 
dispersions are the sam because of a c m n  Mars environment for  entry. 
In addition the final navigation 
The other 
T a b l e  6.3.2-1 Mars Capture Aero-entry Error Analysis: -13 ]an2/sec2 
EQUIVALENT 
PERIGEE ERROR 
TARGETING ERRORS 
(FINAL CORRECTION BURN AT ENTRY MINUS 1 HR) 
- POINTING ERROR = 136 FT f . l  DEG 
- CUTOFF ERROR = 1282 FT 3 3  FPS ACCELEROMETER 
- NAVERROR = 7688 FT FROM 7824 FT POSITION UNCERTAINTY 
880 FT FROM 0.155 FPS VELOCITY UNCERTAINTY 
AERODYNAMIC VARIATION 
ATMOSPHERIC UNCERTAINTY = 15200 FT f 50% DENSITY 
= 6700 FT - UD UNCERTAINTY f 2' AT 12' ANGLE OF ATTACK (f 17% UD) 
- BALLISTIC UNCERTAINTY = 2400 FT f 8% WICDA 
6 RSS = f 7850 FT 
= f 16800 FT = f 2.76 NM FROM AERODYNAMICS 
= f 1.29 NM FROM TARGETING 
I = f 18500 FT = f 3.05 NM NET V A R I A T T I  
CONCLUSION: 8.1 2 N.M. CONTROL CORRIDOR REQUIRED TO COVER ERRORS WITH 33% MARGIN 
The 8.12 nm net control corridor s ize  sets a mininun L/D requixamt of 0.26 for 
the entry vehicle when control parmtrics (Figure 6.3.2-1) are ut i l ized .  
Figure 6.3.2-2 sumnarizes the aercxapture heat- e n v i r o m t  for  this encounter 
condition. 
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Figure 6.3.2-1 Mars Capture, -13 - Control & Loads 
/ 
0 MARSCAPTURE 
ENTRY w- 13 KM~MC* 
AERO EXIT APOGEE - 18108 NM 
BASE m - 0.20 
0 PEAK STAGNATION HEATING 
SETS TPS MATERIAL REQMTS 
o INTEGRATED HEATING 
SETS TPS THICKNESS 
Figure 6.3.2-2 Mars Capture, C3=13 - Heating 
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6.3.3 MARS AEROCAPTURE, C3=31 
T a b l e  6.3.3-1 sumnarizes the error analysis conducted for a Mars capture with an 
encounter C3 of 31 k d / s e c 2 .  
that conducted for the 8.2 kd/sec2 Mars capture is in the dispersion sensitivity 
of the faster i n c m t r a j e c t o r y .  
entry minus 1.5 hours occurs f-r out which increases the state vector error 
t o  10720 f t  in position and 0.212 fps in velocity. 
the same because of a co~my3n Mars e n v i r m t  for entry. 
The primary difference k e t m  this analysis and 
In ackiition the final navigation solution at  
The other dispersions are 
T a b l e  6.3.3-1 Mars capture Aero-entry Error Analysis: C3=31 &/s& 
EQUIVALENT 
PERIGEE ERROR 
TARGETING ERRORS 
(FINAL CORRECTION BURN AT ENTRY MINUS 1 HR) 
- POINTING ERROR = 132 FT 
- CUTOFF ERROR = 1245 FT 
- NAVERROR = 10684 FT 
1181 FT 
f . l  DEG 
.33 FPS ACCELEROMETER 
FROM.10720 FT POSITION UNCERTAINTY 
FROM 0.212 FPS VELOCITY UNCERTAINTY 
AERODYNAMIC VARIATION 
- ATMOSPHERIC UNCERTAINTY = 15600 FT f 50% DENSITY 
- UD UNCERTAINTY 
BALLISTIC UNCERTAINTY = 2500 FT f 8% WICDA 
= 1 1500 FT f 2" AT 12" ANGLE OF A'ITACK (f 17% UD) 
RSS = f 10820 FT = f 1.78 NM FROM TARGETING 
P f 19500 FT = f 3.22 NM FROM AERODYNAMICS 
= f 22300 FT = f 3.67 NM NET VARIATION 
I CONCLUSION: 9.76 N.M. CONTROL CORRIDOR REQUIRED TO COVER ERRORS WITH 33% MARGIN -1 
The 9.76 nm net control corridor size sets a m h h m  L/D rquireinent of 0.19 for 
the entry vehicle w h m  control parametrics (Figure 6.3.3-1) are ut i l i zed .  
Figure 6.3.3-2 sumnarizes the aerocapture heating envirorrment for this encounter 
conditian. 
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Figure 6.3.3-1 Mars Capture, -31 - Control C Loads 
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Figure 6.3.3-2 Mars Capture, -31 - Heating 
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6.3.4 MARS AEZOCAPTURE, C3=60 
T a b l e  6.3.4-1 sumnarizes the error analysis conducted for a Mars capture with an 
encounter C3 of 60 Id/sec2. 
that conducted for the 8.2 ld/sec2 Mars capture is i n  the dispersion sensitivity 
of the faster inccaning trajectory. 
entry minus 1.5 hours occurs further out which increases the state vector error 
t o  14270 f t  in position and 0.282 fps in velocity. 
the sane because of a camry3.n Mars e n v i r o m t  for entry. 
The primary difference Mween this analysis and 
In addition the final navigation solution at 
The other dispersions are 
T a b l e  6.3.4-1 Mars Capture Aero-entry Error Analysis: U-60 I d / s e c 2  
EQUIVALENT 
PERIGEE ERROR 
* TARGETING ERRORS 
(FINAL CORRECTION BURN AT ENTRY MINUS 1 HR) 
- POINTING ERROR = 130 FT f .1 DEG 
- CUTOFF ERROR = 1222 FT .33 FPS ACCELEROMETER 
- NAVERROR = 14284 FT FROM 14270 FT POSITION UNCERTAINTY 
1552 FT FROM 0.282 FPS VELOCITY UNCERTAINTY 
AERODYNAMIC VARIATION 
ATMOSPHERIC UNCERTAINTY 16100 FT f 50% DENSITY 
- UD UNCERTAINTY 
- BALLISTIC UNCERTAINTY = 2600 FT f 8% W/CDA = 17300 FT f 2" AT 12" ANGLE OF AlTACK (f 17% UD) 
* RSS P f 14420 FT = f 2.37 NM FROM TARGETING 
= f 23800 FT = f 3.91 NM FROM AERODYNAMICS 
I = f 27800 FT = f 4.58 NM NET VARIATION I 
I CONCLUSION: 12.18 N.M. CONTROL CORRIDOR REQUIRED TO COVER ERRORS WITH 33% MARGIN 
The 12.18 nm net control corridor size sets a m i n b  L/D requirement of 0.16 
for the entry vehicle when control par-rics (Figure 6.3.4-1) are utilized. 
Figure 6.3.4-2 sumnarizes the aerocapture heating environment for  this encounter 
condition. 
112 
0 MARSCAPTURE 
ENTRY a-60 K M ~ ~ E C ~  
BASE W I W  = loo. LEET2 
AERO EXIT APOGEE = 18108 NM 
. 
0 AEROASSIST CONTROL CORRIDOR 
WIDTH = DELTA OF PERIGEES 
ERROA &ALYSl.S SETS REOMT 
CONTROL CORRIDOR SETS M 
0 PEAK DECELERATION 
SETS STRUCTURAL REOMTS 
I 
0 0  0.1 0.2 0.3 
LID  
Figure 6.3.4-1 Mars Capture, C3=60 - Control 
won *LATWO naris RFERUED 
roAlonRurnsnEI1E 
.o 
I I 1 ! o  - 
10 20 30 40  50 60 
BALLISTIC COEFFICIENT ( LB I F l z  ) 
0 MARS CAPTURE 
ENTAY w = 60 K M * ~ E C ~  
AERO EXIT APOGEE = 18108 NM 
BASE VD = 0.20 
0 PEAK STAGNATION HEATING 
SETS TPS MATERIAL REOMTS 
0 INTEGRATED HEATING 
SETS TPS THICKNESS 
Figure 6.3.4-2 Mars Capture, -60 - Heating 
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6.4  EARTH AERLX'APTURE RESULTS 
The following sections surmrarize the data and results for Earth aerocaptures. 
These represent missions where an in i t ia l ly  hyperbolic encounter trajectory with 
the Earth is rnodified into a closed orbit about the planet by mans of an 
aeroassist maneuver. &cause the aeroassist mewer captures the vehicle into 
Earth orbit it is termed an "aerocapture". These missions differ  in aero-exit 
conditions from the Earth return cases shown earlier in that their apogees are 
very high (38485 m, Earth synchronous) t o  r&ce heating and aerodynamic loads. 
Four different hyperbolic encounter energies w e r e  consickred: C3 = 8, 16, 32, and 
68 kr$/secZ. 
6 . 4 . 1  EARTH AEROCAPTURE, C3=8.0 - ERRDR ANALYSIS 
T a b l e  6.4.1-1 shows the results of entry error analysis conducted for  the C3 = 
8.0 G / s e c 2  Earth capture mission. 
baselined as in the Earth retun cases. Also a samewhat higher base angle of 
attack (go, consistent with generally higher L/D requirements) is used. 
variation in this higher angle of attack actually results in a samewhat lower 
L/D dispersim than for  the Earth return error analyses. 
discussion of Earth aeroassist error analysis see "GM> Return Aeroassist - Error 
Analysis" (section 6.2.1) . 
U s e  of the GE?3 navigation system is 
The 20 
For a more extensive 
T a b l e  6.4.1-1 Earth Capture Aero-entry Error Analysis: C3=8 &/secZ 
EQUIVALENT 
PERIGEE ERROR 
* TARGETING ERRORS 
(FINAL CORRECTION BURN AT ENTRY MINUS 1 HR) 
- POINTING ERROR 
- CUTOFF ERROR 
- NAVERROR 
= 139 FT f.l DEG 
= 1309 FT 
= 1025 FT 
397 FT 
.33 FPS ACCELEROMETER 
FROM 1020 FT POSITION UNCERTAINTY 
FROM 0.1 FPS VELOCITY UNCERTAINTY 
AERODYNAMIC VARIATION 
- ATMOSPHERIC UNCERTAINTY = 5600 FT f 30% DENSITY 
- UD UNCERTAINTY 
- BALLISTIC UNCERTAINTY = 1500 FT f 8% W/CDA 
= 2300 FT f 2' AT 9' ANGLE OF ATTACK (f 22% UD) 
. RSS = f 1720 FT 
= f 6200 FT 
= f 0.28 NM FROM TARGETING 
= f 1.03 NM FROM AERODYNAMICS 
= jl6500 FT = f 1.06 NM NET VARIATION 
I CONCLUSION: 2.83 N.M. CONTROL CORRIDOR REQUIRED TO COVER ERRORS WITH 33% MARGIN I 
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The net result of this error analysis for the entry C3 is a 2.83 nmi control 
corridor requirmt. 
L/D of 0.25 usirig the control parametrics presented in the next section. 
This control corridor requirerent translates t o  a vehicle 
6.4.1.1 EARTH A E R W T U R E ,  C 3 d . O  - CONTROL C IOADS 
Figure 6.4.1.1-1 smmrizes the growth in control corridor and deceleration 
loads as a function of L/D. Various entry trajectories were generated uti l izing 
a pre-entry hyperbolic C3 of 8.0 Iu$/sec2 and an Earth capture a p g e  of 38485 m 
(post-aero) . 
continuous lift up and lift down trajectories t o  generate the parametric data 
base. 
and peak deceleration is shown as a functian of L/D. 
Aercdynamic L/D and ballistic coefficient were varied for 
Because of natural sensitivities the data on pre-entry perigee altitude 
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Figure 6.4.1.1-1 Earth Capture, ( 3 8  - Control & mads 
The difference between the pre-entry vamm perigees for lift up and lift down 
aero-trajectories defines a control corridor w i d t h  which represents the region 
i n  which the vehicle can be steered t o  the desired exit conditions w i t h  the 
available lift. 
control corridDr, the vehicle's required L/D is set. 
w i d t h  of 2.83 rnn an L/D of 0.25 is required for Earth capture frm an encounter 
C3 of 8.0 )an2/sec2. 
W i t h  error analysis having defined the maqitude of this 
For a control corridor 
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Peak entry deceleration is shown for lift up and lift down trajectories. 
highest values of deceleration are always encountered in the continuous lift up 
case which is thus used as a worst case loading condition for  structwal sizing. 
The 
6.4.1.2 EARTH AERLxlApTURE, C3~8.0 - HEATING 
Figure 6.4.1.2-1 shows heat- information for Earth capture w i t h  an encounter C3 
of 8.0 km2/sec*. Stagnation pint convective heating values are calculated using 
a modified Fay-Riddell mthd n o d i z e d t o  a 1 .0  f t .  radius sphere. 
convective heating is ccanbined w i t h  an estimte of non-equilibrium kating the 
net heat flux on the aerobrake can be carput&. 
the convective heating only. 
ballistic coefficient which is its principal sensitivity over the range of the 
study space. 
Whm t h i s  
The data shown in the charts is 
Heating data has been shown as a function of 
Knl nfAl19 R I l E S  WLREWCLD 
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BALLISTIC COEFFICIENT ( LB I FT2 ) 
Figure 6.4.1.2-1 Earth Capture, C3=8 - Heating 
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BASE UD - 0.20 
0 PEAK STAGNATION HEATING 
SETS TPS MATERIAL REWTS 
o INTEGRATED HEATING 
SETS TPS THICKNESS 
Peak stagnation heating determines which TpS mterials are acceptable for the 
aercbrake. The lift up comiition shown generates maximal peak heating values. 
Integrated stacpation heating is shown for the lift down maximal condition. 
This paramter determines the required thickness of the aerobrake's insulating 
TPS . 
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6.4.2 EARTW AERocAeTURE, C3=16 
T a b l e  6.4.2-1 sunarizes  the error analysis conducted for  an Earth capture w i t h  
an encounter C3 of 16 kn-&/sec*. 
that conducted for the previous 8.0 kn-&/sec2 capture is in the dispersion 
sensitivity of the faster incaning trajectory. 
same because of a c m n  Earth e n v i r m t  for entry. 
The primary difference bet- this analysis and 
The other dispersions are the 
T a b l e  6.4.2-1 Earth Capture Aero-entry Error Analysis: C3=16 &/seC;! 
EQUIVALENT 
PERIGEE ERROR 
TARGETING ERRORS 
(FINAL CORRECTION BURN AT ENTRY MINUS 1 HR) 
- POINTING ERROR - 138 FT f .1 DEG 
- CUTOFF ERROR 1301 FT 3 3  FPS ACCELEROMETER 
- NAVERROR = 1024 FT FROM 1020 FT POSITION UNCERTAINTY 
FROM 0.1 FPS VELOCITY UNCERTAINTY 394 FT 
AERODYNAMIC VARIATION 
ATMOSPHERIC UNCERTAINTY = 5700 FT f 30% DENSITY 
BALLISTIC UNCERTAINTY P 1500 FT f 8% W/%A 
- UD UNCERTAINTY = 3300 FT f 2' AT 9" ANGLE OF ATTACK (f 22% UD) 
RSS = f 1700 FT = f 0.28 NM FROM TARGETING 
= f 6800 FT = f 1.1 1 NM FROM AERODYNAMICS 
= f 7000 FT = f 1.15 NM NET VARIATION 
CONCLUSION: 3.05 N.M. CONTROL CORRIDOR REQUIRED TO COVER ERRORS WITH 33% MARGIN I 
The 3.05 nm net control corridor s i z e  sets a minimUm L/D requirement of 0.195 
for the entry vehicle when control parmtrics (Figure 6.4.2-1) are utilized. 
Figure 6.4.2-2 sumoarizes the aerocapture heating envirorarwt for this encounter 
condition. 
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6.4.3 -TI3 AEROCAPTURE, C3=32 
Tab le  6.4.3-1 sumoarizes the error analysis conducted for an Earth capture with 
an encounter C3 of 32 M/sec*. 
that conducted for the 8.0 lu-&?/se$ Earth capture is in the dispersion 
sensitivity of the faster inccgningtrajectory. 
same m u s e  of a ccpmyln Earth environmnt for entry. 
The primary difference ketwea this analysis and 
The other dispersians are the 
Tab le  6.4.3-1 Earth Capture Ilero-entry Error Analysis: -32 & / s d  
EQUIVALENT 
PERIGEE ERROR 
TARGETING ERRORS 
(FINAL CORRECTION BURN AT ENTRY MINUS 1 HR) 
- POINTING ERROR = 137Ff f.1 DEG 
- CUTOFF ERROR I1288 FT .33 FPS ACCELEROMETER 
- NAVERROR = 1024 FT FROM 1020 Ff POSITION UNCERTAINTY 
FROM 0.1 FPS VELOCITY UNCERTAINTY 390 FT 
AERODYNAMIC VARIATION 
ATMOSPHERIC UNCERTAINTY a 6000 FT f 30% DENSITY 
- UD UNCERTAINTY 
- BALLISTIC UNCERTAINTY am 1600 FT f 8% WQA 
i. 4900 FT f 2" AT 9" ANGLE OF ATTACK (f 22% UD) 
RSS = f 1700 FT 
= f 7900 FT 
= f 0.28 NM FROM TARGETING 
P f 1.30 NM FROM AERODYNAMICS 
I = f 8100 FT 0 f 1.33 NM NET VARIATION I 
CONCLUSION: 3.54 N.M. CONTROL CORRIDOR AEOUIRED TO COVER ERRORS WITH 33% MARGIN 1 
The 3.54 nm net control corridor s ize  sets a m h h m  L/D requiramnt of 0.155 
for the entry vehicle when control paramtrics (Figure 6.4.3-1) are utilized. 
Figure 6.4.3-2 swmarizes the aerocapture heat- environment for this e n c m t e r  
conditim. 
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Figure 6.4.3-2 Earth Capture, -32 - Heating 
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6 . 4 . 4  EARTH AEROCAPTURE, C3=68 
T a b l e  6.4.4-1 smmarizes the error analysis concbcted for an Earth capture w i t h  
an encounter C3 of 68 lu~?/sec2. 
that conducted for the 8.0 lm-?/se$ Earth capture is in the dispersion 
sensitivity of the faster inccaningtrajectory. 
s m  because of a c m n  Earth e n v i r o m t  for entry. 
The primary difference hetween this analysis and 
The other dispersians are the 
T a b l e  6.4.4-1 Earth capture A e r m t r y  Error Analysis: C3=68 h-? /sec2  
EQUIVALENT 
PERIGEE ERROR 
TARGETING ERRORS 
(FINAL CORRECTION BURN AT ENTRY MINUS 1 HR) 
- POINTING ERROR = 134 FT f .1 DEG 
- CUTOFF ERROR = 1266 FT .33 FPS ACCELEROMETER 
- NAVERROR = 1026 FT f ROM 1020 FT POSITION UNCERTAINTY 
FROM 0.1 FPS VELOCITY UNCERTAINTY 384 FT 
AERODYNAMIC VARIATION 
- ATMOSPHERIC UNCERTAINTY = 6300 FT f 30% DENSrrY 
- UD UNCERTAINTY 7300 FT f 2' AT 9" ANGLE OF AlTACK (f 22% UD) 
- BALLISTIC UNCERTAINTY 3 1700 FT f 8% w/cD A 
RSS = f 1700 FT = f 0.28 NM FROM TARGETING 
= f 9800 FT = f 1.61 NM FROM AERODYNAMICS 
I = f 9900 FT = f 1.64 NM NET VARIATION I 
I CONCLUSION: 4.35 N.M. CONTROL CORRIDOR REQUIRED TO COVER ERRORS WITH 33% MARGIN I 
The 4.35 m net control corridor s ize  sets a minimUm L/D requirerent of 0.13 for 
the entry vehicle when control paramtrics (Figure 6.4.4-1) are u t i l i zed .  
Figure 6.4.4-2 summrizes the aerocapture heating e n v i r o m t  for this encounter 
c d t i o n .  
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6.5  AERQASSIST CONTROL SUbMARY 
The m t  of velocity reduction accqlished in an aeroassist has a direct 
impact on the amount of lift control available. 
function of the drag force for a fixed L/D, a larger aero-deceleration (drag 
directed) results in a larger cross ccmponent of lift. 
Figure 6.5-1 w h i c h  plots control corridor magnitudes for  given L/D values vs 
aeroassist velocity reduction for the Earth return case. 
Since the lift force is a 
This is i l lustrated in 
0 UD EFFECT VS AERO DELTA-V 
FOR GEO & LUNAR RETURN 
0 EXIT APOGEE = 245 NM 
0 CONTROL REQUIREMENTS 
FROM ERROR ANALYSIS / 
’ /’ 
/ 
0 ,  I I I I I I I 
6K BK 10K 12K 14K 0 2K 4K 
VELOCITY REDUCTION IN AEROASSIST ( FT I SEC ) 
Figure 6.5-1 Control vs Aero Delta-V: Earth Return 
The higher the aero AV the larger the control corridor (i.e. the larger the 
amount of trajectory control available). 
Earth return type missions, that is those w h i c h  return t o  a low Earth park orbit 
(245 nm) . The two missions for which error analysis (sizing the control 
corridor) have been conducted are indicated: GED return and lunar return. These 
pints indicate that while the control corridor requirenwts are growing for 
higher energy missions, the control capability from a given L/D grows at a 
faster rate. 
aeroassists. 
Figure 6.5-1 shows these trends for 
Thus the required L/D declines with increasingly energetic 
Figure 6.5-2 sumnarizes the growth in control corridor capability for Earth 
capture missions (those which capture an inccaning vehicle into a 245 x 38485 nm 
park orbi t ) .  As with the previous graph for the Earth return case, control 
capability grows steadily with increased aeroassist AV. Also shown are the 
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control corridor requirerents for the four capture conditions analysed ( C y  8, 
16, 32, and 68 lu$/sec2). Again, as with the Earth return case the growth in 
control requirmts w i t h  increasingly energetic missions is outstripped by the 
growth in control capability resulting in a net decrease in L/D r@remvlts. 
0 VD EFFECT VS AERO DELTA-V 
FOR EARTH CAPTURE 
0 ENTRY C3 = 8,16,32,68 
0 EXIT APOGEE = 38485 NM 
0 CONTROL REQUIREMENTS 
FROM ERROR ANALYSIS 
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0 2K 4K 6K BK IOK 12K I ~ K  16K 
VELOCITY REDUCTION IN AEROASSIST ( FT I SEC ) 
Figure 6.5-2 Control vs Aero Delta-V: Earth Capture 
Figure 6.5-3 sumnarizes the growth in control corridor capability for Mars 
capture missions (those which capture an incaning vehicle into a 270 x 18108 nm 
park orbi t ) .  
aeroassist AV. 
capture conditions analysed (CF 8.2, 13, 31, and 60 l d / s e c 2 )  . As before, the 
growth in control requirements w i t h  increasingly energetic missions is 
outstripped by the growth in control capability resulting in a net decrease in  
L/D requirerrrults. 
As before, control capability grows steadily with increased 
Also shown are the control corridor requirenrerrts for the four 
6.5 .1  MINIMUM L/D REQUIREMENTS FOR AEROASSIST 
Figure 6.5.1-1 shows the decreasing L/D requirements for increasingly energetic 
aeroassist maneuvers covering the three different entry missions. As the three 
previous figures have shown, the growth in control capability is faster than the 
growth in cmtrol  requirmts for 1aqe.r aeroassist AV's. All three aeroassist 
mission types are shown on this graph: Earth return, Earth capture, and frhrs 
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capture. 
offsets due t o  dynamic rate differences in the aeroassist processes. 
data one can see that it is the less energetic entries tha t  w i l l  be the mst 
diff icul t  t o  control. 
reduction manewers that are more efficiently corductedprcpdsively. 
Each of the mission classes shows the sam trends w i t h  vertical 
Fran this 
Fortunately, these are also the type of velocity 
6 .6  LUNAR -BRAKE DESIGN 
In order t o  mre accurately characterize the performance of the 
logistics vehicle a &sign w a s  undertaken of the lunax aerobrake. 
is based on lunar return parametrics, presented earlier, which are consistent 
w i t h  return f r m  low lunar orbit on a "free-retum" type  trajectory. 
landing and LJ libration point returns w i l l  not vary significantly frm these 
results. 
lunar 
This &sign 
D i r e c t  
6.6.1 LUNAR LtXD RELIEF 
After performing the lunar aeroentry error analysis and ccknparing it against the 
applicable control parametrics it was found that an L/D of 0.11 w a s  required t o  
maintain acceptable control margins. Unfortunately, this L/D level also results 
in significantly higher levels of peak deceleration than are encountered in 
typical GEO returns (4.8 g V.S. 3.5 9).  Since an implicit goal is t o  pr-ce 
the lunar lcqistics vehicle by a minimum nurrber of modifications t o  the baseline 
space based OTV, alternative aeroassist approaches were investigated for load 
rel ief .  
By analyshg the. load profile for a nc&.nal GEO vehicle when flown through a 
lunar return (next section), it w a s  found that t k  lower 25% of the control 
corridor contains a steeply rising peak load. 
steeply into the atamsphere and, thrcugh the use of a pr&amnan ' t l y  lift up 
condition, exit steeply out. Such an entry w i l l  go w r  ard encounter a 
faster onset of aero-loads than do entries w h i c h  OCN higher in the corridor. 
By m v k g  this lower 25% of the corridor these higher load levels can be 
eliminated. 
necessary t o  expand the control capability such that when 25% of it is 
eliminated, the remaining piece still spans the requirement. 
Trajectories in t k i s  region dive 
Since the basic control corridor rwre rnen t  remains it is 
When this control corridor expansion was performxi it resulted in a new corridor 
requirement of 7 . 3  nm w h i c h  equates t o  a new L/D of 0.14. 
is used in lunar entries the load profile shown in Fig. 6.6.2-2 results. 
flying i n  the upper 5.5 m of the corridor (the requirement f r m  error 
analysis), peak loads of 4.0 g's result. 
lesser OTV core structure mdificatians of only 64 lb. 
result in higher aerobrake weights &e t o  higher integrated heating. 
overall vehicle weighs slightly more, consistent w i t h  results presented in the 
first extension of this study. 
When this higher L/D 
By 
These loads result in substantially 
This technique dces 
The 
Since the aerobrake would have t o  be redesign& 
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anyway for lunar return the aT[y)uIlt of vehicle redesiq is minimized by keeping 
the core relatively unchanged. 
6.6.2 LUNAR R E l "  LOADS, L/D = 0.12 h 0.14 
Figure 6.6.2-1 shows the peak load profile spanning the control corridor for a 
vehicle returning fran the mon w i t h  an L/D of 0.12 (baseline m return vehicle 
value) t o  a Space Station pickup orbit at an altitude of 245 m. 
Figure 6.6.2-1 Lunar Loads, L/D = 0.12 
0 LUNAR RETURN 
( PRE-ENTRY APOGEE 
= 287700 NM ) 
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Figure 6.6.2-2 shows the peak load profile Spanning L e  control corridor for a 
vehicle returning frcin the m n  with an L/D of 0.14 to a Space Station pickup 
orbit at  an altitude of 245 nm. By restricting flight t o  the upper 5.5 m of 
the corridor, peak loads are reducedto 4 .0  9's. 
These t w o  figures illustrate the amount of load relief achievable with fair ly  
mdest increases in L/D. 
excess control for load relief.  
error analysis and is about the s a  for both 
oversizing the control capability in the lunar case the upper portion of the 
corridor can be used as the aperating fl ight envelop since it has mre Wgn 
vehicle loading. 
Figure 6.6.2-3 sumrarizes the basic principal of using 
The rnininarm control requirmt is derived f r m  
and lunar returns. By 
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Figure 6.6.2-2 Lunar Loads, GRelief: L/D = 0.14 
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Figure 6.6.2-3 Lunar Aero Load Relief 
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6.6.3 LUNAR AeROBRAKE CHARACTERISTICS 
T a b l e  6.6.3-1 surrrnarizes the Wrtant features of the lunar aerobrake. 
heaviest return payload w a s  used w h i c h  is the 15000 lb c r e w  mxhile. 
relief,  discussed previously, was used t o  reduce the peak deceleration loads t o  
4 .0  g 's .  
The 
Load 
T a b l e  6.6.3-1 Lunar Aercbrake Characteristics 
DIAMETER, FT 
W/CDA, LB/FT2 
L /  D 
ANGLE OF ATTACK, DEG 
PEAK g-LOAD 
TPSAREA, FT2 
RSI 
FSI 
PEAK STAGN. HEAT, BTU/FT~-SEC 
TOTAL HEAT LOAD, BTU/FT~-SEC 
TPS THICKNESS, INCH 
RSI 
FS I 
LUNARBRAKE 
45.2 
10.8 
0.14 
8.83" 
4.0 g 
149 
1641 
36.9 
4802 
0.92 
0.52 
GEO BRAKE 
44.0 
8.0 
0.12 
7.23" 
3.5 g 
149 
1553 
26.4 
3805 
0.77 
0.45 
Because the angle of attack is smwhat higher than for the return case, the 
aerobrake dimter must be increased t o  ccmpensate for the increased imping-ement 
angle. 
center core portion of the brake is the same s ize  as the GED brake, with the 
outer flex fabric annulus being increased in s ize  for the 1-r diarrrtter. 
peak stagnation heating is significantly higher than for the GEO brake but the 
flux is still  w i t h i n  the capabilities of both the rigid and flexible surface 
insulation (RSI & FSI). 
higher heat loads is shorn. 
This results in the brake being 45.2 f t .  in  diameter. The hard shell 
The 
The increase in TPS thickness t o  protect against the 
T a b l e  6.6.3-2 sunarizes the basic subsystem weiats for the lunar and GED 
return aerobrakes used on the space based OTV. 
used i n  performance aSsesSments of OTV lunar logistics. 
The lunar brake weight was then 
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Table 6.6.3-2 Lunar Aercbrake Weights 
OTV CORE - A  STRUCTURE CHANGES 
LUNAR BRAKE GEO BRAKE 
+64 
TPS WEIGHTS rc 
73 
~ 217 
120 
220 
169 
799 
160 
1092 
147 
894 
AEROBRAKESTRUCTURE 
RSI HONEYCOMB SUBSTRATE 
INTERFACE RING 
RADIAL BEAMS (1 2) 
SUPPORT STRUTS 
DOORS & AlTACH HARDWARE 
STRUCTURE TOTAL 
78 
264 
152 
283 
270 
1047 
1 TOTAL AEROBRAKE WEIGHT I 2299 I 1840 
ALL WEIGHTS IN POUNDS 
The core of the OTV increases by 64 lb over the basic GEO return vehicle due t o  
the higher aerodynamic loads encountered in lunar return. TPS weights increase 
because of higher heating but also because of the larger diarrreter of this 
aerobrake. 
brake. In the case of the radial beams and support struts the increased brake 
diameter also contributes t o  higher weights. 
was made for the mre canrplex door mscharu 'sms required t o  protect the 4-engine 
landing cluster. 
458 lb over the GUl return brake weight. 
The increased peak loads scale up the supporting stucture of the 
Finally an allocation of 100 Ib 
Overall, the lunar aerobrake weighs 2299 lb for an increase of 
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APPENDICES - PRELIMINARY m SAFETY ANALYSIS 
?he following two appendices contain the results of a preliminary safety 
analysis conducted for  the ACC OTV system. 
OTV preliminary hazard analysis charts. These charts address safety related 
issues for  the ACC OTV mission phases: Prelaunch, STS Ascent, OTV/STS Remkzvous 
Cprations, OTV Mission (payload delivery and return), STS/OTV Descent, and 
Postlanding Activities. 
date frm the preliminary safety analysis. 
allocations of top level safety requirerents t o  the various subsystems. These 
derived recpirerrents w i l l  be used as inputs for &velaping design and operations 
specifications and concepts. The attached requirements should be used in 
addition t o  the existing design, integration, and operations requirerents 
developed for  the OTV. 
Ilppendu< A contains sumnary level 
B contains the safety rqyirarents  derived t o  
These requirerents are generally 
Following each requirement is a referenced Preliminary Hazard Analysis Manber 
(PHA) . 
recpirenwt &rimtion. 
and evaluation of work acccanplished chrrhg the ini t ia l  Phase A period of this 
contract. It also included an analysis of the work perfonred by NASA and the 
advanced program study contractors supporting Aft Cargo Carrier (E), O r b i t a l  
Transfer V e h i c l e  (0, and the STS Cargo Bay integration of Gppr Stage V e h i c l e  
Analyses. while the current safety analysis is not ccanplete, it does provide a 
base l ine  for: (1) E'uture analyses, (2) Criteria for preliminary hardwa~ and 
s o f t m e  designs, (3) Systems and vehicle integration, and (4) The &vel-t 
of operations concepts, plans and reference missions. 
The PHA number refers t o  the hazard analysis that was the basis for the 
The preliminary safety analysis included the research 
13 1 
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APPENDIX B 
STS & ACC O N  
DERIVED 
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
B- 1 
B-2 
DERIVED REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ACC OTV 
(REQUIREMENTS ARE BASED ON PRELIMINARY 
OTV HAZARD ANALYSIS, PHA #'S INDICATED) 
REQUlREMENTS' 
A STRUCTURES AND MATERIALS 
1. The Orbiter Caution and Warning (C&W) system shall include a 
rapid OTV depressurization warning device. 
2. The pressurization system shall be designed so that no two failures 
results in a catastrophic overpressurization of the OTV volume. 
3. The OTV pressurized volume shall be designed to be Fail Safe. 
4. No two mechnical, electrical, or operator errors shall result in a 
catastrophic loss of OTV volume pressurization. 
5. No two failures shall result in failed ON commands to valves in 
pressure systems. 
6. Thermal control systems shall provide a two failure tolerance 
against freezing of liquid lines. 
7. No two instrumentation failures shall result in OTV fuel tank 
or associated hardware overhnder pressurization. 
8. All materials including seals, gaskets and lubricants used in flight 
equipment shall be compatible with system commodities. 
9. Pressure excursions caused by anomalous leakage rates shall be 
announced by the Orbiter C & W system. 
10. External structure shall be designed so that worst-case leakage 
shall not result in structural failure. 
11. Equipment which may be damaged during installation shall be 
equipped with suitable guards, cushions or other protective devices 
as appropriate. 
12. Equipment, systems, subsystems and fittings shall be designed to 
accommodate the sequence of their installation/attachment to a 
STS system or structure. 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
Note: All safety requirements include both manned, man-tended, and 
unmanned operations applications. It is assumed that any OTV may be 
called upon to support a manned operation. 
13. Sensitive switchedcontrols shall be physically protected 
from inadvertent activation by the use of guards, covers 
or other suitable means and shall be clearly marked, visible and 
remain accessible to the crew. 
14. Warning placards or labels shall be provided on all controls which 
are m t o  be operated during ground operations. 
15. Venting systems shall not vent incompatible substances at the same 
time and shall be purged, if necessary, prior to or after venting a 
known reactive substance. 
16. Venting systems shall be single failure tolerant against venting 
incompatible substances at the same time. 
B. JvlECHANlSMS 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
No single mechanical failure shall result in the loss of the ability to 
vent. 
No single electrical component failure shall result in the loss of the 
ability to vent. 
Docking/payload mating mechanisms shall be jam resistant. 
The engagement locks on docking mechanisms shall incorporate 
multiple load paths to insure safe engagement with a TBD margin of 
safety with one broken locking member. 
A means shall be provided for emergency unlock and disconnect 
from a damaged docking mechanism. 
Redundant power distribution buses shall not be routed through the 
same connector. 
Systems shall be designed with overload protection. 
All SNV used to control hardware movement or initiate hardware 
action shall be verified through analysis and/or test prior to 
acceptance. 
TBD factors of safety shall be incorpoprated into design. 
Conservative factors of safety shall be provided where 
critical-failure point modes of operation cannot be eliminated. 
No single failure or operator error shall result in 
premature/inadvertent deployment of the OTV. 
ACC-4/6- 1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-4/6-2 
ACC-4/6-2 
ACC-4/6-2 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-2-1 
B-4 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
There shall be no devices that create arcing or sparking during 
normal operations. Devices capable of producing arcing or 
sparking shall be single failure tolerant against such occurrences. 
Notification of the failure conditions shall be provided to the crew. 
Devices capable of producing hot spots that exceed the 
temperatures specified in the OTV PDRD shall be single failure 
tolerant against such occurrences. Notification of the failure 
condition shall be provided to the crew. 
Fuse/wire compatibility requirements shall be applied to prohibit 
the possibility of wire segments exceeding critical temperatures 
from all possible shorts. 
Fault isolation techniques shall be used to prohibit the possibility 
of shorting unfused circuitry to the ground. 
Where the return of a circuit is switched, both the feed and the 
return must be switched at the same time. 
No two events or operator errors shall result in irreversible/ 
complete loss of power. 
Power consuming assemblies shall be protected from power surges 
on the main feed lines. 
All SMI used to control the electrical system shall be verified 
through analysis and/or testing prior to acceptance. 
Multiple operator/control center actions shall be required to 
initiate discharge of pyrotechnic devices. Operator feedback shall 
be provided to indicate successful completion of actions preparatory 
to pyrotechnic discharge. 
No combination of two failures (including operator error) shall 
result in initiation of pyrotechnics devices where the results are 
potentially catastrophic. 2 
Where pyrotechnic devices can not be avoided, the NASA Standard 
Initiator (NSI) shall be the preferred device. 
Firing circuitry employed for pyrotechnic devices shall provide a 
minimum of 20 dB with (TBD) safety margin on electromagnetic 
interference (EMI). 
Hazardous gas detectors shall be provided in locations where 
release of a hazardous gas would pose a hazard. 
Orifice purge flows shall restrict hydrogen/air ratios below 
explosive limits. 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-2- 
ACC-2- 
ACC-2- 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-2- 1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
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C. 
25. No single failure shall result in the presence of a potential ignition 
source. 
26. Where hazardous gases may pose a potential combustion or 
explosive threat, electrical equipment shall be designed to 
explosion proof standards or "intrinsically safe" standards. 
27. Electronic components that require power during ascent shall be 
designed and/or qualified to the criteria of NSU81 -M082. 
THERMAL CONT ROL SYSTEM 
1. OTV heat rejection capabilities shall be single failure tolerant. 
2. All S/W used to control the thermal subsystem shall be verified 
through analysis and/or test prior to acceptance. 
D. QTV/ORBITER AND OTWPAYLOAD INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
1. No single sensor failure shall result in premature Caution and 
Warning (Caw) activation. 
2. No single electrical failure shall result in premature C&W 
activation. 
3. The alarm limits to which the sensors are set shall reflect the 
environment in which they are operated and the degree to 
which they will monitor for safe conditions. 
4. All S/W used to control or monitor OTV information systems 
and/or interfaces shall be verifed by analysis and/or test prior to 
acceptance. 
5. No single sensor failure shall result in the loss of the C&W 
system's ability to detect a hazardous condition. 
6. No single electronic failure shall result in loss of the C&W system's 
ability to function. 
E COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACK ING 
1. Procedures (including checklists) and crew training will be 
developed and implemented to insure all crew members are 
familiarized with the correct operating and safety procedures. 
Specific controls are TBD. 
2. All SMI used to control or initiate communications and/or 
tracking systems action shall be verified through analysis and/or 
test prior to acceptance. 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1- 
ACC-2- 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
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3. Loss of optical or sensor reference or alignment capability in ACC-4/6-1 
general will require that all engagement or proximity operations be 
stopped/suspended and equipment/platforms/payloads/OTV be 
brought into equilibrium until problem has been corrected. 
4. The OTV shall have continunous ground command and control 
capabilities during all Orbiter proximity operations 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
All SMI used to control the propulsipn system shall be verified 
through analysis and/or testing prior to acceptance. 
No two mechanical component failures shall result in 
premature/accidental engine firing. I 
No two electrical component failures shall result in 
premature/accidental engine firing. 
No TBD number of operator errors shall result in 
premature/accidental engine firing. 
No two mechanical, electrical, or operator failurederrors shall 
result in the loss of the ability to perform collision avoidance 
maneuver(s). 
The electrical control system shall be able to diagnose electrical 
failures that will cause failure to fire or improper firing and 
reroute signals, etc., in order to perform the required 
maneuver(s) in the required time. 
G. FNVlRONMFNTAl CONTROL S Y S m  
1. No single electrical component failure shall result in loss of the 
ability to detect a fire given the condition that the fire has started 
and may have affected the fire detection system at any location. 
2. No single sensor failure shall result in premature fire suppression 
system activation. 
3. The fire suppression system shall be an arm/fire system. 
4. No single equipment failure shall result in a critical hazard. 
5. No single electrical, mechanical, or operator failure/error shall 
result in premature fire suppression system activation. 
6, All SNV used to control the fire detection and suppression system 
shall be verified through analysis and/or testing prior to 
acceptance. 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6- 1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6- 1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Cryogenic surfaces shall be insulated to preclude condensation ACC-1-1 
of air. 
Controller/valves shall be fail safe such that the STS crew ACC-4/6-1 
and/or OTV payload are not subjected to any increased hazardous 
risk. 
The amount of any reactive gases released into the OTV compartment 
shall not result in an average concentration greater than 25% of 
the lower explosion limit. 
ACC-1-1 
The total available volume of combustible gas released into the ACC-1-1 
an enclosure and ignited in the worst case concentration should not 
cause the structural damage of the enclosure by exceeding the 
compartment proof pressure. 
Provide for containment of shrapnel within the package interface of 
any major assembly which may require an enclosure with an 
explosive mixture of hydrogen (or other hazardous gases) leakage. 
Sizing of tubing or connectors shall be such that they are 
impossible to cross-connect. 
No two credible seal failures shall result in the release of 
hazardous gases or fluids. 
H. MAN-SYSTEMS 
1. Radiation calculation baselines shall include: 
a. The galactic cosmic radiation environment shall be as defined 
by Adams, et.al., in NRL Memorandum 4506. 
b. A reference orbit of 140 NM shall be the OTV park orbit. 
c. Uniform shielding of 100 mils aluminum from internal 
equipment shall be assumed and factored into dose 
calculations for pressurized volume. 
d. No uncertainty factor shall be applied to the proton and 
electron spectra. 
e. The trapped electron spectrum shall be calculated using 
NSSDC AE-8, May 1985, and magnetic field values for 
1970 
The trapped proton spectrum shall be calculated using 
NSSDCWDC-A-R&S 76-06, AP-8-Trapped Proton 
Environment for Solar Mazimum and Solar Minimum's, and 
magnetic field valure for 1970 (Epoch 1970). 
f. 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
TBD 
TBD 
TBD 
TBD 
TBD 
2. Equipment having an EVA interface shall meet JSC 1061 5, "Shuttle ACC-4/6-1 
EVA Description and Design Criteria.'' 
3. All other man-svstern requirements are TBD. TBD 
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1. FLUID MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
1. System connectors shall be keyed or sized so that it is physically 
impossible to connect an incompatible commodity or pressure 
level/vessel. 
2. Color coding of pressure vessels, pipes, tubing and connectors shall 
conform to TBD upon delivery of articles. 
3. All liquid and gas systems shall be designed to permit leak testing 
after installation. 
4. An isolation shutoff valve shall be installed in each system supplied 
from a common liquid or gas pressure source. 
5. All materials including seals, gaskets and lubricants used in flight 
equipment shall be compatible with the system commodity. 
6. Perform off-gas testing prior to space flight use. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Perform analysis to identify areas of sensitivity to 
hardware-induced software errors (bit-changes, errors, etc.). 
Where sensitivity is identified, implement verification measures 
(such as command redundancy, command/compliment schemes, 
etc.) commensurate with the controlled function criticality. 
Provide SNV pre-use checkout capability. 
Provide redundancy for critical software functions (Le., function 
capability simultaneously present in two or more processors). 
Implement SMI such that two or more processors are required to 
initiate a potentially hazardous event sequence. 
Utilize modular SNV design and structure to enhance 
comprehension of decision logic. 
Utilize write protected memory locations for critical software. 
Protect SNV that controls interrupt priorties against inadvertent 
overwrite. 
lnitilize all unused memory locations to a pattern that, if executed as 
an instruction, will cause the system to revert to a known safe 
state. 
Evaluate all software interrupt priorities for safety impact. 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6- 1 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-1-1 
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13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Identify singularities (potential division by zero, etc.) associated 
with critical S/W modules. Verify that potential singularity 
occurences will return the system to a known safe state. 
Verify critical SNV modules by test. 
Incorporate provisions in safety critical software modules to 
ensure that errors resulting from on-orbit compilation of 
additional SNV does not overwrite, invalidate, or otherwise render 
the critical SNV ineffective. 
Provide S/W control where system response is time critical. 
Implement initiation of potentially hazardous event sequences such 
that: 
a. No hazardous sequence can be initiated without operator 
intervention. 
b. Two or more operator actions are required to initiate any 
potentially hazardous sequence. 
Provide capability for operational checkout to testable critical 
system elements prior to exceution of a potentially hazardous 
sequence. 
Protect SAN against hardware induced errors. 
1. Provide redundant source of power for critical 
systems/equiprnent/components. 
2. Utilize redundancy via other OTV/STS processors for critical 
functions. 
3. Provide processor self-test capability to verify processor 
integrity prior to initiation of potentially hazardous event 
sequences. 
4. Subsystems or materials subject to degraded performance or 
failure due to environmental extremes shall be provided with active 
and/or passive thermal control with failure tolerance levels 
consistent with hazard potential. 
L. MFCHANlCAl GROUND SUPPORT FQUlPMFR 
1. Design shall include a scupper to catch leaking or spilled transfer 
fluid. 
2. Service lines/hoses shall be of sufficient length to provide remote 
operation of pressure control panel. 
B-10 
~~ ~ 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-4/6- 1 
ACC-416-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-4/6-1 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-4/6- 1 
ACC-416-1 
ACC-2-1 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
Lines and fittings shall be designed to withstand pressures at least 
four times maximum working pressure without rupture or burst. 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
3. 
4. Tubing shall be stainless steel per KSC-SPEC-0007, fabricated 
and installed per KSC-SPEC-0008. 
5. Pressure connections for tubing shall be in accordance with MC240 
or MS33649. 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 6. Tubing shall be proof pressure tested to 1-1/2 times maximum 
working pressure by hydrostat or 1 4 4  times by pneumatic. 
7. Material in contact with fuels, oxidizers or combustible gases shall 
be selected, tested and certified per NHB 8060.1. 
ACC-1-1 
Control system shall be equipped with an emergency stop switch. ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 
a. 
9. All components including structures should be constructed of 
compatible material that is not subject to oxidation. 
10. Control stations should be designed to conform to MIL-STD-1472, 
Chapter 5. 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 11. Controls for critical functions should be designed and located in a 
manner not susceptible to inadvertent operation. 
12. Provide locking and tested tiedowns capable of restraining 
anticipated loads with a satety factor of 5:l ultimate. 
ACC-1-1 
NOTE: Special requirements for air transport of pressurized 
vessels and hazardous chemicals are listed in AFR71-4 and U.S. 
Code Title 49, Exemptions and waivers may be required. 
13. 
14. 
OTV mating to launch vehicle design shall provide for handling by 
two or more personnel and/or mechanical means. 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 Hoistbane design shall include positive failsafe braking system, 
finite controls and capability to lift a minimum of five (5) times 
maximum anticipated load. 
15. 
16. 
HoisVcrane line shall be sized to carry a suspended load of at least 
five (5) times maximum anticipated load. 
ACC-1-1 
ACC-1-1 Positioning of loads shall be facilitated through use of center of 
gravity identification, matching guidelines, identification of 
attaching points, etc. 
17. All designs shall avoid the use of carbon based lubricants and 
minimize friction points. 
ACC-1-1 
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18. Test sets should be cleaned for oxygen service per MSFC-SPEC-164. 
19. All valves and controls should conform in shape, size, and mode of 
operation as outlined in MIL-STD-1472. 
M ELEC TRICAL GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 
1. Provide ventilation and/or air conditioning commensurate with 
component environmental requirements. 
2. System controls/panel design shall conform to MIL-STD-1472, 
Section 5.4. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7.  
8. 
9. 
10. 
OTV shall be shut down, except for required avonics, power, and 
command and control systems, and be orbitlattitude stabilized 
prior to TBD feet of Orbiter rendezvous. 
During Orbiter proximity operations, there shall be continunous 
Ground Control Center monitoring and control capabilities of the 
OTV. 
The OTV shall have all fuel tanks vented, sealed, and all associated 
lines purged prior to Orbiter proximity operations. 
The Orbiter Crew shall assume control of the OTV for all proximity 
operations. The control zone shall be TBD NM in any direction 
of the Orbiter. 
The OTV water collection tanks shall be dumped no later than TBD 
hours prior to Orbiter rendezvous. 
The OTV shall not impact any other element envelopes within the 
Orbiter Cargo Bay. 
The Orbiter shall be required to approach/depart the OTV. The O W  
shall not fire its ACS or MPS unless necessary to protect the Orbiter 
and/or its crew. 
The crew shall have direct line-of-sight viewing of all proximity 
operations which involve docking or berthing, including an 
unobstructed view of the approach and departure paths. 
For all proximity operations a crew member shall be required to 
actively monitor and exercise command and control of the OTV. 
The OTV shall be equipped with visual ranging cues 
(markingdtargets of known dimension)visible to the Orbiter crew 
along the OTV's normal approach path. 
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ACC-1-1 
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11. The OTV shall provide for nighttime visibility for proximity ops. ACC-4/6-1 
12. The Orbiter crew shall be trained in all aspects of OTV operations ACC-4/6-1 
prior to conducting on-orbit operations. 
13. Operations for dealing with potential collisions with orbital debri 
are TBD. 
TBD 
14. Operations for dealing with potential Orbiter collisions with the OTV ACC-4/6-1 
are TBD. 
15. A designated STS center shall be responsible for coordination ACC-4/6-1 
and integration of proposed OTV missions into the Orbiter's long- 
term planning effort. 
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OTV/AFT CARGO CARRIER REQUIREMENTS 
(THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE ALSO APPLICABLE 
TO STS AND SPACE STATION OPERATIONS) 
REQUlREMENTS 
OTV shall not impact other element envelopes assigned within 
the ACC (if any). 
ACC shall withstand natural and induced thermal and external 
acoustic environments. 
ACC shall withstand structural loads. 
ACC shall withstand aero loads. 
Compartmental hazardous gas content shall be less than 4% 
(safe compartments). 
ACC shall provide a breathable air purge during ingress of 
ground crew. 
ACC shall be purged prior to, during, and after ET cryogenic 
tanking. 
ACC shall provide capability to drain propellants at the pad. 
ACC flight subsystems' redundancy shall not be less than fail safe. 
Redundant components shall be physicialy oriented or separated to 
reduce the chance of multiple faillures from the same cause. 
Explosive devices shall be armed as near the time of use as is 
feasible with provisions for disarming. 
Pytotechnics and associated electrical circuits and electronics 
shall conform to STS Spec. JSC 08060. 
All ACC LRUs shall be accessible. 
ACC shall not violate the LH2 tank aft dome pressure requirement 
of 0.1 9 psi when LH2 tank is depressurized prior to loading. 
Power provided by the Orbiter (STS) shall not exceed 50 KWh. 
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16. ACC/PL mass properties shall be such that the mated orbiter and ACC-2-1 
ET/ACC is controllable with the orbiter flight control system 
during all mission phases (while the ET is attached to the STS). 
17. ACC shall accommodate the OTV with the environments (acceleration, 
vibration, acoustic, thermal, and pressure) specified in ICD 
2-1 9001. 
ACC-2-1 
18. ACC shall be able to carry a payload (OTV) mass of 55 Klb. ACC-1-1 
19. ACC shall provide the capability to carry a cargo with the following ACC-1-1 
dimensions: 25' Diameter, 15' Length 
20. ACC shall comply with the contamination criteria specified in 
ICD 2-1 9001. 
ACC-1-1 
21. The OTV shall be accessible for LRU replacement on the pad, while ACC-1-1 
mated to the ET/ACC. 
22. The ACC shall provide the capability for the following: 
a. Ground checkout and status of the OTV. 
b. Flight status of the OTV 
c. On-orbit predeployment checkout of the OTV. 
23. The ACC environmental protection system (EPS) shall: 
a. Protect the ACC structure from ascent heating 
b. Satisfy ice/frost accumulation limit requirement of 
1/16". 
c. Maintain P/L compartment within allowable temperature 
limits during ascent of TBD degrees. 
d. Maintain P/L compartment within allowable acoustic limits 
during ascent of TBD db. 
e. Maintain subsystem components allowable temperature limits 
of TBD degrees. 
of TBD BTU/G' sec. 
24. Purge, Vent, Hazardous Gas Detection Systems shall provide the 
following: 
a. Preventlmonitor hazardous gas accumulation. 
b. Condition payloads (OTV). 
c. 
d. 
Maintain compartments within allowable pressure/temperatures. 
Reduce acoustic levels in compartments. 
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25. Shround Separation System (SSS) shall: 
a. Sever the ACC shroud at the separation plane. 
b. Maintain positive control of the shroud during separation. 
c. Receive separation signal from and confirm separation to the 
STS Orbiter. 
26. Payload Accommodation System (PAS) shall: 
a. Provide ACC/payload interface (structural, electrical, fluid). 
b. Support cargo during ground processing, ascent, and on-orbit 
ope rations. 
c. Deploy payload. 
27. ACC Avionics Subsystem (AS) shall provide electrical power, data 
transfer, and commandkontrol for all ACC subsystems. 
28. ACC will not affect ET break-up altitude requirement. 
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